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Introduction:  Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are characterised by difficulties in 
social interaction. High functioning  (HF) adults with an ASD diagnosis often report subtle 
social cognitive difficulties. The main aim of the study was to develop and validate a novel 
measure of social cognition (The Strange Stories Film Task (SSFt) and in doing so 
overcome a number of limitations to available measures in the field.  
 
Method: The measure consisted of acted scenarios designed to capture the subtle 
mentalizing difficulties observed in adults with high functioning ASD. 20 participants were 
recruited to pilot the new measure. A final test set was produced and shown to a group of 
20 well diagnosed HFASD adults and matched controls. Participants also completed well 
established measures of social cognition and questionnaire measures of empathy, 
alexithymia and ASD traits. 
 
Results: The SSFt was more effective at differentiating the HFASD group from the 
control group showing greater levels of sensitivity. Group differences could not be 
attributed to general cognitive factors. The SSFt was associated with the traditional 
measures of social cognition. Performance on the SSFt was associated with measures of 
empathy and ASD symptomatology. No associations with alexithymia were observed.  
 
Conclusion: The SSFt is a potentially useful tool to indentify mentalizing difficulties in 
HFASD samples. In addition, the measure was sensitive to individual differences in 
mentalizing abilities in non-autistic adults. The SSFt showed adequate convergent validity. 
The elements of the measure targeting social interaction abilities rather than 
understanding proved the most sensitive. These findings are discussed with regard to 
clinical implications and future research.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Autism Spectrum Disorders 
1.1.1 Autism Spectrum Disorder Diagnosis and Terminology 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases 4th edition (DSM-IV) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and the International Classification of Diseases, 
10th edition (ICD-10) (World Health Organization, 1992), use the terminology ‘triad of 
impairments’; difficulties in social interaction, communication and stereotyped behaviours 
(Wing, 1981; Wing & Gould, 1979), to describe Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). For a 
diagnosis to be made, symptoms must be present by the age of three. Asperger’s syndrome 
(AS) and autism are considered separate categories under the umbrella term of pervasive 
developmental disorders (PDD). Within these classification systems it is the presence (or 
lack thereof) of delayed cognitive and linguistic development that distinguishes childhood 
autism from AS.  
 
In 2013, the DSM-IV was revised and updated. Within DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) the term pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) has been replaced 
with an overarching category of ASD that collapses the diagnostic sub-categories into a 
single spectrum. The notion of a diagnostic continuum, being of greater explanatory power 
than a categorical system, has been favoured by some (Murphy, Beecham, Craig, & Ecker, 
2011; Wing, Gould, & Gillberg, 2011) while criticised by others (Tsai & Ghaziuddin, 2014). 
Of particular weight in favour of using a dimensional, rather than categorical, system is 
concern about the reliability with which information regarding severity of symptoms 
across the triad, IQ and linguistic abilities is used across different sites for diagnosis (Lord, 
Petkova, Hus, & et al., 2012)  In their multi-site study, Lord, et al. (2012) found that the 
distribution of autistic symptomatology as measured by the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedules (ADOS; Lord et al., 1989) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Couteur, 1994) were equivalent across sites. However, the 
distribution of diagnostic categories assigned varied substantially across site, despite each 
showing high levels of expertise. These findings suggest that the differences in 
categorisation are more influenced by clinician factors rather than standardised (and to 
some extent more objective) measurements.  
14 




In contrast, Tsai and Ghaziuddin (2014) have argued in their review, that the observed 
differences between autism and AS over a range of studies questions their integration into 
a unitary spectrum. These changes have a number of important effects including questions 
regarding validity (McPartland, Reichow, & Volkmar, 2012), impact on prevalence 
(Matson, Hattier, & Williams, 2012), and sociological impact e.g. the effects on the label AS 
being removed on the identity of such individuals (Wing, et al., 2011).   
 
For the remainder of this review the terms high functioning (HF) autism and AS will be 
used under the umbrella term of HFASD to reflect this change in thinking.    
1.1.2 Prevalence and Aetiology 
 
Rates of ASD have been shown in epidemiological research to be approximately 6-10 
in 1000 (Simonoff et al., 2008) and the gender ratio of male to females is approximately 
3:1 (Baird et al., 2006). Some theorists have considered ASD as being best described as an 
‘extreme male brain’ (Baron-Cohen, 2002), however the notion of a ‘female protective 
effect’ has also been evidenced (Murphy, et al., 2011; Robinson, Lichtenstein, Anckarsäter, 
Happé, & Ronald, 2013). 
 
Despite ASD being behaviourally defined, there is a consensus that the disorder is 
biologically-based. Twin studies yield concordance rates for monozygotic twins that are 
extremely high (between 70-90%) and for dizygotic twins the rate is substantially less, 0-
25% (Trikalinos et al., 2005). A recent meta-analysis suggests that environmental factors 
may account for more variance than previously expected (Hallmayer, Cleveland, Torres, & 
et al., 2011). The biological argument is furthered by the presence of a ‘broader autistic 
phenotype’, whereby autistic traits that are also present in the general population (Happé, 
Ronald, & Plomin, 2006) are elevated in family members of those diagnosed (Sasson et al., 
2013). Interestingly, this supports Kanner’s (1943) initial observation regarding the 
characteristics of the cases he described, being reflected in the parents’ presentations or 
personality (e.g. obsessionality). Advances in behavioural genetics have enabled the 
genetic underpinnings of the phenotypic heterogeneity observed in ASD to be better 
understood, for review see (Jeste & Geschwind, 2014). Similarly, advances in imaging 
technology have enabled structural differences in brain anatomy (Ecker et al., 2010) and 
15 
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atypical functional connectivity associated with the condition to be identified (Philip et al., 
2012, Travers et al., 2012)  
 
 
1.1.3 Cognitive Accounts of ASD 
 
There have been a number of cognitive accounts of ASD proposed over the last 30 
years. The three that will be briefly discussed are the executive function (EF; Hill, 2004), 
‘central coherence’ (CC; Happé & Frith, 2006) and theory of mind (ToM; Frith, Morton, & 
Leslie, 1991) accounts. Executive functions are a broad range of higher-order processes 
including updating, set-shifting, inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000) and working memory 
(Baddeley, 1992). Deficits in these processes have been shown in individuals with ASD 
(Hill & Bird, 2006) and some theorists argue that EF capabilities are necessary for later 
ToM capacities to develop (Pellicano, 2012). CC, is the tendency to process information as 
an integrated whole rather than as compartmentalised segments and the ability to 
integrate contextual information to form meaning (Happé & Frith, 2006). In ASD a ‘weak 
CC’ processing style affords a keen ‘eye for detail’ and has been linked to specialist abilities 
observed in ASD (Happé & Vital, 2009) although it may also impair social reasoning where 
integration of multiple cues guides interpretation of the social exchange (Vermeulen, 
2014)   
 
Initially research attempted to conceptualise the difficulties of people with ASD within 
a single account (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Russell, 1997), however recent developments from 
population level research have led some researchers to consider the triad of impairments 
best conceptualised as distinct and separable from one another (Happé, et al., 2006). Each 
cognitive theory therefore, may be unable to explain the entire constellation of ASD 
presentations (as it is not a unitary construct), but have differential explanatory power for 
the separate elements of the triad (for in-depth discussion on this issue see Brunsdon & 
Happé, 2014)  
 
The ToM account will be the focus of the remainder of this review. Of all the cognitive 
theories it has received the most attention with regard to explaining the atypical 
interpersonal style seen as fundamental to ASD. How ToM is defined and more 
importantly how it is measured will be the focus of the remaining literature review with an 
16 
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emphasis on recent measures that attempt to quantify subtle ToM difficulties within the 
HFASD population. 
1.2  Theory of Mind.  
 
ToM was traditionally defined as the ability to ‘impute[s] mental states to himself and 
to others’ (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p515) and was termed a ‘theory’ due to the fact 
that mental states are both unobservable and one can infer or predict behaviour from 
them (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM was first used in primate research and is still an 
area for current research (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Experimental work with humans has 
stimulated argument as to whether to regard ToM development as evidence for a domain-
specific ‘modularity of mind’ hypothesis (Fodor, 1981; Scholl & Leslie, 1999) or 
alternatively to see ToM as a construct influenced by domain-general processes such as EF 
(Pellicano, 2010, 2012), emerging over the course of development as a specialised 
cognitive function (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009).  
 
The definition of ToM, as above, has been broadened by theorists in the field of 
developmental psychology and researchers now use terms such as metalizing, mind-
reading or more broadly, social cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006). These newer definitions 
take into account the multi-faceted nature of the social world where integration of 
language, expression and, importantly, contextual information are required as human 
beings do not interact according to ‘if x then always y’ rules (Vermeulen, 2014). Such 
definitions also acknowledge the tension between ‘purely’ tapping a construct such as 
ToM and the additional cognitive demands of ever increasing ecologically valid tasks 
(Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000). When a broader definition is required for 
the remainder of the review, ‘mentalizing’ or social cognition will be adopted to reflect this 
trend in changing terminology (Tantam, 2014).  
 
For the purpose of this review, it is worth briefly mentioning the areas of the brain 
consistently associated with the ‘mentalizing network’ (Happé & Frith, 2013). The right 
and left temporo-parietal junction, precuneus, superior temporal sulcus and medial 
prefrontal cortex  (Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011 p705) are consistently 
activated by tasks that assess belief representation. Furthermore, atypical connectivity of 
this network is a hallmark of the biological basis for mentalizing difficulties observed in 
adults with ASD (Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009). Social cognition, by 
17 
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virtue of its complexity, requires additional structures that are involved in emotion 
regulation, responsiveness and recognition as well as mentalizing (Kennedy & Adolphs, 
2012). These are areas of importance when considering the wider concept of ToM and for 
further information see Happé and Frith (2013), Kennedy and Adolphs (2012) and Walter 
(2012).   
 
1.3 Assessing/Measuring Theory of Mind 
1.3.1 False Belief Tasks  
 
The seminal work of Wimmer and Perner (1983) presented the ‘false belief task’ to 
measure ToM abilities in typically developing children. Within their paradigm, children 
are presented with a scene where a character (e.g. ‘Maxi’) leaves a desired item (e.g. some 
chocolate) in one location (e.g. the cupboard) and then leaves the scene. While he is away, 
Maxi’s mother comes into the scene and moves the chocolate. Upon Maxi’s return, the 
children are asked ‘Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?’ The authors argue that to 
pass, the children had to be able to represent a belief (Maxi thinks the chocolate is in the 
cupboard) that is distinct from their own regarding the situation, or possess a first-order 
ToM. They found that typically, around the age of 4, children passed this task and 
subsequent meta-analysis of false belief paradigms have revealed that age is a consistent 
predictor of task performance and differing results cannot be ascribed to ‘procedural 
differences’ e.g. whether a doll or a cartoon is used (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
 
The paradigm was first used with young people with ASD by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and 
Frith (1985) who showed for the first time that 80% of children with ASD failed the ‘Sally-
Anne’ task whereas 85% of neurotypical children (matched for ‘mental age’) and children 
with Down’s syndrome (matched for chronological age) passed. This result suggests that 
young people with ASD were unable to represent the mental states of other agents or 
lacked a ToM (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985) and it was hypothesised that this deficit 
explained the impairments in social behaviour and imagination, characteristic of ASD (Hill 
& Frith, 2003).  
 
A wealth of literature considering the pre-cursors to ToM development emphasising 
the roles of early social interactions such as joint attention and pretend play followed 
18 
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(Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Charman et al., 1997; Leslie & Happé, 1989) . Theoretically, the 
development of such behaviours (or lack thereof in ASD) was considered evidence for a 
‘meta-representation system’ account, necessary for later ToM development (Leslie, 1987; 
Leslie & Frith, 1988). While this theory has been well supported, it has not gone 
unquestioned (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Mundy & Sigman, 1989). Criticisms focus on 
whether the ‘Sally Anne task’ solely taps belief representation and inferring from this that 
it is a modularized cognitive system and, secondly, whether these abilities emerge around 
four years in typically developing children (Bloom & German, 2000). Firstly, the consistent 
association between domain general process (e.g. executive functions) with ToM 
development (Pellicano, 2007, 2010, 2012) questions the modularity assumption. 
Secondly, whether the false belief task itself is recruiting other cognitive processes has 
been debated (for more information on this debate see Bloom & German, 2000; Wimmer & 
Weichbold, 1994). Finally, the findings that 15 month olds pass the paradigm if looking 
time is analysed rather than verbal output (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), has led theorists 
to question when meta-representation emerges.  
 
A key point that arises from research into false belief tasks is that for ToM abilities to 
be accurately assessed at different ages and abilities, one needs to apply a 
developmentally sensitive measure (Baron-Cohen, 2000). The means by which ToM is 
assessed is therefore of paramount importance in understanding atypical social 
functioning. The pursuit of such methodologies are equally important when considering 
early detection of precursors to later ToM difficulties in infancy (Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008; 
Zwaigenbaum et al., 2009) as when assessing subtle ToM difficulties in adulthood 
(Roeyers & Demurie, 2010). 
 
Results from early false belief studies showed that although a high percentage of 
individuals with ASD failed the tasks (40-80%; Happé, 1995), the fact that some passed 
suggested that having autism was not synonymous with first-order ToM impairment 
(Happé, 1994). Baron-Cohen (1989a) investigated the performance of young people who 
could pass the original first-order false belief paradigm (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985) on a 
more sophisticated, second-order false belief task. The target question required an 
understanding of what ‘Mary thinks that John thinks’ (Baron-Cohen, 1989a) following a 
story where John’s belief has been updated unbeknownst to Mary (e.g. Mary holds a false 
belief about John’s belief). The entire autistic group failed on the task compared to just 
10% of the neurotypical control group and 40% of the young people with Down’s 
19 
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syndrome. However, Bowler (1992) suggested that successful performance on second 
order ToM is possible by adults diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome whose verbal 
abilities are within the average range.  
 
Compiling research investigating individuals with ASD performance on ToM tasks, 
Happé (1995) showed that individuals with ASD require a higher level of verbal abilities to 
pass false belief paradigms compared to typically developing youth. While the author was 
cautious not to ascribe a causal interpretation to correlation analysis, she suggested that 
individuals with ASD may be able to use their verbal abilities to ‘solve’ the false belief 
problem (Happé, 1995). The interpretation is supported by individuals with autism being 
able to explain their correct performance on second-order ToM tasks while younger 
typically developing ‘passers’ were not (Happé, 1995). Additionally, this points to an 
inherent association between linguistic performance and ToM, in that, to understand what 
is often being communicated by a speaker, a dynamic interplay between these two 
constructs is required (discussed in more detail below; Happé, 1993; Milligan, Astington, & 
Dack, 2007). These points are of particular importance to the current study as they 
suggest that instances where language is used in a pragmatic sense will cause individuals 
with ASD unique difficulties, but that verbal abilities are likely to play a role in 
performance (Happé, 1994; Sarah White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 2009).  
 
1.3.2 Overcoming Initial Problems with False Belief Tasks 
 
A fundamental flaw in early ToM tasks, which partially undermined the ToM 
hypothesis, was the intact ability of older, high-functioning individuals with autism who 
performed akin to controls (Bowler, 1992). These findings called for the development of 
more advanced ToM measures to capture the subtle difficulties of this able group. 
Overcoming ceiling effects on traditional false belief tasks was first evidenced by Happé 
(1994) Strange Stories (SS) paradigm. The measure was rooted in ‘relevance theory’ which 
positions inference at the heart of human communication (Sperber & Wilson, 2002).  
 
The decoding of verbal output is merely the first step to understanding, as it can often 
be undermined as in the case of irony. Meaning can therefore only be derived from a 
constellation of the verbal output alongside ostensive cues such as the speaker’s actions, 
gestures and intonation or the context of the social exchange (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). 
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For Sperber and Wilson (2002) it is the relevance of either external (e.g. gesture) or 
internal (e.g. memory) inputs that guide the individual’s inference of a particular meaning 
from the multitude possible in most social scenarios. The SS (Happé, 1994) used relevance 
theory to show comprehension of increasingly sophisticated linguistic concepts (simile; 
metaphor; irony) was associated with increasing ToM abilities because of the differing 
levels of inference needed to comprehend the intended meaning within each concept 
(Happé, 1993, 1995).  
 
The SS consists of 24 short vignettes that include two examples of 12 forms of 
figurative language: Idiom, mixed emotions, misunderstanding, deception, forgetting, 
appearance reality distinctions, verbal irony, persuasion, joke, double-bluff, pretence and 
white lies. Control vignettes that required non-mental state reasoning to answer correctly 
were included to enable domain general processes to be accounted for and isolate unique 
difficulties with linguistic concepts that required mental state inference. Happé (1994) 
found that autistic individuals’ performance on the SS was related to performance on 
traditional first-order and second-order false belief tasks. However, even the most 
intellectually able individuals with ASD were outperformed on the SS by all other control 
groups. When stratifying the results by incorrect responses, but still including reference to 
mental states (e.g. thoughts and feelings), the able ASD group responded with significantly 
more incorrect mental state answers. Shorter paradigms have included fewer stories and 
developed continuous rating systems (Fletcher et al., 1995; White, et al., 2009), which 
encourages use in a wider range of settings (e.g. clinical assessments).  
 
A recent meta-analysis suggests that the SS are useful in differentiating ToM abilities 
in adults with HFA along with the ‘faux pas test’, a vignette-based measure requiring 
participants to judge whether a social faux pas has been committed (Chung, Barch, & 
Strube, 2013).  The SS are sensitive to developmental changes in ToM across middle and 
late childhood (Devine & Hughes, 2013), and have been shown to be related to reading 
comprehension (Ricketts, Jones, Happé, & Charman, 2013). IQ is significantly associated 
with performance in a number of studies (Dziobek, et al., 2006; White, et al., 2009)  
 
The SS are not without limitation however. The vignette design of the task undermines 
its utility, as the assessment of real social stimuli (e.g. facial expression, intonation) is not 
demanded. Furthermore, participants are given as much time as is necessary to process 
the material, making it deviate further from the fast-paced nature of social interaction, 
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which may explain why individuals ‘pass’ yet still struggle in day-to-day scenarios 
(Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013). A number of studies were also not included 
in the aforementioned meta-analysis that compared the performance of adults on the SS. 
Senju et al., (2009) found differential gaze-inferred predictions in the ASD group to a 
standard false belief task and White, et al. (2009) revealed greater response latencies in 
the ASD group. This provides evidence for the notion that adults with HFS/AS may use 
compensatory strategies or alternated cognitive routes to ‘pass’ ToM tasks in the 
laboratory that would differentially affect real time social understanding (Bowler, 1992 
208).  
 
The SS has been the platform for conceptually similar measures that include dynamic 
material. One recent example is the ‘Silent Films task’ that took clips from a 1920’s silent 
film (Devine & Hughes, 2013), using incidences where the character’s behaviour could be 
best understood with mental state attribution e.g. misunderstanding. The measure is 
clinically useful as there are only 5 clips and each is short (M=25secs). Convergent validity 
was established as performance correlated with the SS task, and inter-rater reliability was 
good (Devine & Hughes, 2013). The large sample enabled performance on the measure to 
be mapped onto a single ToM latent variable confirmed by factor analysis (Devine & 
Hughes, 2013). The nature of the stimuli is problematic however, for high functioning 
adults with ASD that have subtle impairments. 
 
 Firstly, the emotional expressivity in Devine and Hughes (2013) task is exaggerated as 
one would expect from a 1920’s silent comedy. The slapstick quality makes the ecological 
validity for the measure questionable. While it is an old film and the sample young, prior 
exposure to the material in an adult sample (e.g. the plot and/or storyline) could affect 
comprehension. The range of mental state concepts is also limited by its brevity. While the 
absence of verbal information make the inferences of the character’s behaviour reliant on 
integrating context, facial expression and body language the absence of control clips 
makes falsifying central coherence (Frith & Happé, 1994) as an explanatory variable in 
task performance challenging. The conceptual framework is useful however, as the 
measure is specific and focused on beliefs. The clips are short enough to place minimal 
demands on working memory and do not require updating a narrative or plot to 
understand the mental states being presented. Such advantages, make it a purer ToM 
measure than is often seen when using dynamic stimuli (Heavey, et al., 2000). 
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The ‘Frith-Happé’ triangles (F-HT; Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000) is another non-verbal 
paradigm, in which participants view two animated triangles interacting with one another. 
The triangles’ interactions were designed to be best described as random, goal directed 
(e.g. following) or intentional (e.g. persuading) and performance on the task was first 
shown to differentiate children with and without ASD (Abell, et al., 2000). Castelli, Frith, 
Happé, and Frith (2002) showed the animations to 10 adults with HFASD and compared 
their responses to matched controls finding that adults with HFASD were only 
differentiated on the intention animations. Individuals with HFASD were both less 
accurate and less likely to use psychological state talk (PST) when describing the 
animations’ interactions. The findings evidenced the imbuing of geometric shapes by 
controls with intentions, and activation of the ‘mentalizing’ network despite the absence of 
any ‘sentient’ interactions. Conversely, this finding was not observed in the HFASD group. 
Finally, the reduced use of PST in communicating about interactions is of particular 
relevance to the conceptualization of HFASD and separates this group from controls. The 
short and applicable nature of the test makes it a useful measure however, the lack of 
ecological validity undermines its utility in the pursuit of an appropriate measure of subtle 
ToM impairments in HFASD (Dziobek, 2012).    
 
1.3.3 Mentalizing and Emotion Recognition: More Ecologically Valid? 
 
A range of mentalizing tasks were developed to bridge the gap between the laboratory 
and the social world that primarily focused on emotion recognition, including assessing 
such inferences from ‘vocalizations’ (Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002) or 
from photographs of the eye regions alone e.g. the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task 
(Eyes; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). The latter has been shown 
to be effective overall at identifying mentalizing difficulties in adults (Chung, et al., 2013). 
However, a recent critical review of the measure has suggested that the task’s validity as a 
measure of mentalizing is undermined by the choice of stimuli (actual mental states of the 
images are unknown and were decided upon via consensus) and the distracter questions 
enable an alternate route to performance e.g. by exclusion (Johnston, Miles, & McKinlay, 
2008). Furthermore, the role of VIQ has seldom been analysed yet a recent meta-analysis 
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Whilst using dynamic stimuli may make emotion recognition more ecologically valid it 
does not necessarily make it more challenging for those with ASD (Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 
2007). Of interest for the current study, emotion recognition was differentially harder for 
young people with ASD when only visual or prosody derived cues were available 
compared to when verbal or a combination of all forms was presented (Lindner & Rosén, 
2006). These findings suggest a preference for verbal ostensive clues when decoding 
emotional stimuli.  
 
Interestingly, no interaction effects between the HFASD individuals and controls were 
observed when ‘neutralising’ the eye/mouth region of images depicting a range of facial 
emotional expressions (Back, et al., 2007). Thus, while the ASD groups’ performance was 
poorer overall, removing information from the eye region or the mouth region affected 
both groups’ performance (Back, et al., 2007) suggesting that non-verbal ostensive cues 
also aid individuals with ASD’s performance. This group difference disappeared when the 
eyes were viewed in isolation (Back, et al., 2007), contradicting the findings of Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al. (2001). Finally, the largest study to date revealed that on a 
test battery of visual and auditory (both verbal and non-verbal) emotion recognition tasks 
no differences were found between ASD and control groups and the pattern of errors did 
not differ (Jones et al., 2011). These mixed findings highlight that the availability of both 
non-verbal and verbal ostensive cues affect emotion recognition for individuals with and 
without ASD and that the role of VIQ may be of particular importance even in seemingly 
non-verbal tasks, suggesting again its close relationship with ToM (Milligan, et al., 2007). It 
may be the identification of complex emotions that are more challenging for those with 
HFASD (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006). Alternatively, the emotions displayed in 
these paradigms were congruent with the ostensive cues available and thus situations 
where these contradict one another (as in sarcasm) may lead to particular challenges for 
individuals with ASD.  
1.4 Ecologically Valid Tasks of Social Cognition. 
 
The problem of assessing subtle ToM difficulties in an ecologically valid manner has 
led to a conceptual divide as to whether one should prioritise limited, but natural 
interactions (Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001) or theoretically tailored, but acted 
stimuli (Dziobek, et al., 2006). The following sections will endeavour to cover this divide 
and highlight the strengths and weakness of both approaches. 
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1.4.1 Empathic Accuracy  
 
The empathic accuracy paradigm was developed from the social psychology literature 
and could be argued to be the most naturalistic form of ToM task to date (Roeyers & 
Demurie, 2010). The paradigm was developed by Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette & Garcia 
(1990) and involves secretly filming naive participants [targets] having a conversation 
while waiting to take part in an expected experiment. The targets then watch their 
conversation back and write down their thoughts and feelings at specific moments in the 
conversation. The term ‘empathic accuracy’ is the discrepancy between the target’s 
retrospective mental states and the study participant’s inferences of them when watching 
the conversation at a later point (Ickes, 1993).  
 
Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal (2001) first applied the paradigm to individuals 
with pervasive developmental disorder and then specifically individuals with AS (Ponnet, 
Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der Heyden, 2004) and revealed that the ASD 
participants only showed difficulties relative to the controls in unstructured 
conversations. Thus, when the next logical path of a conversation can be expected or 
predicted, the mental states associated with it can be more readily inferred. For HFASD 
individuals, positive and neutral valence was beneficial to performance in more structured 
social exchanges (Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & Clercq, 2008). An important finding for the 
current study was that when the targets’ internal states were incongruous with 
observable cues, these were the hardest to decipher (Ponnet, et al., 2008). The original 
paradigm has also been used with adolescents with ASD replicating the findings (Demurie, 
De Corel, & Roeyers, 2011).   
 
The empathic accuracy paradigm has enabled the naturalistic assessment of social 
interaction that has demonstrated good reliability and validity (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & 
Teng, 1995). However, the nature of a brief conversation with a stranger is less likely to be 
associated with particular linguistic constructs that people with ASD may struggle with 
(e.g. deception; Happé, 1994) especially as incongruence between the content of the 
internal state and the observable cues predicts poor performance (Ponnet, et al., 2008). 
The generic nature of the situation may also lead to a narrowing of potential internal 
states being experienced. Furthermore, the conversational content can only be as 
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sophisticated as one member of the partnership’s social skills permit (Ponnet, Buysse, 
Roeyers, & Corte, 2005). For these reasons, while the empathic accuracy paradigm is 
heralded as the most naturalistic of social cognition tasks it is limited as a clinical tool by 
this strength.  
 
1.4.2 Social Cognition Measures using Dynamic Stimuli 
 
A number of studies have attempted to capture social cognition difficulties using 
dynamic stimuli. Table 1 below shows current tasks of social cognition that have utilised 
dynamic stimuli to assess social cognition abilities in the HFASD populations. 
 
  26 


























AMT UK  
advertisements 
(7) and TV 
series clip (1). 














HFASD <Controls, including some 
Memory questions. 
 
Intention yielded greater effects than FC 
ER questions.  
 
Only controls performance on AMT 
related to the SS and IQ.  
 
No group response latency difference  




HFASD group struggled 
with memory questions. 
 
Complex coding system 
for intentionality. 
 









RMFT 22 short film 
clips from 
feature films.  
FC ER Adults: 
22 HFASD 
22 Controls* 
HFASD < Controls 
 
Performance on RMFT related to VIQ, 
AQ and CMFVB 













MASC 15min video of 
4 characters 

















MASC group difference > Eyes, SS and 
ER task. 
 
HFASD=Controls on Memory Questions. 
 
No association with MASC and VIQ 
 
MASC associated with SS and ADI-R 
 



















Trained rater required for 
scoring 
 
Basic control questions. 
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Table 1: *Age, gender and IQ matched AMT, Awkward Moments Test, RMFT, Reading the Mind in the Films Task, MASC, A Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition, FC, Forced 




Table 1 cont: Characteristics of current dynamic social cognition tasks. 
 
Author Test Stimuli Scoring/ 
Question type 





ATOMIC 18 computer 
generated 
animations. 





HFASD < Controls, but not on CC or Memory 
questions. 
 
No difference between affective (feeling) 
and cognitive (thinking) ToM questions. 
 
Positive association between SS and 
ATOMIC 
 























Use of mental 
state words in 
narrative 
description of 
task, length of 
description, 





Lower frequency of mental state references 
in HFASD narratives and shorter overall. 
 
VIQ correlated with performance only for 
HFASD. 
 
Empathy scores correlated with only 



























HFASD < Controls, but not on ER questions. 
 
VIQ did not correlate with performance on 
TASIT. 
 
Only self-reported cognitive empathy 





Bespoke clips  







 Table 1. ** Opinion of the author. *Age, gender and IQ matched. ATOMIC, The Animated Theory of Mind Inventory for Children, MDFT, Moral Dilemmas Film Task, TASIT, 
The Awareness of Social Inference Test, FC, Forced choice, ER . Emotion Recognition. 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from reviewing the findings of the studies in 
Table 1. Firstly the studies consistently found mentalizing difficulties in the HFASD group 
compared to well matched controls (Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 
2009; Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008; Dziobek, et al., 2006; Golan, et al., 2006; Heavey, et al., 
2000; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013b). The convergent validity of the new 
measures were supported in most cases and a number of the tasks have been either 
replicated with other samples (Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 2008; Montag et al., 2011; 
Sparks, McDonald, Lino, O'Donnelle, & Green, 2010) or had meaningful forced choice 
versions created (Montag, et al., 2011). The majority of the studies employed forced choice 
questions. One concern with such designs is that orientating participants to consider 
feelings, thoughts intentions may differentially affect the degree of mental state language 
produced as compared to being unprompted (Callenmark, Kjellin, Rönnqvist, & Bölte, 
2013) and the deviation from day-to-day interchanges such directive probing creates.  
 
Administration time and scoring complexity are evident weaknesses however, to the 
studies that employed open-ended questions. VIQ did not undermine group differences on 
the social cognition tests, however, the studies yielded differing levels of associations 
between performance and verbal IQ within groups (see Table 1) questioning the 
necessary association of the two constructs. In the studies that did assess response 
latency, no differences were observed (Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008; Heavey, et al., 2000) 
suggesting that the HFASD individuals may be processing the material as automatically as 
the controls.  
 
A consistent limitation with all of the studies, was the lack of well-designed control 
items that matched the experimental stimuli in cognitive difficulty. Memory questions at 
times were employed but often reached ceiling (Dziobek, et al., 2006) and in some cases 
yielded group differences (Heavey, et al., 2000) highlighting the necessary inclusion of 
such material to conclude specific mentalizing difficulties from group differences.  
 
The majority of the studies also utilised pre-existing film material that is often highly 
dramatised or chosen because of affective content (Golan, et al., 2006). In such cases, 
defining the emotion displayed becomes a consensus decision and the naturalistic quality 
of the exchange is affected. The use of animated stimuli (Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008) 
undermines ecological validity and relevance to real world social exchanges, which has 
been argued as essential to understanding the social abilities of more able individuals with 
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ASD (Dziobek, 2012). Finally, one of the more psychometrically and theoretically robust 
measures was filmed in a non-English speaking country, with the English version being 
dubbed (Dziobek, et al., 2006). To the authors’ knowledge the dubbed version has not 
been validated with an English sample. Recent research from a Spanish (SP) dubbed 
version has yielded differing results from the original paper, with the Eyes test revealing 
greater group sensitivity than the MASC-SP (Lahera et al., 2014). With regard to the 
literature on preferential gaze in ASD samples to the mouth region(Ami Klin, Jones, 
Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003), dubbing stimuli may differentially affect ASD individuals when 
inferring mental sates from such material.  
 
Overall, a range of theoretically devised and well validated measures are currently 
available to assess mentalizing in HFASD. The limitations in appropriate control material, 
dramatised stimuli and designs limited to ‘short but forced choice questions’ and ‘lengthy, 
but open-ended questions’ suggests this area still requires development.   
1.5 Cognitive vs. Affective Empathy 
 
Empathy is a complex construct to define with no universally agreed definition, but is 
argued to be a central feature of ASD (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). A helpful 
heuristic in the empathy literature is dividing the construct into two psychological 
processes; cognitive and affective empathy (Davis, 1980; Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 
2013). The former is associated with abilities in representing the mental states of other 
people and in turn predicting their behaviour; such definitions share a clear similarity 
with ToM (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and researchers use the 
terms interchangeably (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007; Smith, 2009a). 
Affective empathy is an emotional state that is triggered in response to an observed or 
imagined emotional experience (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006).  
 
The two subsystems are hypothesised to be ‘related but independent’ (Rogers, et al., 
2007) , thus it is possible to have an affective response without a cognitive component and 
vice versa (Smith, 2006, 2009a, 2009b).  The fractionation or dissociation of these 
components of empathy has been particularly relevant to the ASD literature and in 
particular, dispelling the misperception that autistic individuals are generally lacking 
empathy (Huws & Jones, 2010; Smith, 2006) Furthermore, the interaction and biological 
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basis of these constructs has yielded a consistent pattern of brain regions that are 
associated, but distinct from each other (for a review see Walter, 2012)   . 
 
Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf & Convit (2007)compared a group of adults with a 
diagnosis with ASD with matched neurotypical controls on the interpersonal reactivity 
index (IRI); a self-report measure that differentiates between the cognitive and affective 
dimensions of empathy (Davis, 1983)They found a preservation or heightening of the 
affective components of empathy, with ‘personal distress (PD)’ being significantly elevated 
in the autistic group and ‘empathic concern (EC)’ being intact.  Conversely, the cognitive 
empathy dimensions; perspective taking (PT) and fantasising (F), were significantly lower 
in the ASD group. The profile of the ASD group suggested a greater sense of personal 
discomfort in difficult interpersonal situations, which is at odds with the lay conception of 
autistic individuals lacking empathy (Rogers, et al., 2007). The authors hypothesise that 
this heightened score may be related to difficulties in emotion regulation (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004) although other theorists argue that it reflects a genuine 
hypersensitivity to emotionally laden stimuli (Smith, 2009b).  
 
Interestingly, self-reported cognitive empathy was correlated within the control group 
to performance on the SS (Happé, 1994) suggesting that behavioural measures of ToM are 
associated with self-reported cognitive empathy. Mathersul (2013b) similarly found an 
association between questions on the TASIT pertaining to beliefs, intentions and meaning 
(ToM) and cognitive empathy as measured by a composite score of the IRI and Empathy 
Quotient (EQ). Affective empathy was only predicted by group (HFASD or control) despite 
an emotion recognition question being used as a predictor.  
 
In contrast to previous literature, Mathersul et al., (2013b) findings that affective 
empathy was reduced in individuals with an ASD is contrary to research data showing that 
empathy is intact (Dziobek et al., 2008; Rogers, et al., 2007) and or heightened (Smith, 
2009a). Importantly, Mathersul et al., (2013b) used a composite score from the EQ (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and only the empathic concern subscale of the IRI. The 
authors argue that compared to the personal distress sub scale for the IRI the empathic 
concern scale is a purer measure of affective empathy (Mathersul, et al., 2013b). However, 
the researchers’ differing concepts of what represents true affective empathy makes 
conclusion regarding whether it is reduced, intact or increased in ASD challenging (Smith, 
2009a).  
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Demurie et al., (2011) found an overall dampening of both cognitive and affective 
empathy in a group of adolescents with ASD as measured by the IRI. However, they also 
found unique discrepancies between self-reported and parent-rated cognitive and 
affective empathy subscales. While it is difficult to ascribe the direction of discrepancy 
(e.g. are the parents or individuals less accurate), only the ASD group significantly over-
reported their perspective taking abilities and under-reported their personal distress 
scores relative to parents. The literature on the reliability of self-report measures in adults 
with HFASD for emotional difficulties is mixed (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Mazefsky, Kao, & 
Oswald, 2011), and discrepancy studies have mainly investigated adolescents (Storch et 
al., 2012) .  
 
The observed dissociation between the cognitive and affective components of empathy 
in both experimental tasks and self-report measures has also been reported in children 
and adolescents with ASD (Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010) and in 
community samples that score highly on ASD trait questionnaires (Lockwood, et al., 2013). 
It is this distinct empathy profile that researchers argue distinguishes autistic individuals 
from psychopathic individuals (another pathology characterized by disturbances in 
empathy), where the opposite profile is observed e.g. low affective empathy and high 
cognitive empathy (Blair et al., 1996; Blair, 2008; Dolan & Fullam, 2004).  
 
Finally, this dissociation has been demonstrated in fMRI studies whereby components 
of the metalizing network showed reduced activation in autistic individuals when 
observing images of harm that was intentionally inflicted, coupled with heightened 
arousal (Fan, Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2013).  Furthermore, facial electromyography 
responses to emotional stimuli, which have been found to correlate with affective empathy 
(Sonnby–Borgström, 2002) have shown to be intact or heightened in autistic individuals 
(Magnée, De Gelder, Van Engeland, & Kemner, 2007; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 
2013a) However, Mathersul et al., (2013a) showed that when measuring autonomic 
arousal via skin conductance and changes in heart rate autistic individuals did not follow a 
typical trajectory but instead were ‘dampened overall’ (Mathersul, et al., 2013a p20) . The 
authors suggest one explanation could be a detaching from the affective stimuli to down 
regulate heightened arousal (Hadjikhani et al., 2014) as increased arousal has been shown 
when autistic individuals are exposed to social stimuli (Kylliäinen et al., 2012) 
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Overall, these findings suggest that ASD are characterised by reduced cognitive 
empathy profile, which supports the mentalizing/theory of mind literature. While not 
entirely consistent, the evidence suggests an association between some behavioural 
measures of ToM and the self-reported construct of cognitive empathy. Whether affective 
empathy is reduced or intact in autistic individuals is less consistent however at the 
physiological, cognitive, and behavioural level. That said, behavioural ToM measures 
appear to be consistently tapping a separate construct to self-reported affective empathy, 
as no previous research has shown an association between these two constructs. 
 
An alternate hypothesis to account for the inconsistent findings in research assessing 
affective empathy and emotion processing differences is that a confounding variable is 
accounting for the variance, rather than participant’s diagnostic category. Unmeasured 
alexithymia has been argued to potentially account for these observed differences (Bird & 
Cook, 2013) and is discussed in the next section.    
 
1.6 The Alexithymia Hypothesis  
 
Alexithymia is a trait defined as a person’s inability to identify and describe their own 
emotions (Taylor, Michael Bagby, & Parker, 1991) and within the alexithymia construct 
there are both cognitive and affective components (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, 
& Berthoz, 2010).  Alexithymia is common in a range of clinical groups, including those 
with eating disorders, psychosis and ASD. The suggestion is not that autism and 
alexithymia are a unitary construct, but that they overlap, thus the emotional difficulties 
observed in the ASD population can be explained by differences in alexithymia rather than 
ASD per se (Bird & Cook, 2013). Such a hypothesis would predict that individuals high in 
alexithymia traits would struggle in the areas of emotion recognition and empathy like 
those with ASD.  
 
Moriguchi et al. (2006) found that those high in alexithymia traits showed lower PT, 
EC and higher PD scores on the IRI and performed poorly on the Frith-Happé triangles 
task. In addition, Swart, Kortekaas, and Aleman (2009) found that those high in 
alexithymia traits scored lower on the EQ and were less able to recognise subtle emotional 
expressions. Within ASD samples, higher incidences of alexithymia have also been 
observed (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004) adding to the evidence that these two constructs 
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are related. It is important to add however, that the scales used to measure alexithymia 
(through self-report) have shown differing abilities to differentiate ASD from control 
groups at multiple time points (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). In Berthoz and Hill’s (2005) 
research the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) was 
deemed the most reliable self-report measure of alexithymia traits in their ASD sample.  
 
A number of research studies show alexithymia traits in those with autism being 
closely associated with differences in performance on both visual and auditory (both 
verbal and non-verbal) emotion recognition paradigms (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; 
Heaton et al., 2012) and a recent review supports these findings (Grynberg et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, once alexithymia was controlled for, group differences in activation of brain 
regions associated with observing others in pain did not remain significant (Bird et al., 
2010). However, some caution should be exercised when interpreting the findings. 
Heaton, et al. (2012) only reported correlations between the TAS-20 and emotion 
recognition findings and concluded that alexithymia could not account for all the specific 
difficulties observed in the ASD group. Again, while Fan, et al. (2013) found a correlation 
between alexithymia and affective empathy, it was not a ‘significant mediator in 
processing pain empathy’ (Fan, et al., 2013 p21). Finally, in the typically developing 
literature, recognition of non-verbal affect from prosody was not shown to be impaired in 
those high in alexithymia traits (Swart, et al., 2009).  
 
In participants with ASD both affective and cognitive subscales of the IRI have shown 
to be associated with alexithymia traits (Silani et al., 2008). In contrast, research using a 
large community sample showed alexithymia was not associated with difficulties in 
cognitive empathy observed in participants who showed high ASD traits, but was 
independently associated with affective empathy difficulties in those high in psychopathic 
traits (Lockwood, et al., 2013). Importantly, however, not all the variance in the latter 
finding could be explained by alexithymia (Lockwood, et al., 2013).   
 
Overall, the research suggests that alexithymia is less associated with the cognitive 
elements of empathy/ToM. No research has investigated the relationship between more 
sophisticated and ecologically valid measures of social cognition and how alexithymia 
traits relate to performance on such measures.  
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1.7 Successful Mentalizing Equals Appropriate Social Interaction?   
 
Even when people with HFASD can track others’ mental states they may have difficulty 
generating appropriate behaviours in an interaction. There is relatively little research on 
this topic, but research on moral cognition in ASD may be of relevance. 
A range of recent studies have begun to identify how HFASD individuals use their ToM 
abilities to make moral judgements (Zalla, Barlassina, Buon, & Leboyer, 2011), tailor their 
responses using mentalizing information, or respond to characters who might be in need 
(Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Roberts, & Channon, 2014; Yang & Baillargeon, 2013).. 
 
The ‘Above and Beyond (AaB)’ task developed by Jameel, et al. (2014), is a vignette-
based task describing characters in need e.g. a close friend breaking up with a partner. The 
researchers asked ‘What would you do in this situation?’ as a measure of unprompted pro-
social behaviour. They found that the participants high in ASD traits were less pro-social 
overall. The concept of pro-social behaviour is linked to Yang and Baillargeon (2013) ideas 
of ‘social acting’, which is where beliefs are decoupled from a speech act for the benefit of 
another (e.g. white lies). In both, the perspective of the other is overriding the perspective 
of the individual, and the former guiding behaviour. Yang and Baillargeon (2013) found it 
was ‘social acting’ and not mentalizing that predicted quality of social relationships. These 
findings highlight a gap in the ToM literature, which is particularly pertinent to the current 
study. Until recently, the focus has been mainly on internal state representation. How such 
knowledge is applied however, is equally important, especially when findings have shown 
that mental state inference can be highly successful in adults with HFASD (Ponnet, et al., 
2005) even though adaptive behaviour and abilities to maintain meaningful relationships 
can be limited (Palmen, Didden, & Lang, 2012).   
 
Another area investigating the relationship between behavioural responses and ToM 
is the field of moral decision making. Moran et al. (2011) has shown that adults with 
HFASD rate characters’ behaviour as less permissible only in vignettes that result in a 
negative outcome, but the behaviour is unintentional. Similarly, Buon et al. (2013) created 
silent cartoons where the characters’ intentions, responsibility and causal role in a 
situation were manipulated. The HFASD participants were more likely to ascribe higher 
levels of intentionality, responsibility and punishment in scenarios where negative 
outcomes were accidental. While Buon, et al. (2013) argue that, in part, this finding is 
related to reduced mentalizing abilities, both Moran, et al. (2011) and Buon, et al. (2013) 
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research suggests that for the more able HFASD participants, information regarding the 
character’s mental states is being undermined by outcome, which has also been shown in 
positive outcomes (Zalla & Leboyer, 2011). 
 
In all, these findings are particularly interesting as they point to a decoupling of the 
ability to understand others’ mental states and the ability to use this information to guide 
decision making and inform behaviour, which is not solely a bi-product of limited affective 
empathy (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013). Throughout all of this research, however, the use of 
paper tasks to measure mentalizing abilities in HFASD individuals suggests that their 
abilities may be being over estimated. Better measures of ToM would help tease apart 
those individuals who were unable to use this information to guide behaviour, even when 
passing more sophisticated measures of mentalizing.  
 
1.8 Aims of the Current Study 
 
The current study aims to develop and evaluate a new video-based mentalizing task 
that addresses a number of the gaps in the literature and can differentiate between adults 
with HFASD and matched controls. The Strange Stories Film Task (SSFt) will use dynamic 
stimuli, requiring real time processing of social exchanges with naturalistic emotional 
expressions in day-to-day scenarios, which are not exaggerated or unusual. The task will 
be designed to avoid the ceiling effects undermining healthy controls’ performance. 
Furthermore, the measure will focus on figurative language to build on the vast literature 
suggesting that metalizing difficulties are related to the degree of inference necessary to 
understand the communicated meaning of a speaker. The measure will include a 
behavioural response question to build on recent literature exploring the relationship 
between mental state inference and appropriate behavioural responses. To account for 
more domain general processes control questions and control clips will be included in 
which understanding of mental states is not necessary, but the appropriate integration of 
verbal/contextual information and recruitment of attention resources is required. To 
assess the validity of the new measure, traditional, well validated measures of ToM and 
emotion recognition will be included in the test battery. Similarly, self-report measures 
assessing potentially associated variables will be included (alexithymia and empathy) to 
further explore the relationship between these constructs in ASD and control populations.  
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1.9.1 Group Differences 
 
1. The HFASD group will show lower scores on the experimental stimuli compared to 
the control group. 
 
2. The HFASD group and the control group will perform equally on memory questions 
and all the control stimuli questions. 
 
3. The HFASD group will show lower scores on the SS, Eyes, F-HT but not on the TASIT. 
 
 
4. SSFt will be more effective at differentiating between the two groups than the SS, 
Eyes task, F-HT and the TASIT. 
 
1.9.2 Convergent Validity 
 
5. Performance on SSFt will be positively associated with the SS and the F-H T triangles 
,TASIT and the Eyes tasks. 
 
6. Performance on the SSFt will be positively associated with the PT and F subscale of 
the IRI, but not the affective subscales. 
 
7. Performance on the SSFt will be negatively associated with the TAS-20. 
 
8. Performance on SSFt will be correlated with reciprocal social interaction scores and 
communication scores on the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised in the ASD group, 
and the AQ in the controls.  
 
9. Performance on the SS, Eyes, F-HT but not the TASIT will be associated with the ADI-
R communication and social domains and the AQ. 
 
10. Performance on the TASIT and the Eyes will be positively associated 
 




12. The HFASD group will show lower scores on the cognitive domains of the IRI but not 
on the affective subscales. 
 
13. Performance on the SS and F-H T will be positively associated with the cognitive 
domains of the IRI but not the affective subscales. 
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14. The HFASD group will report higher levels of alexithymia than the controls.  
 














2.1 Devising the Strange Stories Film Task (SSFt) 
2.1.1 Scripts 
 
Scripts were informed by clinical experience, research literature and service user 
consultation A copy of the scripts can be found in Appendix 1. Prior to embarking on this 
project the author and second supervisor worked in an adult autism service, both 
providing psychological therapy and completing neuropsychological assessments. A 
repeated theme from service users struggling with social situations was surrounding 
language that was both non-literal and subtle; for example, when people are sarcastic, but 
do not exaggerate the fact. One service user reported his partner coming home (where he 
had spent the day working) and his belongings were everywhere. His partner stated “this 
is just perfect” so he left his items on the table, misunderstanding the intention behind her 
statement. This situation described by the service user was used as a basis for one of the 
verbal irony scenes.  
 
The SS devised by Happé (1994) were used as a platform to inform the types of 
situations and communication that individuals with ASD are likely to find challenging. It 
provided a guide to the overall structure of the assessment tool. It was the authors’ 
intention to avoid using clips from films (Devine & Hughes, 2013; Golan, et al., 2006; 
Heavey, et al., 2000) to control for the effects of prior exposure to the material, 
overdramatized expressions, distracting camera work (e.g. fast paced editing) and 
unrealistic scenarios that are unlikely to occur in day-to-day interactions. To reduce 
cognitive load, memory and attention, the scenarios and accompanying dialogue were 
intentionally kept short with the majority of scenes only consisting of a single utterance 
per character. Participant’s did not have to follow a narrative, plot or back story to answer 
the questions as is necessary in the MASC (Dziobek, et al., 2006) as each script was self-
contained.  
 
The language used in the scripts was kept as close to everyday spoken language as 
possible and complex or overly sophisticated vocabulary was avoided. When filming took 
place it was not always possible to adhere rigidly to the original script and the actors were 
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given artistic license to fine tune subtleties as long as the themes, affect and intended 
meanings were maintained. Similarly, at times body language, gestures and expressions 
were included that were not scripted to keep the clips from appearing ‘wooden’. The 
scripts were written to include day-to-day scenarios that adults were likely to be faced 
with in their lives. Scripts were intentionally written with different emotional valence 
including both positive and negative affect. Three or four scripts for each theme present in 
Happé (1994) SS were written to enable sub-optimal clips to be deleted from the final 
version.  
 
In addition, ten control scripts were written (for a copy see Appendix 2). These 
mirrored the experimental clips in terms of length, cognitive load and linguistic 
sophistication. However, they required logical reasoning, (e.g. economic decision making 
or natural phenomenon), to decipher the characters’ language or behaviour, rather than 
understanding of mental states per se, akin to the control vignettes used by Fletcher, et al. 
(1995) and White et al (2009).  
 
2.1.2 Actors  
 
An advertisement was placed on www.castingcallpro.com with an accompanying brief 
for the project. 83 applicants responded to the advert. From this 17 were deemed suitable 
and could make the 2 day audition period. Each was sent a brief of the characters and the 
project (see Appendix 3). The potential actors performed a range of scenes with the lead 
author and producer playing the other character. Each scene was filmed to camera. Of the 
8 applicants who attended audition, the final two were chosen based on their portfolio 
(which included a lead character in a television series for the lead female actor) ability to 
respond to direction, naturalistic performance and the plausibility of the scripted 
relationship e.g. age and appearance. The actors were not paid and took part in the project 
both to enhance their show reel and because they deemed the project worthwhile.  
 
2.1.3 Filming and Editing 
 
Filming was completed over a three day period that included six locations; a 
residential property, local pub, green grocer, park, local street and office space. The 
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majority of the scenes were filmed within the residential property. In each scene, a third 
person perspective shot was filmed to show the viewer the context of the social exchange. 
The scenes of this initial shot were kept as sparse as possible e.g. artwork was taken from 
the walls, to minimise possible distractions that might differentially distract individuals 
with ASD (Klin, et al., 2003), but were still kept naturalistic (e.g. scenes were identifiable 
as occurring within a kitchen). The actors wore clothing that did not have any obvious 
logos or distracting patterns, a plain jacket and plain smart office clothing. During the 
indoor scenes outfits were rotated to convey that each scene occurred at a different time 
and were not part of a continuous narrative. In all office-based scenes the actors wore 
smart clothing and when outside a winter jacket. The female actor kept her hair tied back 
in all but one scene (a bedroom scene) so that her hair was not masking her face. All 
speech was directed to camera and thus filmed in the first person to both reduce possible 
attention biases for the viewers with an ASD (Klin, et al., 2003) and simulate a live 
conversation for the viewer as closely as possible. (see section 2.1.4 for screen shots of an 
example scene). A number of takes were performed until the intended balance of natural 
performance, emotional valence and smooth cinematography was achieved.  
 
The clips were all filmed on a Sony Z4 camera and edited on Final Cut Pro on a 
Macintosh Laptop. During the editing process, takes that conveyed the closest depiction of 
the scripted affect and meaning were chosen through consensus between the author, 




A series of questions were used to assess social understanding in participants 
immediately following their viewing of each clip. See example script, accompanying screen 
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White lie example clip: 
Third person perspective of Max and Alice sitting in the living room across from each 




Focus on Alice from Max’s perspective: (looking nervous) ‘I’ve been working on this 
for ages and I think I have finally got it. I think my songs gonna end like this…. (strums 




Focus on Max from Alice’s perspective: (nods head encouragingly and half smiles)  
 
‘Well done Alice… that sounds really good’  
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1. Intention Question: Why did Max say that?  
2. Interaction Question: If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next? 
3. Memory Question: What instrument was Alice playing? 
 
Due to the theoretical and structural similarities, the first question used in the 
measure was taken from Happé’s (1994) SS ‘Why did X [the character] say that?’, and 
always referred to the last speaker and utterance. This wording of the question is 
sufficiently open ended, but also is directive enough for participants to consider the 
mental states of the characters. The statement to which this question refers will be 
referred to as the target utterance hereafter. 
 
The second question was introduced based on clinical experience and consultation 
with an individual with ASD. The second question was: ‘If you were in Y’s [other character 
i.e. not X/the last speaker] situation, what would you say next? ’ This question was again 
deemed sufficiently open ended to gain a rich description from the participants. Moreover, 
it also targeted a common difficulty that was expressed by a number of clients in the 
aforementioned clinic and the service user consultant with a diagnosis of ASD; the ability 
to understand another’s intentions without being able to generate a response that 
incorporates the mental states and intention of the speaker and thus continue the social 
exchange. These difficulties are highlighted in well validated measures of ASD such as 
question 26: ‘I frequently find that I don't know how to keep a conversation going’, in the 
Autism Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001a). 
 
The final question was used as a means of controlling for potential lapses in attention 
or gross difficulties in memory abilities that may affect performance and took the form of a 
closed question pertaining to a piece of information in the scene, which was important for 
an appreciation of the scene’s context and/or the interaction. 
 
2.1.5 Order  
 
The order which the items were presented was quasi-randomised. Initially, all the 
clips were assigned a random number using a random number generator website 
http://www.pangloss.com/seidel/rnumber.cgi. The 10 control clips were randomly 
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interspersed with experimental clips. This preliminary sequence was checked and re-
arranged according to the following criteria:  
 
1) The first clip could not contain scenes where the relationship was not clear or a 
context had not been previously established, for example, one clip in which the 
characters are cross dressing.  
 
2) Clips of the same theme (including control clips as a theme) could not directly 
follow one another, to avoid potential contamination or priming effects that 
would bias responses for that theme. 
 
3) Clips that were similar in content, but crossed themes were not presented in 
succession. This was to reduce the likelihood that the participants’ responses 
would have been affected if they could not consider each scene to be self-
contained.  
 
Once the clip order did not violate criteria 1-3 it was labelled order A, which was then 





Ethical approval was granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, Nursing and 
Midwifery Ethics Sub-Committee PNM/10/11-22. Information sheets were provided to 
inform potential participants of the nature of the study and written consent was gained 




20 healthy adults took part in this part of the study and were recruited via an 
opportunity sample. The sample included 10 females and 10 males and the mean age of 
the samples was 28.8years (SD = 7.66). Participants were only recruited into the study if 
they had an Autism Quotient score below 32, which is the cut off suggestive of ASD/ high 
ASD traits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001a). No participants who opted 
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into the study had to be rejected from the pilot due to the presence of ASD traits as 
measured by the AQ (M= 10.68 SD = 3.87 range = 6-17). 
 
2.2.3 Procedure  
Participants completed the AQ and then returned the completed questionnaire. 
Participants then completed the SSFT Pilot on a laptop (using headphones to listen to the 
materials), within a quiet room at the Institute of Psychiatry. Participants answered the 
questions verbally and their responses were recorded verbatim on a laptop computer. 
 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 The Autism Quotient (AQ) 
 
The AQ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001a) is a 50 item self-report 
questionnaire designed to assess ASD traits in adults with an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) in 
the normal range. A copy can be found in Appendix 5. The 50 questions are equally divided 
across five areas; ‘social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communication and 
imagination’(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001 a, p.6), assessing both 
symptom clusters and well evidenced cognitive styles associated with the diagnosis. 
Scores of 0-1 are given for each question on a Likert scale; ‘definitely agree, slightly agree, 
definitely agree, definitely disagree’, where either the agree statements or disagree 
statements are awarded a point. Total scores range therefore from 0-50. Participants are 
asked to complete the questionnaire as quickly as possible, but there are no time 
limitations. 
 
The AQ shows good test-retest reliability (r = 0.7) and the cut-off of >32 has been 
shown to discriminate adults with an ASD diagnosis from control groups (N=1014; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001a). The questionnaire has been translated into 25 
different languages and has been validated cross culturally, showing satisfactory internal 
consistency (Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008; Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, 
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2.3.2 The Strange Stories Film Task Pilot  
 
The SSFt-p set consisted of 48 clips. Thirty-eight clips followed the themes of the 12 
types of mental state vignettes presented in Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories; lie, irony, 
double-bluff, pretence, joke, appearance reality, white-lie, persuasion, misunderstanding, 
forget, contrary emotions and idiom. Ten clips, which acted as control stimuli, were based 
on White, et al., (2009) physical state reasoning stories. The order of viewing was quasi-
randomized as per the procedure outlined in section 2.1.5, and half the participants 
(stratified by gender) viewed order A and half viewed order B.  
 
Prior to the task the experimenter read a set of instructions informing the participants 
of the nature of the task, the characters’ relationship and invited any further questions 
(see Appendix 6). Each of the clips was approximately the same length and no clip 
exceeded 36 seconds (M = 17.92 seconds, SD = 6.34). Before each scene a black 
background was presented for one second and then the clip’s number was presented on a 
black background for two seconds. The full running time of the pilot was 17 minutes and 
eight seconds.  
 
After viewing the first clip the video was paused and the experimenter asked the three 
experimental questions outlined above in section 2.1.4. 
 
The participants’ responses to each question were typed verbatim on a scoring sheet 
(see Appendix 7). The next clip was then viewed and the procedure repeated. Following 
the end of the scenes, participants were thanked for their time and asked if they had any 
questions. 
 
2.4 Selection of Final Test Set 
2.4.1 Scene Selection  
 
Appropriate scene selection for the final 12 stimuli followed a step by step procedure 
in order of priority:  
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1) Ineffective clips where viewers did not identify the exact intended meaning 
(<5/20) in answering the first question were removed (6 experimental and 2 
control scenes), if the clip did not match the intended meaning (1 experimental), 
if the theme was not equally portrayed (n=1) or the introduction of a new 
character (n=1) 
 
2) Scenes were selected based on who delivered the target utterance (male or female 
actor), and setting (kitchen, living room, outside, in an office) with the aim of 
having a balanced set of scenes.  
 
The final set consisted of 12 experimental (one of each theme) and 3 control clips, 
where the female actor delivered the target utterance on nine occasions and the male on 
six. The scenes selected were shot within a living room on six occasions, a kitchen on six 
and outside/in an office on three. A second set of 12 viable clips was left for future 
research purposes (See Appendix 7 for scene selection). 
 
2.4.2 Order effects 
 
One issue that arose from the pilot was that participants had to adjust to the task and 
found answering the questions for the first time difficult. This was evidenced by 
comparing responses for item 1 in order A to item 48 in order B (the same clip) and vice 
versa. This prompted the implementation of three practice clips at the start of the final 
version of the task; two with social content and one control. This enabled participants to 
adjust to the task demands before starting the scored part of the task, and allowed the 
researcher to check whether the participant had any questions regarding the task before 
starting the experimental stimuli.   
 
2.4.3 Imposing a Narrative 
 
On a number of occasions the participants made reference to what happened between 
clips or referenced behaviour in one clip to guide their response in later clips, despite the 
explicit instruction to treat each as a self-contained clip. Following the pilot, prompts were 
provided by the experimenter during testing (for example ‘remember that each story is 
self contained’) if participants responded in a manner that suggested they were 
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connecting clips, e.g. explicitly mentioning information from previous clips when 
answering latter clips. 
 
2.4.4 Prompting  
 
For question 2 participants sometimes responded with a vague or generic answer such 
as ‘I would say something in response to the joke’. In these instances a prompt was 
provided (‘For example?’ or ‘Such as?’) to the participant to generate a more specific 
answer. 
 
2.5 Scoring  
2.5.1 Experimental Clips  
 
The scoring system for the new task followed that described in White et al., (2009), 
Devine and Hughes (2013) and Castelli, Frith, Happé and Frith (2002). Of particular 
importance, this system has shown to be reliable in film-based tasks based on the SS 
(Devine & Hughes, 2013). For a full description of the scoring system please see (Appendix 
8) In accordance with these systems, possible scores ranged from 0-2 for questions 1 and 
2 and 0-1 for question 3 (see section 2.1.4). Using the example in section 2.1.4 of a clip 
depicting the use of a ‘white lie’ the scoring system was as follows. 
 
For question 1:  
 
2 points: Answers had to identify the main theme of the story (e.g. stating it was a 
white lie), or an elaborated description that articulated this point (e.g. Max did not want to 
hurt Alice’s feelings).  
 
1 point: Answers that were partially correct or in which an aspect of the correct 
description was missing. Examples of these kinds of responses often included solely 
factual information or simple internal state responses (e.g. he is nice).  
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0 points: Answers that were irrelevant to the social exchange or incorrect (e.g. he 
thought it was good).  
 
Psychological-State Talk (PST) was also scored on a scale of 0-2:  
 
2 point: Answers that included 2nd order (or higher) PST e.g. thoughts about 
thoughts/feelings (e.g. ‘he wanted her to think he liked it’), or complex metal states (e.g. 
‘he’s telling a white lie’).  
 
1 point: Answers that used 1st order PST e.g. one person’s thoughts, or feelings (e.g. 
‘he’s being kind’). 
 
0 points: Responses that involved no mention of psychological states.   
 
The scoring schedule for question 2 was developed by the research team as no other 
previous research was identified using similar methodology. To improve direct 
comparison between the two questions and as the 0-2 point system has proved successful 
in generating reliable scoring in novel research (Castelli, et al., 2002; Devine & Hughes, 
2013) and neuropsychology more generally(D. Wechsler, 1997, 1999; D Wechsler, 2008) 
the same system was adopted, but with a slight alteration in emphasis. Importantly, for 
these responses, the utterance had to make sense with regard to continuing the 
conversation so therefore had to make sense in light of the intentions of the last speaker. 
  
Again, using the same scenario as described in section 2.1.4. as an example, the scoring 
system was as follows: 
 
2 points: Answers had to acknowledge the underlying intention of the utterance (e.g. 
‘thanks, but how do you think I could improve it?’) 
 
1 point: Responses were partially correct and/or minimal (e.g. ‘thanks’).  
 
0 point: Answers were either irrelevant (e.g. do you want me) or incorrect (e.g. 
misunderstanding the intention of the white lie such as ‘don’t take the mickey’).   
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Question 3 was scored as either 0 or1 and correct answers had to mention the relevant 
piece of information e.g. a guitar in the example in section 2.1.4. 
 
2.5.2 Control clips 
 
The control clips followed the same 0-2 point system devised in previous research 
using similar control stimuli (White, et al., 2009). In all three control clips a suggested 
solution was presented to the character that was logical, but varied in its content e.g. 




2 points: Answers had to articulate exactly why the suggestion had been 
recommended (e.g. to save them money or it is cheaper).  
 
1 point: Answers that were partially correct (e.g. because they have the money now).  
 
0 points: Irrelevant or incorrect answers (e.g. it’s more expensive).  
 
The mental state scoring system was the same as for the experimental clips (see 





2 points: Answers had to acknowledge the reasoning behind the suggestion (e.g. ‘yeah 
that’s the best option’).  
 
1 point: Answers were deemed partially correct. 
 
0 points: Incorrect or irrelevant answers were scored as 0 (e.g. we could save more 
money if we didn’t pay for the year).  
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Question 3 was scored as either 0 or1 and correct answers had to mention the relevant 
piece of information 
2.6 Psychometrics 
2.6.1 Item Analysis 
 
Internal consistency was assessed for each scale of the SSFT as shown in Table 2 
below: 
 
Table 2: Internal consistency for both the Experimental and Control film clips.  
 
 Experimental Films Control Films 
 Intention PST Interaction Memory Intention PST Interaction Memory 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
.594 .454 .745 * .323 .395 -.232 * 
Table2: * No variance in the items resulted in too few items being preset to represent the scale 
adequately. 
 
The internal consistency values for the experimental clips’ Intention and Interaction 
scales were both adequate and satisfactory, respectively. The PST rates however, were 
low. This is likely to be related to the intentional design of the clips to have varying levels 
of mental state attribution necessary to understanding them. The Memory questions 
showed no variance (all participants passed) on 9 items, undermining the alpha statistic. 
The Control questions showed poor internal consistency on all scales and the Memory 
questions again showed no variance on 2 items (all participants passed) meaning an alpha 
statistic could not be calculated. The low alpha in the control films again reflects the 
intentional variation in control material (economic decisions, understanding of natural 
phenomena, using left-over food to prevent waste) and the different components of 
reasoning needed to pass the clips. Therefore, one would not expect adequate alpha values 
on these subscales as shown on the experimental clips which appear to be tapping an 
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2.6.2 Inter-rater Reliability 
Inter-rater reliability was established by double rating 20% of the responses where 
the second independent rater was blind to group (shown in Table 3 below).  
 
Table 3: Intra-class coefficients for each dimension of the SSFt for both the ASD and 
control group. 
 
                         Experimental Clips                                Control Clips 




ASD (n=4) .93 .86 .84 1 .93 1 1 *(3/3) 
 
Controls (n=4) .99 .96 .95 *(12/12) .91 1 *(6/6) *(3/3) 
Table 3: * (number/number) = no variance observed in performance so coefficient could not be 
calculated so each rater’s scores are displayed. 
 
The control group scored at ceiling for memory questions on experimental and control 
clips. Participants with ASD also correctly answered all memory questions relating to 
control clips. There was also no variance for scores on interaction questions for control 
participants. For this reason an intra-class agreement statistic could not be calculated for 
this data. Given good agreement between the independent rater blind to group and 
hypothesis and the first author, the latter’s ratings were used for the subsequent analyses. 
 
2.7 Phase 2: 
2.7.1 Ethics 
 
Ethical Approval for the second phase of the study was granted by the National 
Research Ethics Service Committee – London, Westminster (13/LO/0092), the 
Behavioural and Developmental Psychiatry Clinical Academic Group and the Institute of 
Psychiatry/South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust Research and 
Development Office (R&D2013/016). Information sheets were provided to all participants 
before they took part in the study and written consent was taken before the study took 











A mixed methods design was used whereby both between and within subject variables 
were analysed. One group consisted of adults with a diagnosis of either Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS) or High Functioning Autism (HFA), which will be collectively referred to as 
the ASD group. The control group consisted of an age, gender and verbal IQ matched 
adults. Using the results of Dziobek, et al. (2006) as an estimate, and setting the alpha level 
at 0.05, a sample size of 20 in each group was deemed sufficient to reach the 




A total of 40 participants were recruited into the study; 20 with a diagnosis of ASD and 
20 healthy controls. The ASD group had all been assessed by the Behavioural Genetics 
Clinic (BGC), South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, a national specialist, 
tertiary level adult ASD diagnostic service. Participants were recruited by clinicians 
working within the BGC or by the researcher if individuals had consented to be contacted 
for research purposes during previous contact. The control group was recruited through 
an opportunity sample and advertisements in the local community detailing the research.  
 
2.7.4 Inclusion Criteria 
 
In order to be included in the study, participants in the ASD group had to meet the 
following inclusion criteria: 
 
 A formal diagnosis of either AS or HFA provided by a multi-disciplinary team 
according to ICD-10 criteria. 
 A reliable informant had completed an ADI-R  
 If no informant was available, the ADOS had been completed at assessment   
 Aged between 18 and 65 years at the time of testing. 
 Fluent in English 
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 Verbal IQ >70 as measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III/IV (WAIS-
III/WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 1997; Wechsler, 2008) or the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). 
 No other neurodevelopmental or organic disorder present e.g. no velocardio facial 
syndrome, hyperkinetic disorder, or brain injury 
 None of the following psychiatric diagnoses present at assessment: schizophrenia, 
eating disorders, personality disorder or substance abuse/dependence. 
 
Inclusion criteria for the control group were (in addition to the criteria above 
excluding the ASD diagnosis and ASD structured interviews) :  
 No formal mental health or neurodevelopmental disorder diagnosis. 
 An AQ score below 32. 
 
Demographics of both groups can be seen in Table 4 
 






t df p-value effect 
size: 
d 
95% mean  
Difference CI . 
Age in years  30.60 (6.52) 30.65 (6.27) -.025 38 .980 0.007 -4.05 – 3.80a 
 
Gender Ratio (F:M) 0:20 1:19 1.03c 38 .31 0.33 - 
 
Verbal abilities  105 (17.01) 111 (11.52) -1.35 38 .186 0.42 -15.2 – 2.7a 
 
Autism Quotient  34.2 (7.42)b 15.6 (7.21) 7.926 37 .001 2.52 13.91 – 23.4 
 
ADI-R Social Domain  13.53 (7.86)b 
 
- - - - - - 
ADI-R Communication 
Domain 
11.11 (5.42) - - - - - - 
Table 4 : aindependent bootstrap test derived confidence intervals  bASD N=19  cChi squared value. 
 
 
The two groups were matched for age, gender and verbal IQ and these variables were 
not significantly different from one another (see Table 4). The AQ acted as a screening 
measure for ASD traits and the groups were significantly different in their responses, with 
the ASD group scoring higher (see Table 4). Of particular importance, no individual in the 
control group scored above 32 on the AQ; the cut-off for significant ASD traits (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). In all but one case, a suitable informant was 
available to provide developmental history information for the participant’s diagnosis via 
an ADI-R. For the individual who did not have ADI-R data, diagnosis was supported by an 
ADOS. One participant was unable to complete the AQ due to testing constraints. 
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2.8.1 Wechsler Intelligence Tests 
 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) is a brief reliable and valid 
measure of general intelligence that is recommended for research purposes (Wechsler 
1999). The test consists of two verbal and two non‐verbal subtests. Participants complete 
the verbal subscales (Vocabulary and Similarities), which are required to calculate a 
verbal IQ score. 
 
In cases where a neuropsychological assessment had been completed within the South 
London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust Adult Autism clinics, participants’ verbal IQ 
scores as defined by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale –III (WAIS-III) short form 
(Axelrod, Ryan, & Ward, 2001)  The WASI and the WAIS-III scores show good convergent 
validity (Wechsler, 1999). In two cases, the verbal comprehension index of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale –IV (WAIS-IV) was used (Wechsler, 2008).  
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2.8.2 The Autism Quotient (AQ) 
 
Please see section 2.3.1 for a description of the measure. 
2.8.3 The Twenty item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20). 
 
The TAS-20 is a 20 item self-report instrument developed to identify alexithymia traits 
in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Bagby, et al., 1994). The questionnaire uses a 
Likert scale: ‘strongly disagree, moderately disagree, neither agree or disagree, 
moderately agree or strongly disagree’. Total scores across all items indicate the degree of 
alexithymia present (see Appendix 10)  
 
The TAS-20 (Bagby, et al., 1994), shows good internal consistency (0.81), test-retest 
reliability (0.77) and the data were best described using a three factor solution that is 
theoretically consistent with the alexithymia construct; ‘1) Difficulties in identifying 
feelings 2) Difficulties in describing feelings 3) Externally orientated thinking’ (Bagby, et 
al., 1994). The measure has been validated internationally (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003). 
Importantly, for the current study the TAS-20 has shown to be a reliable measure of 
alexithymia in adults with high functioning ASDs and shows good test-retest reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminate validity in this population (Berthoz & Hill, 2005) 
 
2.8.4 The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
 
The IRI is a 28 item self-report questionnaire designed to test empathy as a multi-
dimensional construct (Davis, 1980; 1983; please see Appendix 11 for a copy). Items are 
equally divided across four factors: ‘Perspective taking, Empathic concern, Personal 
distress in difficult interpersonal situations, and Fantasising about imagined 
situations’(Davis, 1983). Participants answer each question on a 0-4 Likert scale from 
‘does not describe me very well’ to ‘describes me very well’. Scores are totalled for each 
factor. 
In the original paper describing the IRI’s development (Davis, 1980) all four factors 
showed sufficient levels of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 0.70-0.78) and test-
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retest reliability (0.61-0.81) in both males and females and the factors were stable across 
two independent samples (total N=1169). It shows appropriate convergent validity and 
theoretically consistent between-factor correlations i.e. positive correlations between 
perspective taking and empathic concern (Davis, 1980).The measure has been validated 
cross-culturally and the psychometric properties are acceptable in the translated versions 
(Fernández, Dufey, & Kramp, 2011; Siu & Shek, 2005). Pertinent to this study, the IRI has 
been used in a high functioning adult ASD sample and each factor effectively discriminated 
the ASD group from a matched typically developing adult sample (Rogers, et al., 2007) 
 
2.8.5 Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Eyes) 
 
The Eyes task is a forced choice measure of mentalizing abilities that consists of 36 
items (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001b). For each item, participants view a 
photo of a person’s eye region. Participants have to then choose (from four options), which 
word presented best describes the person’s expression. Correct score are then totalled 
giving a score in the range of 0-36 (for copy see 
http://www.autismresearchcentre.com/arc_tests.)  
 
In the original study, the Eyes task discriminated between a group of adults with high 
functioning ASDs (N=15) and three control groups; a community sample (N=122), student 
sample (N=103) and IQ matched controls (N=14) and performance on the measure was 
negatively correlated with ASD traits as measured by the AQ in all groups (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001b). The Eyes test has been translated into 24 languages, but 
the psychometric properties of the measure have rarely been assessed. Internal 
consistency is mixed, with Cronbach’s alpha values ranging from 0.58-0.70 in adult non-
clinical populations (Vellante et al., 2012). Test-retest reliability of the measure is 
acceptable in adult populations (Vellante, et al., 2012; Yildirim et al., 2011) although 
scores should be considered an ‘approximation’ due to variance in performance over time 
(Hallerbäck, Lugnegård, Hjärthag, & Gillberg, 2009). The convergent validity of the Eyes 
test with self-report measures of empathy is mixed (Muller et al., 2010; Vellante, et al., 
2012). A recent meta-analysis suggests the Eyes is a reliable measure to discriminate high 
functioning adults with ASDs and neurotypical adults (Chung, et al., 2013) and is 
recommended by experts in the field (Pinkham et al., 2013). 
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2.8.6 The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) 
 
Participants completed the forced choice ‘Emotion Recognition’ subsection of the 
TASIT (McDonald, Flanagan, & Rollins, 2002). Participants view 28 short film clips, where 
an actor performed one of the 6 universal emotions: Anger, Sadness, Happiness, Anxiety, 
Surprise, Disgust, or was emotionally ‘Neutral.’ Following each clip, participants state the 
most ‘dominant, persistent or pervasive emotion’ (McDonald, et al., 2002). Total, scores 
are calculated ranging from 0-28 respectively. 
 
The TASIT in its entirety shows good test-retest reliability (r = .74‐.88) and good 
correlation coefficients (r = .68) with static second order ToM measures evidencing 
convergent validity (McDonald et al., 2006), While the TASIT was originally developed for 
identifying social deficits following traumatic brain injury (McDonald & Flanagan, 2004) 
its construct validity is supported by it being a suitable measure for identifying social 
difficulties in patients with schizophrenia (Sparks, et al., 2010) and pertinent to this study 
and most recently, adults with high functioning ASD (Mathersul, et al., 2013b). Part III is 
also recommended by experts in the field of social cognition (Pinkham, et al., 2013).  
 
2.8.7 The Frith-Happé Triangles (F-HT) 
 
The F-HT is a non verbal dynamic ToM task (Castelli, et al., 2002). Participants view 1 
practice animation and then 4 experimental animations on a computer screen used in 
Castelli et al., (2002) study. The animations feature a small blue and a large red triangle 
that interact throughout the clips within a white space and in three of the experimental 
clips a blue enclosure was present in the centre of the screen. The movements of the 
triangles depict a range of mental states; ‘Surprising, Coaxing, Mocking and Seducing’, and 
the animations were designed such that the triangle’s thoughts and feelings could be 
inferred from their behaviour. The clips last between 36 and 44 seconds. Following each 
clip the participants are asked ‘What was happening in that animation?’. Participants’ 
responses are then written verbatim and coded on a previously established 
‘appropriateness’ scale of 0-2 (Castelli, et al., 2002) and PST scale of 0-2. Scores therefore 
range from 0-8 for each scale. 
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The ‘F-HT’ task has been shown to differentiate between a high-functioning adult ASD 
group (N=10) and a verbal ability matched adult control group (N=10). The ‘F-HT’ has 
been used to assess mentalizing abilities in young children (Abell, et al., 2000) adolescents 
(Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007), in non-English speaking cultures 
(Moriguchi, et al., 2006) and has been validated as both an explicit and implicit measure of 
ToM (Klein, Zwickel, Prinz, & Frith, 2009). 
 
2.8.8 The Strange Stories (SS)  
 
The SS is a written verbal vignette task that has been used extensively in the ASD ToM 
literature (Dziobek, et al., 2006; Happé, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Roeyers, et al., 
2001; Spek, Scholte, & Berckelaer-Onnes, 2010). Participants completed a short form of 
the SS task (White, et al., 2009), consisting of 8 short vignettes (two versions of the 
following themes: White lie, persuasion, double bluff and misunderstanding). After being 
read the short vignettes participants explain the character’s behaviour or language by 
answering a single question, usually in the form of ‘Why did X [the character] say that?’ 
The vignettes are left in front of the participants to reduce memory loading. Responses are 
recorded verbatim and are coded on a previously devised 0-2 accuracy scale (White, et al., 
2009) alongside a PST scale of 0-2. Total scores therefore range from 0-16 for each scale. 
For an example of the material and related scoring (see Appendix 12). 
 
In its original form, the SS (Happé, 1994) consists of 24 mental state stories where the 
actions and/or language of the characters could be best explained in terms of mental 
states e.g. ‘he was joking‘ or ‘he did not want to hurt her feelings’. 6 physical state stories 
act as control stimuli where the character’s behaviour could be best described in terms of 
physical actions e.g. ‘it is cheaper to buy the multi-pack of drinks’. Scoring was defined 
using two orthogonal axes; correct vs. incorrect and physical vs. mental state explanations. 
In the seminal work, (Happé, 1994) found that the ASD group (N=18) gave more incorrect 
mental state responses when compared to a healthy adult, healthy child and controls with 
intellectual disabilities. Similarly, the SS showed good convergent validity with first and 
second order ToM tasks (Happé, 1994). Replications of short form versions of the SS in 
high functioning adults with ASD have yielded mixed findings with some studies finding 
differences in accurate mental state attribution abilities (Dziobek, et al., 2006; Jolliffe & 
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Baron-Cohen, 1999; Spek, et al., 2010) with others revealing no differences (Roeyers, et al., 
2001; S. White, et al., 2009). 
 
2.8.9 The Strange Stories Film Task(SSFt) 
 
The same testing settings and instructions were provided to the participants as 
described in section 2.3.2. Participants view 3 practice clips, two of which were mental 
state clips and one a control clip. Participants view 15 clips; 12 mental state clips and 
three control clips, presented in a quasi-randomised order (A). Half the participants 
viewed order A  and the other half viewed the same clips but reversed (order B). Clips last 
no longer than 27 seconds in length (M= 17.5, SD= 5.83) and the measures total running 
time is six minutes and 21 seconds in total. A black screen is present for 1 second followed 
by the clips number on a black screen for 2 seconds. Participants are asked three 
questions following each clip (including the three practice clips) as described in section 
2.3.2 (for a copy of the test sheet See Appendix 13) 
 
Participants’ responses are recorded verbatim. Intention scores range from 0-2 points 
for accuracy and 0-2 for mental-state talk, totals range from 0-24 for each scale for the 
experimental clips. For the control clips scores range from 0-6.  
 
Each response to the Interaction question was scored from 0-2 with totals scores 
ranging from 0-24 for the experimental clips and from 0-6 for the control clips.  
 
Memory questions are scored as either 0 or 1 giving participants a total score of 0‐12 
for the experimental clips and 0-3 for the control clips. 
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Testing took place for all participants within a quiet room within the Institute of 
Psychiatry. Before attending for an assessment participants completed the AQ, TAS-20 and 
IRI. During the assessment appointment they completed the SS, Eyes, F-HT, TASIT and the 
SSFt. The order was counter balanced between the SS and SSFt tests, with participants 
both doing the SS first and the SSFt last or vice versa, which was stratified by order A or B 
of the SSFt task. The ‘F-HT’, SS and SSFt tasks were audio recorded. Participants were 
thanked and reimbursed for their time and those who wished to hear about the findings of 
the study were put on a list to be contacted regarding the results. If a neuropsychological 
assessment had not been previously completed then the WASI verbal subscales were 
completed to provide an estimate of verbal IQ. 
 
2.10 Statistical Analysis 
 
The Kirmilov-Smirnoff test was used as a measure of normal distribution and 
homogeneity of variance was measured using Levine’s test. No significant outliers were 
identified including the one female participant’s scores, so her results were included in the 
analysis. T-tests were performed to compare between group mean differences on all 
measures. Sensitivity analysis was performed using an independent bootstrap analysis to 
test whether the results were robust against deviations from parametric assumptions 
(Chong & Choo, 2011). The independent bootstrap test is nonparametric. Thus 95% mean 
difference confidence intervals obtained from the bootstrap test were reported alongside 
such cases to support outcomes of the test statistic.  
 
ANCOVA was completed, with VIQ as a covariate, in all cases where VIQ correlated 
with performance on behavioural measures of social cognition. Homogeneity of regression 
slopes was assessed in all cases supporting the utility of ANCOVA to partial out variance 
attributed to VIQ. Bootstrap pair wise comparisons were performed in cases where 
normal distribution was violated. All bootstrap tests were based on 5000 samples.  
 
Alpha values were set at <.05 and effect sizes calculated using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 
1992). Partial Cohen’s d effect sizes were calculated for the ANCOVA analysis (Wildt & 
Ahtola., 1978).  
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Depending on the variables’ parametric status correlations were calculated using 
either Spearman’s or Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Furthermore, on the advice of a 
statistician the alpha value was reduced to <.01 to account for multiple comparisons. 
Trends therefore represent associations <.05. In instances where VIQ correlated with the 
performance on the measure of social cognition partial correlations were completed to 
control for any variance attributable to VIQ. R squared was calculated for coefficients that 
were significant/trends. To compare whether correlation coefficients were statistically 
different form one another, Fischer r-to-z transformation was completed. 
 
A Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve was performed to demonstrate the 
traditional social cognition measures and the SSFt’s ability to assign participants to their 
correct diagnostic group. The ROC curve is plotted along two axes: Sensitivity along the Y-
axis, which demonstrates the test’s ability to correctly identify the ASD participants as 
belonging to the ASD group (true positives) vs. 1-specificity along the X-axis, which is 
defined as the degree in which, control participants are incorrectly identified as being part 
of the ASD group (false positive; Park, Goo, & Jo, 2004). 
 
 Cut-offs for each measure are generated that yield differing levels of sensitivity and 1-
specificity. The cut-off scores’ relative sensitivity and 1-specificity values known as 
‘operating points’ (Park, et al., 2004) are graphically displayed along the sensitivity vs. 1-
specificity axis’ to form the ROC curve. From this, an area under the curve (AUC) value can 
be calculated, which is the ‘average value of sensitivity for all possible values of specificity’ 
(Park, et al., 2004). The higher the AUC, the more effective the measure is at assigning 
participants to their diagnostic group. A perfect diagnostic measure would therefore have 
an AUC of 1, which represents 100% sensitivity (e.g. a cut-off on a particular measure 
where all ASD participants score below) and 0% 1-specificity (e.g. none of the control 
participants’ score below the assigned cut-off). As these two dimensions are in tension 
with one another, optimal cut-offs for each measure in this study (see Park, et al. (2004) 
for scenarios where this may not be the case) therefore represent the largest difference 











The results will first focus on between group differences on the traditional measures 
of social cognition, empathy and alexithymia. Next, between groups differences on the SSFt 
will be assessed. Further investigation into the individual clips from the SSFT will follow 
and how performances on the SSFt scales are related within each group.  Analysis will then 
turn to the SSFt’s ability to discriminate the two groups and the SSFt’s convergent validity 
with traditional social cognition tasks, questionnaire measures of empathy, alexithymia 
and ASD traits/symptoms. 
 
In the following sections the F-value (F), t-statistic (t), degrees of freedom (df), Cohen’s 
d effect size estimate (d) and 95% (mean difference) confidence intervals (CI) are 
displayed with the corresponding abbreviations. F always represents an ANCOVA with VIQ 
as a covariate. Age was not found to correlate with any of the behavioural measures and so 
was not included in analyses. Where correlation analysis is significant/shows a trend r 
squared will also be reported (r2). 
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3.1 Traditional Social Cognition Measures 
 
Analysis was first conducted to assess whether the two groups performed differently 
on the traditional social cognition measures, which is shown in Table 5 below.  
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Table 5. a bootstrap derived confidence intervals. b  N=19. 
 
 
The analysis revealed a significant (medium effect size) group difference between the 
adults with autism and the controls on the SS accuracy sores, but not on the degree of PST 
used to explain behaviour (see Table 5). While individuals with ASD were using 
comparable levels of mental state language to controls, their responses were less accurate. 
Bootstrap analysis was performed, revealing that the findings were robust against 
violations of normal distribution (see Table 5).  
 
Group differences between the F-HT revealed that compared to controls, individuals 
with autism were significantly less able to accurately infer the plot of the short animations 
and the triangles’ ‘intentions’ (see Table 5). The group difference represented a medium 
effect size (see Table5). Furthermore, they were less likely to imbue the geometric shapes 
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with thoughts and feelings and use mental state language to describe the interactions of 
the animated objects. This group difference yielded a large effect size (see Table 5).   
 
Analysis revealed that both groups performed equally on the Eyes task meaning their 
abilities at inferring mental states from the eye region did not differ. Both groups 
performed equally on the emotion recognition subtest of the TASIT suggesting that 
understanding basic emotions presented in video format was not significantly different 
between groups (see Table 5) Both of these effect sizes were small and confirmed by an 
independent bootstrap test (see Table 5).  
 
Correlation analysis revealed no significant association between the four standardised 
measures of social cognition (SS, Eyes task, TASIT and F-HT; see Appendix 14). Additional 
analysis was completed to compare the association of the traditional social cognition 
measures to the empathy and alexithymia questionnaires. Only the SS accuracy scores 
showed a trend towards a significant correlation with the fantasising subscale of the IRI in 
the ASD group (r(16) =-.488, p=.04). No other significant associations were found between 
the social cognition measures and the questionnaire measures (TAS-20, IRI and AQ)  for 
both groups, and the Social and Communication domains of the ADI-R in the ASD group 
(See Appendix 15) 
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3.2 Questionnaire Measures 
 
Participants’ scores on the questionnaire measures used to assess empathy and 
alexithymia are shown in Table 6 below: 
 






t df p-value d 95% 
CI 
 
IRI subscales [max=28] 
       
 














-8.08 – 1.00 
Fantasising    13.05 (5.58) 15.90 (4.72) -1.72 37 .09 0.54 -6.20 –.50 
Empathic Concern   17.42 (4.10) 17.75 (2.59) -0.30 37 .77 .01 -2.46-1.80a 
Personal Distress   14.42 (5.71) 10.25 (4.28) 2.59 37 .01 .80 .90 – 7.43 
 
TAS-20: 
       
 































































Table 6:  a bootstrap derived confidence intervals. b N=19. IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity Index. TAS-
20, Toronto Alexithymia Scale.  
 
Significant differences were seen between the two groups on the perspective taking 
subscale of the IRI. This result suggests a reduced inclination to adopt another’s view point 
in interpersonal situations. There was a trend towards the level of fantasising (i.e. 
imagining what it is like to be another person) to be lower in individuals with autism 
compared to control participants, representing a medium effect size (see Table 6). Overall, 
these results suggest that individuals with autism tended to self-report lower levels of 
cognitive empathy, and especially in perspective taking, as measured by the IRI when 
compared to the control group .  
 
The pattern of results was different for the affective empathy subscales. Both the 
control group and individuals with autism reported equal levels of empathic concern, that 
is, both groups’ ‘other orientated’ (Davis, 1983) feelings of understanding when observing 
people in difficult situations was equivalent (see Table 6). However, when answering 
items pertaining to personal distress, (e.g. the level of distress experienced in difficult 
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interpersonal contexts) individuals with autism rated themselves as significantly higher 
(see Table 6), and the observed difference was of large effect size.   
 
The TAS-20 revealed consistent differences between the two groups, representing 
large effects on each of the subscales and the total scale. Additionally, significantly more of 
the ASD group (52.6%) reported high alexithymia traits (total score > 60; Bagby, et al., 
1994) compared to the control group (20%; X2 (1,39) = 4.51, p = .03). This suggests the 
ASD group showed greater difficulties in identifying and describing their emotions. They 
also showed a tendency to externally orientate their thinking (e.g. not using emotions 
when making decisions).  
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3.3 The Strange Stories Film Task 
 
Analysis was conducted to compare performance of the groups on the SSFt’s Intention, 
PST, Interaction and Memory scales for both the experimental and control clips. No effect 
of order of presentation was seen across any of the experimental clips. Only the control 
clips’ Interaction question showed an effect of order (See Appendix 16). However, there 
was not a between group difference and error rates were evenly dispersed across the 
three clips (see Appendix 16). Results were therefore collapsed across both orders. 
Results are displayed in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Performance on SSFt by group: Mean (S.D.)  
 










        
Experimental Clips         
        
Intention (max=24) 15.60 (3.63) 18.80 (2.33)  8.5237 .006 0.95 0.85 – 4.45 













0.24 – 3.21 
Interaction (max=24) 10.75 (3.42) 17.10 (4.15)  25.0537 .001 1.62 3.38 – 7.96 
Memory (max=12) 11.55 (0.69) 11.85 (0.37) 1.7329  .95 0.55 -0.03 - 0.65a 
        
Control Clips         
        
Intention (max=6) 4.10 (1.41) 4.40 (0.99)  0.7037 .79 0.08 -0.59 - 0.81a 
Psychological State talk 
(max=6) 
 










-0.94 -0 .32a 
Interaction (max=6) 5.50 (0.89) 5.60 (0.75) 0.3838  .70 0.12 -0.63 – 3.98a 
Memory (max = 3)  2.95 (0.22) 3.00 (0.00) 1.0038  .33 0.32 -.18 - -0.04a 
Table 7 a Independent bootstrap derived confidence intervals.  
 
The experimental clips revealed the following pattern of results. Participants with ASD 
scored significantly lower than controls on the Intention dimension of SSFt 
(understanding the intentions of the speaker) and the observed effect was large (see 
Table7).  
 
Individuals with ASD were less likely than controls to use PST (e.g. refer to thoughts 
and feelings) in their responses to explain the character’s behaviour and this difference 
was of a medium effect size (see Table 7).  
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Participants’ responses to the Interaction question (i.e. what they would say next in 
that situation) showed a similar pattern of results. The individuals with ASD performed 
significantly worse than controls (see Table7) and the effect size of this group difference 
was large. 
 
The control films yielded a different pattern of results. Both groups performed equally 
well on the Intention, PST and Interaction questions and these findings were supported by 
independent bootstrap tests (see Table 7). This suggests that they were equally able to 
reason accurately about why the speaker said what they said and provide a suitable 
response to the conversational exchange when not required to ‘mentalize’.  
 
No significant group differences were seen on the memory question for experimental 
or control clips, suggesting that both groups were equally able to recall pertinent 
information regarding the conversational exchange. Ceiling effects were observed 
however. 
 
While not an a priori hypothesis, exploratory analysis was performed to identify which 
themes were contributing to the group differences observed on the SSFt. Descriptions of  
the profile of groups’ performance across different experimental clips’ themes are 
presented. Firstly, the profiles of Intention, PST and Interaction scores were investigated 
within each group (see Figures 1 and 2). Following this, difference scores for each theme 
(Control group minus ASD group) were calculated to investigate which themes best 
differentiated the groups by question type (see Figure 3). For all Figures 1-3 the themes 
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Figure 1: Sum of scores on the SSFt by theme in Control group. Presented in descending 





Figure 2: Sum of scores on the SSFt by theme for the ASD group presented in descending 






















































Figure 1 shows the control groups’ total scores per scale on each clips’ theme. Themes 
are presented in order of descending Intention scores for the ASD group. All the themes 
apart from the Double Bluff clip show total scores at or above 30 (average score of 1.5 per 
individual). The PST scales are at 20 (average score of 1 per individual) or above on all but 
three clips (Misunderstanding, Persuasion and Double Bluff). The Interaction scores fall 
above 20 on all of the clips and above 30 on five (Misunderstanding, White Lie, Pretend, 
and Forget). No clips’ scores were at ceiling for any dimension (40).   
 
Figure 2 shows the ASD group’s total scores per scale on each clips’ theme in 
descending order on the Intention scale. The Pretend, Misunderstanding, Forget and Irony 
scenes all yield scores at 30. In contrast the Lie, Double-Bluff and Idiom all fall at either 20 
or below. Over half of the clips (n=7) fall below 20 on the PST scale. The reduced rates of 
PST can be seen in a number of clips where accuracy was high (for example Irony and 
Joke; see Figure 2). The Interaction scores were generally lower across all items.  
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Figure 3: Difference scores between control and ASD group on the SSFt by theme in 
descending order of Intention scores for ASD group. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the difference in performance by item on SSFt across the three 
domains (Intention, PST and Interaction) by theme (presented in order of decreasing 
Intention scores for the ASD group’s performance). Positive scores represent better 
performance by control than ASD group, and negative scores the opposite. The 
exploratory pattern of results between the dimensions of the SSFt are shown, however 
since this was not an a priori aim of the study (to compare theme types) no statistical 
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The next part of the analysis focused on the relationship between the Intention and the 
Interaction questions of the SSFt. The relationship between individuals’ performance on 
















Analysis revealed a trend towards a significant association between the Intention and 
Interaction scores of the SSFt in the ASD group once verbal abilities had been controlled 
for (r(17) = .53, p = .02).  For the controls however this association was statistically 
significant (r(17) = .60, p = .007). Fischer r-to-z transformation revealed that these two 
coefficients were not statistically significant however (z = -0.3, p =.76).  
  
Figure 4: Relationship of performance on the Intention and Interaction questions of the 
SSFt for both groups 
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3.4 Group Classification Using the SSFt and Traditional Social Cognition tasks. 
 
One of the main aims of the study was to assess whether the SSFt could discriminate 
between participants with and without a diagnosis of ASD compared to the other social 
cognition measures. Figure 5 below shows a ROC curve to assess the sensitivity and 1-
specificity of each measure    
 
Figure 5: ROC curves for each social cognition measure and chance. 
 
The ROC curve in figure 5 demonstrates each social cognition measures’ ability to 
accurately assign the participants to their respective diagnostic group. Only measures in 
which there was a significant difference in means between the two groups were included.  
PST scores were not included as this scale did not differentiate accurate from inaccurate 
mental state attribution. The AUC values and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for 
the scales were .89 (.78 - .99) for the SSFt Interaction question, .76 (.61 - .91) for the SSFt 
Intention question, .72 (.56 – .88) for the SS Accuracy score and .69 (.53 - .86) for the F-HT. 
All of the AUC values were significantly above chance (p<.05). Overall, this suggests that 
while all the measures perform above chance, the SSFt Interaction and Intention scales 
were on average more accurate at correctly assigning participants to their correct 
diagnostic group. The small sample size in the current study, however, necessitates 
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caution when interpreting the findings as the confidence intervals for each measure show 
some overlap. 
 
The preliminary optimal cut-offs and their respective Sensitivity and 1-specificity 
values are presented below for each measure in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Cut-off scores for each social cognition measure. 
 
Test Scale Cut-off Sensitivity 1-Specificity 
    
SSFt Intention 17.50 .70 .20 
    
SSFt Interaction 13.50 .80 .20 
    
Strange Stories Accuracy 12.50 .65 .20 
    
F-H T Accuracy    3.50 .55 .20 
 
Scoring below the assigned cut-off would indicate being assigned to the ASD group 
given the levels of sensitivity and 1-specificity displayed. Table 8 shows how increasing 
levels of sensitivity, on the SSFt Interaction scale in particular, does not increase 1-
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3.5 Convergent Validity of the Strange Stories Film Task. 
 
In order to investigate the hypotheses that the SSFt would demonstrate convergent 
validity with other established measures of social cognition, associations by group were 
performed (see Table  9).   
 
Table 9: Associations by group Between Performance on the SSFt and Traditional Social 
Cognition Measures: Spearman’s partial correlation coefficient controlling for VIQ (r2). 
 
The Strange Stories 
Film Task 
SS Accuracy SS PST F-HT Accuracy a F-HT PST a Eyes TASIT 
       
ASD [N = 20]       
       
Intention  .52(27)*  .45 .04 -.10  -.13 .10 
PST .28   .37 -.12  .06 .06 -.38 
Interaction .28 -.26 .15  .07  -.07 .35 
       
Controls [N = 20]       
       
Intention .19 .34 .46(.21)* .45 .03 .32 
PST -.06 .10 .35   .61(.37)** .08 .21 
Interaction .17  .25 .32  .36 .18 .-.01 
Table 9: Note: Spearman’s correlation coefficients except where marked a Pearson’s * p <.05. ** p 
<.01.  
 
For the ASD group a significant association was revealed between the SSFt Intention 
scores and the SS Accuracy scores, see (Table 9). No other meaningful associations were 
revealed between these measures (see Table 9)  In the control group the SSFt Intention 
scores showed a trend with the F-HT accuracy and mental state scores.  Only the PST 
variables of the F-H T and the SSFt reached statistical significance and the more stringent 
level of p<.01. No other meaningful associations were revealed between the measures (see 
Table  9). When comparing the strength of the associations that were significant/trends 
within group,  across groups, only the PST scores on both the SSFt and the F-H T showed a 
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Analysis was then performed to investigate the association between the SSFt and 
measures of both empathy and alexithymia (see Table 10 below). 
 
 
Table 10: Association of the SSFt with alexithymia and empathy: Pearson’s partial 
correlation coefficients after controlling for VIQ (r2).  
 
The Strange Stories Film 
Task 
TAS-20 IRI 
 Total PT F EC PD 
      
ASD [N = 19]      
      
Intention  .17 -.05 -.34 .17 -.01 
PST  -.14 .25 -.03 .10 .41 
Interaction .12 -.04 -.07 .48*(23) .19 
      
Controls [N = 20]      
      
Intention  -.24 .50* (.25) .18 .42 .11 
PST  -.40  .56* (.31) .32  .32 -.06 
Interaction -.07 .23 -.01 .43 .33 
      
Table 10 Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficients except where marked a Spearman’s r. * p-
value<.05.   
 
 
The ASD group’s performance on the SSFt Interaction question showed a trend to 
being positively associated with the empathic concern scale. No other meaningful 
associations were identified (see Table 10). For the control group, a different pattern of 
results was revealed. The Intention and PST scores of the SSFt showed a positive trend 
with the perspective taking subscale of the IRI (see Table 10). Of interest, the association 
was sizeable between the empathic concern scale and the Interaction scale of the SSFt in 
the controls also, although it was not significant in the current small sample. When 
comparing the strength of the associations that were significant/trends within group,  
across groups, only the Intention scores the SSFt and PT scores showed a trend to being 
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3.6 The Strange Stories Film Task’s Relationship with ASD Traits/Symptoms 
 
Analysis was then performed to investigate the association of the SSFt and ASD 
symptomatology (see Table 11below).  
 
Table 11: Association of SSFt and ASD symptoms: correlation coefficient after controlling 
for VIQ (r2). 
 
The Strange Stories Film 
Task 
ASD Trait/Symptom Measures 
 
AQ ADI-R Com ADI-R Social 
ASD [N =19 ]    
    
Intention .01a -.21 -.28  
PST -.29a -.49* (.24) -.40 
Interaction .12 -.14 .02 
    
Controls [N = 20]    
    
Intention -.50* (.25)a -  
PST -.60** (.36)a -  
Interaction -.34a -  
    
Table 11 Note: Spearman correlation coefficients except where marked aPearson’s r.. * p-
value<.05. ** p-value<.01.  
 
The pattern of results suggests that only the PST scale within SSFt showed a trend 
towards being inversely associated with ASD symptomatology as defined by the 
communication domain of the ADI-R (e.g. the higher the ASD symptoms the worse the 
performance). None of the scales of the SSFt correlated with self-reported ASD traits as 
measured by the AQ in the ASD group. 
 
In the control group, the Intention scores showed a significant trend towards being 
negatively associated with AQ scores. The PST scores showed a statistically significant 
negative correlation with the AQ.  No other associations were revealed. When comparing 
the strength of the associations that were significant/trends within group,  across groups, 
only the SSFt Intention scores and the AQ showed a trend to being significantly different 







Strange Stories Film Task Main Project 
 
 78 
3.7 Summary of Main Findings  
 
The overall findings of the study are presented in Table 12 below.  
 
Table 12: Summary of findings across the social cognition measures. 
 
Measure Group difference Associationa 
   
SSFt  ASD<Control  F-H T, SS, IRI, AQ, ADI-R,  
F-H T ASD<Control                SSFt 
SS ASD<Control                SSFt, IRI (negative). 
Eyes n.s                n.s 
TASIT n.s                n.s 
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4 Discussion  
 
In the discussion the results will be summarised and then reviewed in light of the 
study hypotheses. The findings of the SSFt will be discussed in greater depth and 
contextualised within the current literature. Limitations of the study will be discussed 
followed by potential future research using the SSFt and its clinical implications. 
 
4.1.1 Group Differences 
 
The primary aim of the current study was to validate a new measure of social 
cognition designed to discriminate adults with HFASD compared to age, gender and verbal 
IQ matched controls. The study aimed to overcome a number of the shortcomings in 
current assessments of social cognition in this group by using dynamic, real-time social 
exchanges depicting a broad range of linguistic concepts with which individuals with ASD 
are known to struggle with. The following section will review the results in the light of the 
study hypotheses:  
 
1. The HFASD group will show lower scores on the SSFt’s experimental stimuli 
compared to the control group. 
 
2. The HFASD group and the control group will perform equally on memory questions 
and all the control stimuli questions of the SSFt. 
 
These primary hypotheses (H) of the study were confirmed as the individuals in the 
ASD group showed specific difficulties on SSFt’s experimental scales compared to controls, 
where they were less likely to accurately infer the intentions of the characters, use PST in 
their responses and provide a suitable response to the social exchange. The pattern of 
errors observed in the ASD group was unique to scenarios that specifically required 
inferring an intended meaning from the speaker. Furthermore, these differences could not 
be attributed to verbal ability. These findings support previous studies that have 
investigated mentalizing difficulties using dynamic stimuli in HFASD and argued it to be a 
key feature of the diagnosis (Dziobek, et al., 2006; Golan, et al., 2006; Heavey, et al., 2000). 
Additionally, the lack of group differences in the films that required logical reasoning to 
decipher the reason for the speaker’s utterance is consistent with vignette based studies of 
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mentalizing (Fletcher, et al., 1995; Happé, 1994; White, et al., 2009) and suggests that 
mentalizing is intimately intertwined with non-literal communication.   
 
3. The HFASD group will show lower scores on the SS, Eyes, F-HT but not on the TASIT. 
 
The results partially confirmed the hypothesis that the traditional social cognition 
measures (excluding the TASIT) would discriminate the two groups. Inferring intentions 
from vignettes and short animations were therefore challenging which fits with a recent 
meta-analysis (Chung, et al., 2013). The findings of the current study suggest that basic 
emotion recognition in dynamic stimuli is not impaired in the HFASD group, which is in 
keeping with some existing literature (Jones, et al., 2011; Lindner & Rosén, 2006), but 
inconsistent with other studies (Back, et al., 2007). Variable findings may in part be 
related to the differing age groups used in the studies (adolescents and children) and 
different stimuli. Alternatively, basic emotion recognition abilities may be preserved in 
this high functioning group.  
 
Overall, it appears that basic emotion recognition is intact when all other variables are 
held constant or when the cue is clear (e.g. shouting indicates the emotion of anger) as in 
the TASIT. However, when there are contradictory ostensive cues and/or the emotional 
expression is subtle, HFASD individuals differentially struggle to infer the intentions of the 
speaker. The current findings did not reveal poorer performance in the ASD group 
compared with controls on the Eyes task, unlike some previous studies (Chung, et al., 
2013), although other studies have similarly failed to find group differences (Roeyers, et 
al., 2001). Verbal abilities have often not been accounted for when using this measure and 
recent research suggests the influence of VIQ on this measure is significant (Peterson & 
Miller, 2012), which fits with the current findings. However, the results of a meta-analysis 
(Chung, et al., 2013) and expert opinion (Pinkham, et al., 2013) have deemed it one of the 
leading social cognition measures currently available. Further research is warranted to 
investigate how much variance is attributable to general cognitive factors and whether the 
findings in the current study are replicated.  
 
4. The SSFt will be more effective at differentiating between the two groups than the SS, 
Eyes task, F-HT and the TASIT. 
 
The new measure differentiated the two groups more effectively than previous 
traditional measures of social cognition. These findings are consistent with studies 
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showing that more naturalistic measures of mentalizing are more effective at 
differentiating HFASD samples from controls than traditional ToM measures (Dziobek, et 
al., 2006; Roeyers, et al., 2001). This finding is particularly relevant to the adoption of the 
SSFt into future research and clinical assessment with a HFASD population. It suggests 
that previous tasks may have overestimated the social cognitive abilities of HFASD groups 
and this may account for mixed findings in the literature investigating mentalizing and 
social difficulties in ASD (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014). The improved sensitivity and 
specificity goes some way in justifying the additional administration time of the SSFt 
compared to the other measures. Finally, the ecological validity of the measure also makes 
it a more sensitive and informative clinical tool that could be incorporated into 
neuropsychological assessments, intervention or be used as a social skills teaching tool for 
individuals with HFASD.  
4.1.2 Convergent Validity 
 
5. Performance on the SSFt will be associated with the SS, F-H T, TASIT and the Eyes 
tasks. 
 
6. Performance on the SSFt will be positively associated with the PT and F subscale of 
the IRI, but not the affective subscales. 
 
7. Performance on the SSFt will be negatively associated with the TAS-20.  
 
The findings showed that only the F-H T triangles in the control group and the SS in 
the ASD group (the latter at trend level) were positively associated with the new measure, 
which partially supported H5. For the controls, visual tasks of ToM were closely associated 
with performance on the new measure, although visual tasks that had emotion recognition 
as a focus, whether presented dynamically (TASIT) or statically (Eyes) were not. 
Therefore, the new task appeared to be related to cognitive rather than emotion 
processing and this is likely to explain why performance was not related to alexithymia 
scores (as measured by the TAS-20 and disconfirming H7), but was related to the PT 
subscale of the IRI (measuring cognitive empathy), partially supporting H6. Alternatively, 
poor sensitivity of the emotion recognition tasks could explain the lack of association due 
to minimal variance in task performance.  
 
For the ASD group, traditional verbal tasks of ToM were more strongly associated with 
the new measure, and again this was independent of emotion processing. This suggests 
that VIQ and mentalizing abilities are interdependent in able individuals with ASD (Happé, 
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1995) and that for all the tasks verbal abilities may be in part driving the apparent 
association rather than mentalizing alone. This will be discussed in more depth in section 
(4.2.2). It also highlights a weakness in the current measure to tap mentalizing abilities 
independent of verbal IQ, which has been demonstrated in several previous dynamic 
social cognition tasks (Dziobek, et al., 2006; Mathersul, et al., 2013b; Roeyers, et al., 2001), 
but not all (Golan, et al., 2006; Heavey, et al., 2000). However, previous research has not 
always controlled for the effects of VIQ in associations between new and traditional social 
cognition measures (Dziobek, et al., 2006). While one has to be tentative in the 
interpretation of a positive trend, the association between EC on the IRI and the 
Interaction domain of the SSFt suggests that greater levels of ‘affective resonance’ may 
also be associated with this process.  Future research could investigate the role of affective 
resonance and the generation of responses that acknowledge the intentions of others.     
 
8. Performance on the SSFt will be correlated with reciprocal social interaction scores 
and communication scores on the ADI-R in the ASD group, and the AQ in the controls.  
 
9. Performance on the SS, Eyes, F-HT but not the TASIT will be associated with the ADI-
R communication and social domains and the AQ. 
 
Performance on the new measure was associated with ASD symptomatology as 
measured by the AQ, but only in the control group. The relationship between the 
Communication domain of the ADI-R and the SSFt showed a sizeable yet non-significant 
association, partially confirming H8. No relationship was found between the traditional 
social cognition measures and the ADI-R in the ASD group or the AQ in both groups, 
disconfirming H9.These findings are inconsistent with the work of Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues who have shown an association between the AQ and the Eyes task (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) and other dynamic social cognition measures 
(Golan, et al., 2006). Previous research has also shown no relationship between traditional 
social cognition measures and the ADI-R social domain however (Dziobek, et al., 2006), 
suggesting that informant-reliant childhood symptoms of ASD may not be closely linked to 
current mentalizing abilities. Furthermore, the childhood literature on ASD symptoms and 
tasks of ToM is mixed (Bennett et al., 2013) suggesting that cognitive deficits and ASD 
symptoms may not as be closely linked as some research has suggested (Happé & Ronald, 
2008). A limiting factor of the current study is that the small samples per group meant that 
the findings may represent a type II error as sizeable coefficients did not reach stricter 
levels of statistical significance and thus had to be considered trends.  An important 
consideration for future research with this group is the inclusion, where possible, of 
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clinician/informant measures of current ASD symptomatology (e.g. the ADOS) as learned 
strategies (e.g. verbal) may be masking earlier difficulties and self-report symptoms may 
not fall in line with behavioural measures. While a self-report measure, the Adult Asperger 
Assessment (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Robinson, & Woodbury-Smith, 2005) could be a 
viable measure of current symptoms alongside the Social Communication Questionnaire 
(Chandler et al., 2007), which could be included in future research with adults, as the 
ADOS, while being the gold standard, is a lengthy clinical tool and requires expert training.  
 
10. Performance on the TASIT and the Eyes will be positively associated 
 
11. Performance on the F-HT and the SS will be positively associated. 
 
The traditional measures did not show a significant association with one another or 
with the cognitive domains of the IRI subscales or the TAS-20 which disconfirmed 
hypotheses H10 and H11. Previous research has yielded similar findings suggesting that 
traditional measures of social cognition are not associated with one another (Brent, Rios, 
Happé, & Charman, 2004; Dziobek, et al., 2006; Lahera, et al., 2014; Roeyers, et al., 2001). 
This questions the underlying cognitive mechanism that drives individual differences on 
such measures. The SS, F-H T and the Eyes are all considered ToM measures and the 
former two have been associated with activation of the ‘mentalizing network’ (Castelli, et 
al., 2002; Dodell-Feder, et al., 2011; Fletcher, et al., 1995). The PT subscale of the IRI has 
been shown to be related to the SS in individuals without ASD (Rogers, et al., 2007). It 
would seem pertinent to consider why performances on tasks purporting to measure the 
same underlying construct are not consistently related. One possible consideration is the 
effects of general cognitive abilities, as while they were not all associated with one another 
VIQ was associated with performance on the SS and the Eyes.  The measures are also 
different in their demands of the participant, especially between the non-verbal (F-H T, 
Eyes) and the verbal measures (SS, TASIT). Verbally-based strategies, for example, 
potentially used to ‘hack’ through some paradigms may be less fruitful and unable to 
generalise to other domains (Happé, 1995) resulting in a lack of association. Furthermore, 
the static (SS,Eyes) vs. dynamic (F-H T, TASIT) difference may result in the tasks recruiting 
different cognitive processes, and these were driving the lack of association rather than 
mentalizing per se. The forced choice design (Eyes, TASIT) vs. open ended questions (F-H 
T, SS) used to assess mentalizing may also be relevant, e.g. forced choice designs provide 
alternate routes to performance (Johnston, et al., 2008) and are less tasking of generative 
abilities, which differentially affect those with ASD (Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh, 
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& Thoma, 2013).  The diversity of the social cognition construct, which is evidenced 
neurophysiologically (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012) could also account for this lack of 
association and the possibility that the different tasks are assessing different components 
of interrelated, but independent, abilities i.e. ‘perceptive-affective vs. cognitive’ (Brent, et 




12. The HFASD group will show lower scores on the cognitive domains of the IRI but not 
on the affective subscales. 
 
13. Performance on the SS and F-H T will be positively associated with the cognitive 
domains of the IRI but not the affective subscales. 
 
The IRI revealed that the ASD group reported reduced rates of cognitive empathy 
when compared to control participants on the PT domain. There were no differences in 
self-reported affective empathy, partially supporting H12, which is reflected in a range of 
studies (Dziobek, et al., 2008; Lockwood, et al., 2013; Rogers, et al., 2007). A single trend 
was revealed between the SS and the F scale of the IRI, although it was negative, in 
contrast with H13.These findings support the notion that ASD is characterized by distinct 
empathy profiles that distinguishes it from disorders characterized by difficulties in EC or 
affective empathy, e.g. psychopathy (Jones, et al., 2010; Smith, 2009a). Knowledge of these 
differences gives clearer direction for clinicians in developing effective social 
interventions (Kasari & Patterson, 2012). The elevated levels of PD further support the 
suggestion that components of affective empathy may be heightened in ASD, which could 
explain why some social situations are often over-stimulating for such individuals (Smith, 
2009b). However, the empathy profile literature is not unanimous as other studies have 
found reduced affective empathy in individuals with ASD (Lombardo, Barnes, 
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Mathersul, et al., 2013b). The use of different scales 
or combinations of scales as found in Mathersul, et al. (2013b), to measure empathy, may 
lead to these contradictory findings. Further research is needed to delineate what is 
driving these cross study differences.  
 
A consistent finding however is that the PT or cognitive empathy subscale is 
consistently reduced in all studies, which is replicated in the current findings. However, 
informant- vs. self-report discrepancies found in the adolescent literature (Demurie, et al., 
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2011) raise the issue of accuracy in rating empathy and the need for validation research 
regarding measures such as the IRI to assess PT abilities in HFASD adults.  Whether 
cognitive empathy and mentalizing are synonymous or whether self-reported cognitive 
empathy and behavioural measures of mentalizing are related is still left unanswered as 
the findings in the literature are mixed (Dziobek, et al., 2008; Rogers, et al., 2007). The 
current negative trend between the F domain of the IRI and the SS suggests that these 
constructs are not related. Furthermore, the PT subscale of the IRI is deemed the closest to 
tapping mentalizing (Rogers, et al., 2007) and this was not associated with the traditional 
measure of ToM (but was associated with the SSFt). Future research is needed to further 
explore this question as the current study limitations (e.g. small sample) undermine its 






14. The HFASD group will report higher levels of alexithymia than the controls.  
 




The ASD group did show greater levels of alexithymia, which supports H14 although 
the lack of meaningful associations between any of the measures and the TAS-20, 
including those that had explicit emotion processing demands (TASIT, Eyes), does not 
support the alexithymia hypothesis of the emotion processing difficulties in ASD  (Bird & 
Cook, 2013). However, this may be affected by the small variation in performance on the 
TASIT making associations difficult to reveal. The findings do not support the claim that 
alexithymia should be used as a matching variable akin to VIQ (Bird & Cook, 2013) when 
assessing measures that have a stronger cognitive focus e.g. the SSFt, rather than emotion 
processing tasks (Lockwood, et al., 2013).   
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4.2 The Strange Stories Film Task 
 
The SSFt was a novel task developed by the research team for this study. The aim of 
the project was to create a measure that could detect real world social exchange 
difficulties in a HFASD sample.  
 
4.2.1 Understanding the Intention question 
 
The group differences on the Intention question of  the SSFt can be seen as evidence 
for a mentalizing impairment in ASD, which has a wealth of empirical support at the 
behavioural and physiological level (Happé & Frith, 2013). Differences have not always 
been found between HFASD individuals and controls on ecologically valid measures 
(Ponnet, et al., 2005) so this measure provides a potential tool to tap subtle social 
cognitive difficulties within this group. The findings that the control group’s performance 
was not undermined by ceiling effects and the sizeable association between the AQ and 
the SSFt’s Intention question also supports the utility of the measure in identifying 
individual differences in mentalizing in the general population (see section 4.5).  
 
 A potential interpretation of the reduced Intention scores is that impairments in EF 
may explain the group difference.  Holding the necessary information in mind in the short 
term, updating or inhibiting responses could lead to the differences in the ASD group as 
such difficulties have been observed in this population (Hill, 2004) especially in more 
open-ended or naturalistic tasks (Hill & Bird, 2006). Moreover, EF have also been 
implicated in the developmental trajectory of mentalizing abilities in ASD in childhood 
(Pellicano, 2012) and into adulthood (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010).  
 
While the EF account cannot be falsified per se due to the lack of any well-validated 
executive function tasks included in the design, the introduction of control clips challenges 
this interpretation somewhat. The control clips were explicitly designed to require varied 
knowledge to pass, include equally complex language, be of equal length to the 
experimental clips and engaged working memory in some instances (e.g. mathematical 
calculations). To answer correctly participants had to be able to recruit a range of general 
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cognitive faculties, which makes the isolated group difference observed between the 
experimental clips puzzling, if one adopts this standpoint. While it is unlikely therefore, 
that the experimental group difference was solely a result of EF impairments, future 
research that systematically controls for the role of these processes would be an 
important avenue of enquiry. 
 
4.2.2 Verbal Abilities and the Strange Stories Film Task 
 
Verbal abilities were associated with the social elements of the SSFt and this finding 
has been well documented in the social cognition literature in both children (Happé, 1995) 
and adults in dynamic tasks  of social cognition (Golan, et al., 2008). The results certainly 
suggest that adults are able to infer mental states, but adults with HFA may use verbally 
mediated compensatory strategies to explicitly decipher the social situation rather than an 
‘intuitive’ reading of it (Bowler, 1992). Correlation does not equal causation, so caution is 
necessary in extrapolating beyond these findings; however, verbal abilities may provide 
individuals with HFASD an alternate strategy to generate a verbal response that explicitly 
states that an intention has been represented (Lind & Bowler, 2009). The implementation 
of compensatory strategies is a potential hypothesis as to why individuals can pass 
laboratory based tasks of social understanding, where verbal abilities are [ as shown in the 
current study] associated with performance, yet these high verbal abilities do not translate 
into real-world adaptive behaviour (Klin et al., 2007).  
 
The demands of the social world are multi-faceted and fast paced. Relevant 
information, therefore, has to be processed and irrelevant information ignored to 
accurately infer meaning (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). These explicit verbal strategies may 
differentially affect those with ASD when reasoning about mental states in such an 
environment, due to an overall slowing in processing speed when other cognitive 
demands are high (Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson, 2011). A limiting factor of the 
current research is that compensatory strategies were not directly assessed. For the most 
part, reaction time is the only proxy measure used to assess the presence of a potential 
compensatory strategy (this in itself is a limitation and will be discussed in the future 
research section). If response latencies are greater for individuals with ASD it is 
hypothesized that the individuals may not be processing the social information as 
automatically as controls, especially if reaction time differences are only present when 
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mental state representation is necessary to pass. The research measuring reaction time in 
social cognition paradigms have yielded mixed findings with individuals with HFASD both 
in adults (Heavey, et al., 2000)  and in children (Chevallier, et al., 2011) and between 
vignette based (White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011) and dynamic tasks using actors or 
cartoons (Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008; Heavey, et al., 2000).  
 
While it was not assessed in the current study, the author’s impression was that for 
individuals with ASD, processing speed was reduced particularly for the Interaction 
question and that testing sessions were longer overall.  This hints at the possibility of 
increased response latencies, although this crude impressionistic assessment is by no 
means sufficient evidence for the presence or absence of an alternative strategy recruited 
by the HFASD group for completing the task. The neuropsychological literature points to a 
cognitive style of ASD being slow but accurate on cognitive tasks (Johnston, Madden, 
Bramham, & Russell, 2011) so capturing response latencies would be an interesting 
avenue for future research using this measure. It would be particularly interesting to 
capture latency by accuracy interactions with the current task. If individuals with ASD 
were slower (the author’s impression) but still inaccurate (the findings), it would suggest 
that potential strategies were affording no benefit to the individuals when assessing real 
time social understanding. This would sit in contrast to vignette based measures, which 
have found greater response latency time in association with increased accuracy (White, 
et al., 2011), lending greater support for the ecological validity of the task.  
 
4.2.3 Understanding the Interaction Question 
 
One particularly novel element of the current study was asking participants ‘if you 
were in x’s situation what would you say next?’ or the Interaction question. The wording 
was considered in depth in order to reduce as far as possible demands on imagination 
which is known to be affected in ASD (Lord, et al., 1989). Participants had to therefore 
generate a response that was their own, regarding the situation, taking into account the 
perspective and information available to the character. The filming, using first person 
perspective camera work and was intentionally designed to simulate a real life 
conversation to further facilitate responding to this question. Clearly the design is by no 
means approaching the naturalistic quality of the empathic accuracy studies where ASD 
participants have to infer intentions in conversational partners (Ponnet, et al., 2005) 
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however, the current study overcomes difficulties with vignette based paradigms used in 
previous research studies that have assessed individuals with ASD traits’ responses to 
‘what would you do next?’ (Jameel, et al., 2014).  
 
The Interaction question yielded the greatest group difference for the SSFt, showed a 
satisfactory degree of internal consistency, and differences could not be attributed to 
verbal abilities. One explanation is that the findings could be seen as a bi-product of poor 
performance on the Intention question. It would not be surprising if individuals who 
struggled to infer the meaning of the speaker then provided answers that did not respond 
to this communicated meaning. In terms of a ToM account of the social difficulties 
observed in ASD, one would expect the scores on the Intention questions to predict 
Interaction question scores (Frith, 1994; Hill & Frith, 2003). Results partially supported 
this prediction, as descriptive analysis showed some clips had similar Intention and 
Interaction difference scores between groups (e.g. White Lie, Joke, Mixed Emotions) 
although this was not universal across the clips. Additionally, there was a significant 
correlation in the control group and a trend in the ASD group between the Intention and 
Interaction scores. However, as Intention scores increased in the ASD group they were not 
associated with higher Interaction scores as seen in the control group, and the Interaction 
scores for several clips/themes were much lower in the ASD than control group despite 
similar Intention scores. These findings suggest that difficulties on the Interaction 
question went beyond secondary problems due to poor attribution of intentions. 
Mentalizing abilities could therefore be conceived as necessary but not sufficient for 
Interaction abilities in the individuals with ASD.  
 
Again, executive functioning differences between groups may have a potential role, 
particularly as verbal generation impairments have been observed in adults with HFASD 
(Hill, 2004). The absence of group differences for the interaction question in the control 
clips suggests that poor verbal generation alone cannot account for the group differences. 
A caveat to this argument however, is that the Interaction questions for the controls were 
often related to a structured problem where a suggestion was made that the participants 
had to respond to (e.g. paying a bill monthly or every year). Choosing appropriate 
solutions to problems has been shown to cause little difficulty for individuals with HFA 
compared to generating the solution to the problem in a forced choice paradigm (Channon, 
et al., 2013). Overall, if generation abilities alone were to account for the differences 
between groups then one would expect the control films to yield group differences and 
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that was not the case in the current study. That said, ceiling effects on the control clips 
were observed in both the ASD and control group, meaning true group differences may not 
have been detected. This is a limitation in most social cognition paradigms (Heavey, et al., 
2000) that this study has therefore only partially addressed  
 
Possible insights into the Interaction questions group difference may come from the 
moral reasoning literature, which has shown a decoupling of intentional understanding 
from punishing behaviour and moral responsibility (Buon, et al., 2013). In this literature 
the outcome of the situation seems to bear more weight for individuals with ASD 
compared to the mental states the situation is contingent upon (Moran, et al., 2011); ‘It’s 
not the thought that counts’. The Forget scene in the current study highlights this. 
Individuals with ASD were more likely to see the act of forgetting as the character’s fault 
and/or become angry because of the outcome, thus assigning more responsibility to a 
mistake. In addition, research has shown that moral behaviour in ASD is guided more by 
rules than the intentions or internal states of others (Zalla, et al., 2011).  
 
Within the Persuasion scene the responses of individuals with ASD are similar to 
controls on the Interaction question. In this scene, a pregnant character wants her partner 
to give up smoking. A clear rule of ‘don’t smoke around others’ or ‘don’t smoke around 
pregnant women’ could be applied to generate a suitable interaction without directly 
integrating the partner’s ‘wanting’. In this scenario, the behavioural outcome would be the 
same. Similarly, a ‘stock phrase’ or ‘social script’ account may prove a helpful heuristic in 
understanding the preserved Interaction scores in some circumstances, but not in others 
(Volden & Johnston, 1999). The recruitment of such scripts has been posited as a possible 
explanation as to why individuals with ASD appear to do well at inferring the thoughts and 
feelings of others in generic conversations (Ponnet, et al., 2005), but may struggle when a 
conversation is more chaotic and lacking the predictable structure of a known topic areas 
(Ponnet, et al., 2008). Conversely, it could be this overreliance on rule-based responses 
that makes the generation of the Interaction question responses more challenging for the 
individuals with ASD in situations that are less clearly defined. 
 
Conceptualising the comprehension of intentions as being necessary, but not sufficient, 
for social interaction and in turn peer relations is highlighted in recent work commenting 
on ‘social acting’ in individuals high in ASD traits (Yang & Baillargeon, 2013). ‘Social acting’ 
refers to the use of speech that is intentionally decoupled from the individuals beliefs that 
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is usually for the benefit of the recipient e.g. white lies (Yang & Baillargeon, 2013). Yang 
and Baillargeon (2013) propose that it is the lack of ‘social acting’ and the differential 
appraisal of its utility that predicts peer relation difficulties seen in adults with ASD traits 
rather than deficits in mentalizing abilities. It would be interesting in future research to 
collect qualitative data about the opinions of participants with ASD regarding the 
characters’ behaviour and use of figurative language in conjunction with their evaluation 
of its utility and how both of these relate to social success or difficulty. From Yang and 
Baillargeon (2013) work, even if HFASD participants were able to conceptualise why an 
individual was using figurative language (e.g. to not hurt the other’s feelings), their 
appraisal of its usefulness and subsequent response (e.g. why did you say it’s good when 
you clearly don’t believe it?), may undermine the intentions of the individual.   
 
Developmental psychology literature also points to a feedback system between 
reduced mentalizing abilities and poor peer relations (e.g. children low in ToM are not 
popular play-mates) (Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011). This association, however, is 
mediated by pro-social behaviour (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012), which also 
predicts peer-relations in adults better than mentalizing abilities (Jameel, et al., 2014). 
Taken together, future research using the SSFt could investigate the role of current peer 
relations (or lack thereof) and/or negative past social experiences, which may affect the 
ability to interpret subtle intentions and provide a suitable response to the social 
exchange.  
 
The current findings therefore are in support of accurate intention representation 
being necessary, but not sufficient for appropriate Interactions and a distinct advantage of 
the current research is the increased sensitivity of the current measure to identify 
intention inference dis/abilities in a HFASD sample. From this sensitive platform, 









Strange Stories Film Task Main Project 
 
 92 
4.3 Limitations of the study 
4.3.1 Generalisability 
 
The study had a number of limitations. The age range of both groups was fairly limited, 
with the samples being centred on young adults. While age did not correlate with 
performance on the social cognition measures, extrapolating the findings to an older or 
younger cohort may be unwarranted. Testing a wider age range would be a next step in 
the validation process of the new SSFt measure.  
 
Sampling bias is a possible limitation. The recruitment methodology and testing 
constraints also limited recruitment to individuals who were living either near to or 
commuting to London. They also had to be motivated to attend the session, willing/able to 
sacrifice the time, and interested in taking part in research. The information sheets 
explicitly stated ‘social understanding’ so participants who responded may have had an 
interest in this area. These motivational factors may have biased the findings, although it is 
likely that better adjusted individuals (e.g. without additional social anxiety) took part, so 
that group differences are perhaps more likely to be diluted than exaggerated.  
 
No data were collected on relationship, living circumstances or occupational status so 
the groups cannot be assumed to be matched on these variables. Furthermore, ethnicity 
was not controlled for in the groups and this may be an area of interest given cross-
cultural differences in normative social behaviour. In addition, gender ratios were not 
equivalent in the current study to ASD population estimates of 3.3:1 (males:female) 
(Simonoff, et al., 2008), as all but one of the ASD participants was male. The female 
participant was not an outlier on any task, but the lack of any female participants in the 
ASD group may have underestimated the ASD groups’ performance (Baron-Cohen, 2002).  
 
The sample size was small compared to some recent assessments of social cognition 
with adults with HFASD (Mathersul, et al., 2013b; Spek, et al., 2010) although it was 
comparable to other studies using the standard measures of mentalizing abilities in adults 
with HFASD (Dziobek, et al., 2006; Heavey, et al., 2000; Rogers, et al., 2007). Importantly, 
the group differences found in Dziobek, et al. (2006) research suggested that the current 
study was sufficiently powered to detect group differences of the anticipated magnitude.  
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Order effects were also observed on one dimension of the SSFt (Control clips’ 
Interaction question). While the differences were not isolated to the first or last clip and 
were not different between groups e.g. the ASD group and not the controls were affected 
by order, the presence of an order effect is likely to reflect participants in each group 
rather than order. The use of a randomisation procedure to order could overcome this 
limitation in future research.  
 
Because of the exploratory nature of the study and the design and inclusion of a 
completely novel task, many variables were examined and there were multiple statistical 
comparisons. The number of tests in the association analysis necessitated reducing the 
alpha level to control for type 1 error. The study is likely to have been underpowered to 
detect differences at this stringent alpha level in many cases. The small sample size is also 
likely to have increased the confidence intervals in the ROC curve’s AUC values for each 
social cognition measure, making comparisons between the tests sensitivity/1-specificity 
difficult to assess. Finally, the small sample further undermined the studies ability to test 
between group differences on the strength of associations across/within measures. These 
statistical limitations highlight the preliminary nature of the findings and that caution 
should be exercised when considering the utility of the SSFt. Future research with larger 
samples would overcome these limitations. 
 
One individual’s diagnosis was not confirmed using ADI-R as a reliable informant was 
not available to provide a developmental history. While his diagnosis was provided by an 
expert clinician in an outpatient national-specialist tertiary service (within which all the 
participants were diagnosed) with the support of an ADOS, this lack of informant-based 
developmental history is a limitation.    
 
4.3.2 The Strange Stories Film Task 
 
The measure itself was limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Intention domain 
did not reach the satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha level of 0.7 suggesting that the inter-item 
correlation was adequate but not satisfactory, which is also highlighted in the low alpha 
level in the PST variable. While this reflects that the measure may not assess a single 
underlying construct (Devine & Hughes, 2013), the test was designed to have items with 
varying levels of difficulty (first and second order ToM) and expected PST complexity, and 
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this is likely to have added to the somewhat low rates of internal consistency. The control 
films’ low rates of internal consistency across all the domains could be argued as a 
limitation, although these films were not designed to tap a unitary underlying construct 
and were few in number (number of variables being related to alpha). 
 
Ceiling performance on the Memory questions on both the experimental and the 
control clips suggests the SSFt is potentially affected by the same problems as previous 
measures in not having sufficiently challenging questions to control for general cognitive 
abilities (Dziobek, et al., 2006). Future work should establish the psychometric properties 
of this novel test, including test-retest and split half reliability. 
 
The current version of the SSFt and this study was not designed to examine 
performance differences across distinct types of non-literal utterance. Since, due to time 
constraints, only one clip was included per theme, theme effects could not be 
distinguished from clip idiosyncrasies.  Future work using multiple clips per theme, 
normed for difficulty, could test the hypothesis that different themes differ in the degree of 
mental state inference necessary. For example, understanding an utterance arising from a 
misunderstanding (e.g. she thought he was a burglar) is arguably simpler in terms of 
mental state representation than double-bluff (e.g. she wants him to think she’s joking, so 
tells him the truth because it is so unbelievable). However, as there was only one item per 
theme, it is impossible to isolate the scores of the theme as being related to the linguistic 
concept per se as demonstrated in Happé’s (1993) early work comparing similes, 
metaphors and irony to ToM comprehension.  
 
The development of the measure may also be conceptually limited by the methodology 
of consensus between researchers with regard to what is considered an accurate 
interpretation or response. Johnston, et al. (2008) provides an insightful yet critical 
appraisal of the methodology of consensus to determine the most accurate description of a 
social stimulus. They use the Eyes test as a case in point, where the true emotion of the 
pictured individual is not identified, but decided upon by the authors. While the current 
study overcomes this limitation in so far as the actors were directed and the emotion 
agreed upon, the scoring overall may have been biased by the researchers’ own cultural 
opinions of what constitutes an ‘irrelevant’ response. This criticism applies to all social 
cognition measures using actors (Devine & Hughes, 2013; Dziobek, et al., 2006; Golan, et 
al., 2008; Golan, et al., 2006; Heavey, et al., 2000) and agreement between (neurotypical) 
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raters to score responses, so is not unique to the current research. However, it questions 
the objectivity of the measure and calls into question the pursuit of objectivity in this line 
of research. Leading from this, Milton (2012) argues that the ToM hypothesis places the 
social deficit within the individual, which misrepresents the relational context within 
which social exchanges occur. He uses the term ‘double empathy problem’ to highlight that 
‘the social difficulty’ is bi-directional in so much as it resides in both the ASD individual 
and those without the diagnosis; if researchers with ASD had devised the scoring system 
would the same ‘irrelevant’ responses have being coded as such or this kind of research 
been pursued in the first place? Such theoretical critiques raise interesting considerations, 
with regard to the nature of and direction of future research in the field of social cognition.  
 
What appears to be relatively uncontentious is that interaction between agents (Zaki, 
Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008), contextual effects and the use of ever more sophisticated tools 
that reflect real life interactions are essential for assessing social cognition; this piece of 
research is a small step in that direction.   
 
4.4 Clinical Implications 
 
The Autism Act 2009 was a landmark change in UK legislation; restructuring service 
provision to accommodate the needs of adults with ASD became a legal duty. The 
accompanying policy documentation that followed the Autism Act 2009 highlights a 
strategy to better equip society to understand, value and support adults with ASD in the 
UK (Social, Care Local Government and Care Partnership Directorate, 2014). Health care 
professionals have a duty of care to use measures that provide an accurate description of 
individuals with ASD’s strengths and difficulties. The current research offers clinicians a 
possible tool to use in the assessment of mentalizing difficulties in adults with ASD. It is 
relatively short to administer and has a reliable scoring system. The Interaction question 
also gives a unique insight into whether the individual’s difficulties generating social 
responses extend beyond their mentalizing dis/abilities. This provides clinicians with a 
clearer direction for targeted interventions or support for individuals with HFASD. While 
the existing evidence for the link between training studies of ToM and real world 
perspective taking abilities is not promising in children (Begeer et al., 2011; Kasari & 
Patterson, 2012), or adults (Palmen, et al., 2012), the use of sensitive measures is of 
potential benefit in assessing changes in mentalizing abilities in already high functioning 
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individuals over time. Such interventions would be particularly beneficial for those 
individuals that seek relationships yet do not have the skills to maintain them, which lies 
in contrast to the lay perception that individuals with ASD are not socially motivated 
(Huws & Jones, 2010). Test re-test reliability would be essential to verify before this next 
step could be taken. 
 
Mental health problems have been shown to be elevated in ASD populations (Simonoff, 
et al., 2008) with social anxiety being one the more common conditions (White, Oswald, 
Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009). Furthermore, awareness of social difficulties in a higher 
functioning group may be elevated, creating a vicious cycle exacerbating difficulties of 
anxiety and social impairments (White et al., 2013). Recent studies have shown that 
treating co-morbid anxiety in HFASD with modified CBT protocols has a significant impact 
on anxiety symptoms (Lang, Regester, Lauderdale, Ashbaugh, & Haring, 2010;. Storch et 
al., 2013) and can reduce core social difficulties (Sze & Wood, 2008). The new measure 
could be used to assess mentalizing abilities before and after therapeutic interventions for 
social anxiety in adults with HFASD, to assess how interrelated these two constructs are. 
 
4.5 Future Research  
 
The preliminary nature of this study calls for future research to first and foremost 
support the construct validity and reliability of the measure. The findings are encouraging; 
however, replication studies will be essential to overcome a number of the statistical 
limitations of this study, such as small sample size.  
 
Administration and scoring of the SSFt is not overly time consuming, however 
clinicians’ time is often scarce. The participants’ responses from the current open-ended 
questions could, in the future, be used to create a forced choice version of the measure. 
Alongside the correct responses, distracter answers could include purely ‘physical’ 
answers, incorrect answers that include mental state terminology and partially correct 
answers. Both accuracy rates and the nature of errors between groups could then be 
analysed (Montag, et al., 2011). Additionally, if the answers were presented electronically, 
response time could be measured. Furthermore, such a task could be uploaded onto an 
online platform allowing the possibility of reaching a broader demographic and larger 
sample. The sensitivity of the current measure suggests that mentalizing difficulties/skills 
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in the normal population could be assessed and an alternate platform would potentially 
open up these research opportunities.  
 
There are of course pros and cons to a forced choice design. Research in the problem 
solving literature has shown intact abilities in ASD individuals abilities to chose 
appropriate solutions to day-to-day problems with concurrent difficulties in generating 
them (Channon, et al., 2013). Furthermore, proving participants answers provides an 
alternative route to completing the task as highlighted by the work of Johnston et al. 
(2008). In all, a forced choice version would be an exciting next step for the SSFt although 
careful consideration of the limitations will be essential to the development of an alternate 
version.  
 
The lack of association between the PT domain in the ASD group and performance on 
the social cognition behavioural measures, calls into question whether they are tapping 
the same cognitive empathy construct as being measured by the IRI. It also calls for 
additional research in the field of insight into mentalizing abilities in adults with HFASD.  
The literature suggests that self-report measures are valid in HFASD sample for emotion 
processing (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). With regard to personal reflection on PT difficulties, 
informants may prove helpful in unpicking whether ASD participants and/or informants 
are accurately reporting PT abilities (Demurie, et al., 2011) or whether the two constructs 
are really not as related as previous research has assumed (Rogers, et al., 2007). 
 
The reliance on verbal and behavioural responses makes the measure an explicit task 
of mentalizing, so a social orientating deficit account cannot be falsified, the ASD group 
were not attending to relevant social cues for example (Klin, et al., 2003). Future research 
may be able to explore this hypothesis further with the use of eye-tracking data, which has 
yielded differences in explicit vs. implicit strategies in HFASD when responding to social 
cognition tasks (Senju, et al., 2009). It would be interesting to evaluate whether different 
parts of the face (e.g. eyes vs. mouth) are attended to (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & 
Cohen, 2002) and how this related to performance in decoding the intended meaning of 
the speaker and subsequent responses to interaction questions .  
 
While age was not associated with performance on the measure, the demographic 
range was relatively small. It would be of interest to assess whether the measure could be 
used in a range of demographics including adolescents and older adults. The 
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developmental trajectory of mentalizing abilities has been studied most in childhood, with 
mentalizing capabilities in adolescence being relatively under-researched despite the 
demands of social cognition being extremely high during this developmental stage 
(Blakemore, 2008; Happé & Frith, 2013). Research has revealed that mentalizing abilities 
are continually developing across late adolescence into adulthood (Dumontheil, et al., 
2010). Better understanding of the aging process of mentalizing in ASD would be an 
interesting line of research, and the SSFt might be used to explore its interaction with peer 
relations, isolation, quality of life and health and wellbeing.  
 
Qualitative methodology may be an avenue of potentially fruitful research. Creation of 
the Interaction question in the SSFt resulted from a conversation with an associate of the 
author who was diagnosed with HFASD in adulthood. A theme of this conversation was 
that the generation of an appropriate response was challenging even when he knew why 
people were saying what they were saying. Insights from the autobiographies of 
individuals with HFASD have taught the research communities substantially about the 
talents and difficulties of HFASD individuals (Frith, 1991). Exploring individuals’ 
subjective experience of completing the measures would be extremely helpful in 
understanding what strategies they use to understand the situations. Were they using cues 
from the films and/or past experiences to guide responses? Did they find the scenarios 
believable and/or could relate to the situations the character’s found themselves in (e.g. 
looking for a romantic partner while being in a relationship)? Did they find the acting or 
the emotions unbelievable and did this affect their ability to resonate with the characters? 
These are all unanswered questions that could be addressed with a thematic analysis of 
participant’s understanding of the test itself.  
 
A recent theory has suggested that it is potentially the implicit understanding of what 
a task is attempting to test and what is expected by the experimenter that may 
differentiate controls and those with ASD in the domain of EFs (White, 2013). Thus, the 
mentalizing difficulties observed in the ASD group in the current study may also be 
impairing the ASD individuals from the onset with regard to what is expected of the task, 
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The current study developed a novel, dynamic, video-based measure to assess 
mentalizing abilities in HFASD adults. HFASD adults’ performance was characterized by 
fewer accurate inferences, less psychological state language and a reduced ability to 
generate a suitable next comment in an interaction where character’s intentions were 
communicated through non-literal language. Intention scores were observed to be 
necessary, but not sufficient, for good generation of conversational contributions, which 
most effectively differentiated the two groups. The new task showed convergent validity 
with traditional social cognition measures, cognitive empathy and ASD symptomatology, 
but for the ASD group these associations were often a reflection of verbal abilities. 
Alexithymia was not associated with performance for either group although it was 
elevated overall in the HFASD sample.  
 
This study suggests that the mentalizing difficulties observed in HFASD are but one 
piece in a large and complex puzzle of social functioning. However, the current task 
provides clinicians and researchers with a more sensitive tool to assess social insight, 
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6.1 SSFT Experimental Scripts 
 
 
Direction: Any shots of dialogue are filmed directly from a first person perspective of 
the other character with a few seconds extra. All other shots are filmed from a third 
person perspective.  
 
Before participants start the test researcher reads/they can read: 
 
You are about to watch a series of short clips where two characters will be interacting 
with one another. Following each clip you will be asked to answer a number of questions 
regarding what you have seen. For all of the clips, the characters will remain the same; one 
man called Max and one woman called Alice. However, it is important that each clip be 
viewed as independent from each other and that character’s actions and utterances in 
previous clips do not influence decisions about character’s behaviour in future clips. Do 
you have any questions? 
 
Qs for each clip = 
 
1) ‘Why did X say that? 
2) ‘If you were X, what would you have said in that situation. 





SCENE 1. HALLWAY/OUTSIDE - DAY 
Alice and Max stand in a hallway. Max puts on a coat. Alice holds the door open and 
kisses him goodbye.  
ALICE 
Mark lives at number 52… see you later. 
12
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Hey Mark I’m outside your house…number 25. 
 
 
SCENE 2. KITCHEN - NIGHT 
Max and Alice are laying the Table for dinner. Max is dressed in a shirt and Alice is in 




Rob’s coming tonight for dinner. (seriously) 










SCENE 3. KITCHEN - DAY 
 
Max is preparing food. Alice enters with coat on.  
MAX 
OK I need potatoes for the dinner tonight and whatever you want for 
pudding…(gives Alice some change) that should be enough. Thanks. 




What? I got the cake for pudding. 
12
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SCENE 4. OFFICE - DAY 
 
Alice and Max pretend to row across the office on chairs coming from main door. 
Alice is in front and Max behind.  
 
MAX 
(smiling and looking 
happy) 
And one… And two… And. 
ALICE  
(turning to max, 
slightly annoyed but 
still smiling) 
Hey, you splashed me. 
 
SCENE 5. LOUNGE - DAY 
Max and Alice play a computer game, which ends. She celebrates by throwing her 






















SCENE 6. OUTSIDE - DAY 
 
Max and Alice are walking through the park. Max spots the children’s playground 




Please push me mummy! 
Appearance reality  
 
SCENE 7. BUS STOP - DAY 
 
Alice waits at the bus stop. Max walks up to the bus stop in a superman t-shirt.   
 
MAX 




Why are you here Max, your superpowers 
not working today? 
 
SCENE 8. OUTSIDE - DAY 
Alice and Max standing in the kitchen tying some balloons to a chair.  
 
MAX 
(neutral but smiling 
at the end) 
Cool, people should be here any second.. do 
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SCENE 9 HALLWAY - DAY 
Alice waits in living room drawing on a moustache. Max comes in dressed in dress 
and Alice checks him out 
 
MAX 








SCENE 9.5 OUTSIDE - DAY 
 
Max comes out of the house to put some rubbish into the bin, and notices some 
flowers on the pavement. He looks around and picks them up.  
CUT TO Max is sitting at the Table and the roses are in a vase on the Table. Alice 
walks in.  
ALICE 
(grinning happily) 
Oh Max! You shouldn’t have! How lovely! 
Alice bends over and kisses Max. 
 
MAX 
I picked them especially as I knew Roses 















SCENE 10. KITCHEN - DAY 
 
Alice and Max are eating. Alice sees Max eating loads but Alice isn’t eating anything. 
Max raises his head looks expectant 
MAX 




It’s wonderful, but I’m not really hungry. 
 
SCENE 11. LOUNGE - DAY 
Max and Alice are sitting in living room. Alice is holding a guitar. 
ALICE 
(nervous and expectant) 
I’ve been working on this for ages and I think 
I have finally got it. I think my songs gonna 
end like this… 
She strums a badly played chord. 
ALICE 
Ooo ooo ooo yeah... 
 
MAX 
(nodding his head 
encouragingly and 
half smiling) 















SCENE 12. KITCHEN - DAY 
Max and Alice sit at the Table. There are finished plates of food on the Table and they 
are eating sweets. Alice picks up a packet of sweets and empties it and there is one left that 




Oh ok…look away? 
 
Alice picks up sweet and places in her left hand.  
 
MAX 
Can I look? 
 
ALICE 
Yep, which one?... think I can feel something 
in my left hand… 
Alice shakes her hand a little. 
 
 
SCENE 13. LOUNGE - DAY 
   
Max is on the computer scrolling through women’s profiles on a dating website. 
Hearing the noise of Alice opening the door, Max looks up. He brings up a work 
document. Alice walks in. 
 
ALICE 
Hi honey, what you up to? 
Alice leans over and kisses Max. 
MAX 
(casually) 
Oh, just looking for a new girlfriend! 
12
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SCENE 14. OFFICE - DAY 
Max is wearing a suit. His tie is a bit loose and shirt messy and he is sleeping at his 




Bryan needed the report for the meeting at 
midday, why haven’t you sent it through? 
MAX 
(annoyed) 
Ummm…because I’ve just been sleeping all 
afternoon (in sarcastic tone). 
Irony 
 
SCENE 15. BEDROOM - DAY 
An alarm clock shows 8:55am. Alice awakes and looks at the alarm clock with surprise. 
 








(annoyed but calm 
voice) 
I’ve got all day Max, take your time. 
 
SCENE 16. KITCHEN - DAY 
 
Alice is standing at the counter. There is lots of mess all over the side. Max walks in 
with lots of shopping bags and looks around in despair.  
ALICE 
(questioningly) 









No, this is just perfect. 
 
SCENE 17. LOUNGE - DAY 
 











SCENE 18. OFFICE/LOUNGE - DAY 





I’m sure I’ll do a great job… Yes I’m confident 
I can manage the whole team… Thank you so 
much for offering me the job  
Alive puts down the phone and smiles. 
CUT TO Alice and Max are sitting on the sofa. Both are smiling and she is wearing the 
same suit. They clink glasses. 
ALICE 
(worried) 
God this new position is going to be so 
challenging. 
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Max and Alice are in the park. Max is throwing ashes and is crying. CUT Max and 






Max is crying but smiling and looking happy at the photographs.  
 
MAX 
It makes me so happy seeing us all together 
in the photos 
 
SCENE 20. LOUNGE - DAY 
 
Max and Alice are sitting on the sofa. Max has his computer in front of him. 
 
MAX 
(a bit embarrassed) 
Jim from work just sent me this disgusting 





















SCENE 20.5 OFFICE - DAY 
 
Max sitting at his desk at work ad answers his telephone.  
 
MAX 
(looking and sounding low) 
Hey NicK (pause) No, they gave the promotion to Alice, I really thought I’d got it this 
time….(looks up).sorry mate I;ll call you later (hangs up) 
 












SCENE 21. LOUNGE - DAY 
 
Alice is sitting with a suit case and checking her tickets. Max goes to get up.  
 
MAX 
(tired and run down) 
I’m going to have a bath. I’m really tired. 
 
ALICE 
Oh please can you give me lift to the station 
Max… 
 
She sniffs melodramatically. 
13
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I’ve got a cold starting I think. 
SCENE 22. kitchen - DAY 
 
 
Max and Alice sit at the Table and Max hands Alice a piece of paper. Alice gestures 
that she doesn’t want it. 
ALICE 
Sorry Max, but we’ve practiced a million 
times, I don’t really feel like going through 
your interview questions again right now. 
 
MAX 
Please Alice, If we don’t practice tonight I’ll 
forget everything in the interview. 
 
SCENE 23. SOFA - DAY 
 
 
Alice sits on sofa reading book. Max enters in coat and sits down next to her. 
ALICE 




I know you find my mum difficult but if 




SCENE 24. GARDEN - DAY 
 
















SCENE 25. KITCHEN/LIVING ROOM - DAY 
 
Max answers the phone in the kitchen. 
 
MAX 
You want to speak to Alice? Ok let me just go 
and get her. 
 
Max walks into room covering phone with his hand and trying to hand it to Alice. 




Oh um sorry she’s not actually here right now, can I take a message? 
 
SCENE 26. KITCHEN/PUB - DAY 
Max has dinner laid for two and pot of food. He looks impatiently at his watch and 
calls Alice on her mobile.  
 














SCENE 27. BEDROOM - DAY 
 
The alarm clock goes off and Max hits the snooze button, rolling back into bed. Fade 
in and out. Max wakes up abruptly and gazes at the clock showing 9am. Cut. Max 
walks hurriedly into the office and sits next to Alice. 
 
ALICE 
What took you so long? 
 
MAX 





SCENE 28. SHOP - DAY 
 
A woman walks into a shop. Max and Alice are outside. 
MAX 
I’ll just grab some fruit, won’t be a second.. 
The woman is in the shop and Max approaches her – she is comparing two types of 
apple. 
MAX 
Excuse me, do you have any kiwis out the 
back? 
 
SCENE 29. OUTSIDE HOUSE - NIGHT 
Max approaches the front door at night and looking for his keys. He calls Alice but it 
goes straight to answer phone. Max makes an annoyed expression and hangs up. He 
then looks around and climbs up and opens front window. 
CUT TO Alice who is walking along the street. She sees someone breaking in. She 
looks afraid and then angry. 
ALICE 










SCENE 30. KITCHEN - DAY 
Alice sits at Table. The phone rings and she puts her hands free set on, talking while 
on the computer.  
ALICE 
Hi this is Alice speaking, ah ha… no we don’t 
have double glazing fitted at the moment…’ 
 











SCENE 31. KITCHEN - DAY 
Alice sits at kitchen Table eating some food. Max walks in and sits down. 
MAX 




Get up with the chickens today Max? 
 
SCENE 32. OUTSIDE - DAY 















SCENE 33. KITCHEN - DAY 
Max and Alice are sitting at a Table. 
MAX 
I think that if John would just own up to what 
he has done it would all be ok between us. 
ALICE 




SCENE 34. OFFICE - DAY 
Max is sitting at his desk. Alice enters and puts cup of coffee next to him. He sips a 
cup of coffee and pulls a disgusted face 
MAX 
Alice This coffee tastes like mud. 
ALICE 
(smiling) 
Yes, it's fresh ground. 
 
SCENE 35. KITCHEN - DAY 
Max and Alice sit at breakfast Table. Max is reading a newspaper. He folds it up and 
puts it down, rolling his eyes. 
ALICE 
What have the party got say about 
everything that’s Happéning then? 
MAX 
Well unfortunately Alice, politicians are like 
bins. They should both be changed regularly, 
and for the same reason. 
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SCENE 36. LOUNGE - DAY 
Max is sitting on the sofa watching TV. Alice walks in and sits down. 
ALICE 
You watching the news? 
MAX 
Yeah… have you noticed that they always 
start with good evening on this program and 
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6.2 SSFT Control Scripts 
 
 
SCENE 37. KITCHEN - DAY 




MAX puts his hand over the end of the PHONE and turns to ALICE. 
MAX  
Ok, we can pay for our line rental monthly, 
which will cost us 15 pound a month or we 
can pay 120 now for the year. 
ALICE 
Well we both have the money now so lets 
pay for the year. 
 
Over the year £120 works out cheaper than £15 a month 
 
SCENE 38. KITCHEN - DAY 
MAX and ALICE are sitting at the Table. MAX is holding a utility bill. 
MAX 
Alice... We've got November's gas bill to pay. 
We can pay the bill now based on an average 
of what we’ve used in the last six month. Or, 
we can send them a reading from the meter 
and pay based on that. 
ALICE considers the options. 
ALICE 
They use the last six months... Ok... let's pay 
using the estimate.  
 
The estimated bill will be based on the summer months estimate, which will be cheaper 








SCENE 39. KITCHEN - DAY 
ALICE and MAX sit in front of a half finished meal.  
ALICE 
God I'm stuffed. I don't think I can eat 
anymore but I don't want to waste anything.  
MAX 
Me too... I know, I'll make soup tomorrow.  
 
Making soup will use up the left over food.  
 
SCENE 40. KITCHEN - DAY 
MAX and ALICE sit at the Table reading a newspaper.  
ALICE 
They've announced a hose pipe ban for this 
summer, so we won't be able to use the hose 
for watering the garden.  
MAX 
Sure, I won't.... Before we head out I'm gonna 
take a shower.  
ALICE 
Remember to put the bucket in the shower. 
 
They can use the shower water to water the garden plants.  
 
SCENE 41. LOUNGE - DAY 
ALICE sits on the sofa. MAX walks in with a shopping bag in his hand.  
ALICE 
Hey… did you pick up that second hand 
climbing harness? 
MAX 
No... Even though I'm really short of money 
and it cost twice as much, I went to the shop 
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It is more important for a climbing harness to be safe than for it to cost less.  
 
 
SCENE 42. KITCHEN - DAY 
ALICE and MAX sit at the Table. Alice is on a computer. 
ALICE 
I have a choice of two anti-malarial pills for 
my beach holiday. They cost the same, but 
they have different side effects. One makes 
you sleepy and the other makes you sensitive 
to the sun. What do you think? 
MAX 
I think you should buy the pill that makes 
you sleepy.  
It would be hard to enjoy a beach holiday in Thailand while being photosensitive.  
 
SCENE 43. SOFA - DAY 
MAX sitting on sofa and Alice comes and joins. Gestures to plant on coffee Table. 
MAX 
I got this new tropical plant today.  
ALICE 
Great.... You could put it in the south facing 
bathroom upstairs.  
 
The plant would like humid and light conditions.  
 
SCENE 44. LOUNGE - DAY 
MAX and ALICE are sitting with their legs up looking at each other. 
ALICE 
Do you need me to water anything while 
you're away for two weeks? 
MAX 
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SCENE 45. KITCHEN - DAY 
ALICE and MAX sit at the Table. ALICE is reading a newspaper. She puts it down and 
turns to MAX.  
ALICE 
They are saying in the news that petrol 
prices are going to reach record highs this 
summer.  
MAX 
Maybe we should catch the train to 
Newcastle to visit your family then? 
 
Petrol prices are affecting the cost of driving.  
 
SCENE 46. KITCHEN - DAY 




Oh my god…there has been an outbreak of 
mad cow disease in England again. 
ALICE 
Maybe we shouldn’t eat those beef burgers 
then. 
 
The beef burgers could be carrying the disease.  
 
SCENE 47. KITCHEN 
14
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God..I hope Farmer Tucket can afford to keep his heard of cows. 
 
 
The drought will increase the cost of soy and wheat. Famers who feed their cows on soy 









6.3 SSFT Project Brief for Actors. 
 
Thank you for your interest in the project, 
 
I would like to just briefly remind you of the project details.  
 
A defining feature of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) is an inability to infer and/or 
represent complex mental states of other people. The integration of non-verbal cues e.g. 
facial expression, body language, and verbal utterances within specific social contexts is 
something we all do unconsciously to decipher the meaning of what people are 
communicating, but people with autism can find this challenging.  Adults who have an ASD 
but also have average intellectual abilities are generally able to understanding literal 
verbal utterances where the context and the person’s intentions are concordant with what 
is said. However, when someone communicates using figurative language e.g. sarcasm or 
pretence, one has to ignore the literal interpretation of the verbal information and rely on 
other cues e.g. tone of voice, context etc to decipher the speaker’s intention.  We are trying 
to design a task that taps into this difficulty in ASD and each clip we are filming will 
involve one character uttering a piece of figurative language.  
 
As I mentioned on the phone, the most important feature of this work is that the acting 
is naturalistic and in some ways the project is reliant on this. The clips have been designed 
to be intentionally short to account for memory difficulties in the sample. Portraying the 
linguistic concept in this single utterance is therefore all the more important and 
potentially challenging.   
 
 
Below find a short brief about the characters: 
 
The characters are both approximately 30 years old and working professionals. They 
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They both live in London and work in the service industry. Both their characters find 
their work satisfying although on a day-to-day basis they can find it boring. 
 
Both are confident individuals who are happy in the relationship, but sometimes act in 
ways that suggest they are not committed to each other. However, they are both caring 
people and supportive of one another when it matters. 
 
Your audition time is XXX Please be on time and text my mobile XXX to let me know 
that you have arrived so that I can let you into the building. 
 
Our address is  
 
4 Windsor Walk 
Denmark Hill 
London SE5 8AF 
 
The closest station is Denmark Hill which is literally 2mins walk from the office and 
regular trains depart from Victoria, Blackfiars and London Bridge. 
 
Alternatively, the number 40, 176 and 68 all stop outside the Maudsley Hospital, whcih 
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6.5 The Autism Quotient 
 
The Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ)  
Ages 16+ 
 
SPECIMEN, FOR RESEARCH USE ONLY. 
 
For full details, please see: 
 
S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin and E. Clubley, (2001) 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) : Evidence from Asperger Syndrome/High 
Functioning Autism, Males and Females, Scientists and Mathematicians 




Name:...........................................     Sex:........................................... 
 
Date of birth:...................................     Today’s Date................................. 
 
 
How to fill out the questionnaire 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. 
 
 DO NOT MISS ANY STATEMENT OUT. 
Examples 
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1. I prefer to do things with others rather than 





















3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very 










4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 





















6. I usually notice car number plates or similar 










7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve 











8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 





















10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 






















































15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people 










16. I tend to have very strong interests which I 





















18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to definitely slightly slightly definitely 
15
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get a word in edgeways. 
 
agree agree disagree disagree 











20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 

































































26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to 










27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when 










28. I usually concentrate more on the whole 





















30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a 










31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me 





















33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when 





































36. I find it easy to work out what someone is 











37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 




















39. People often tell me that I keep going on and 










40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 











41. I like to collect information about categories 
of things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, types 










42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be 












































































49. I am not very good at remembering people’s 










50. I find it very easy to play games with children 












The Autism Research Centre 
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6.6 SSFT Pilot Instructions 
Order A 
 
You are about to watch a series of short video clips.  In each clip there will usually be 
the same two characters; a man called Max and a women called Alice. Max and Alice are 
boyfriend and girlfriend, and live and work together. Each video clip is self-contained, and 
what happens in one clip doesn’t relate to what happens in other clips; there isn’t a story 
running from one clip to another. 
 
I will show you each clip only once and after each clip has finished I will ask you three 
questions about what you have just seen.  I will write down your answers and also audio 
record them in case I miss anything.  Some of the questions do not have right or wrong 
answers  – I’m interested in what you think is going on in the clips, so please just answer 
the questions as best you can. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
[If participant asks questions regarding the content of the material e.g. “How long have 
they been in a relationship? “Respond with: 
 
Please give your answers based just on what you see and the information I gave you at 
the beginning. Would you like me to re-read the instructions? ] 
 
[During testing : 
 
If the participant asks in relation to the first question,  “said what” or something to this 
effect, please respond with ‘What they just said?”  
 
If participants cannot generate an answer to the second question that incorporates 
direct speech so for example say ‘ I would make a joke back’, prompt them by saying ‘for 
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Now you are going to watch a series of clips and I will ask you to answer some 
questions after you have viewed each clip just once. 
 
 
Item 1 Forget (potatoes)  
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 





Item 2  Control (Line Rental) 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Who was Max talking to on the phone? 
 
 
Item 3  Lie (Pub) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Where was Alice when she spoke to Max on the phone? 
 
Item 4 Control (Soup) 
 
Why did Max say that? 
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max going to cook the next day? 
 
Item 5 Misunderstanding (burglar) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
15
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Item 6 Mixed Emotions (biking accident) – which bit? 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was the disgusting picture of?’ 
 
Item 7 Persuasion (interview) 
 
Why did Max say that? 
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Max pass across the Table to Alice?  
 
Item 8 (Misunderstanding (Birthday Cake) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max carrying?.  
 
Item, 9 DB (sleep) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice doing before the phone rang?  
 
Item 10 Irony (injection) 
 
Why did Max say that?]  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max doing to his tummy?. 
15
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Item 11 Pretend (computer game) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max holding in his hands?  
 
 
Item, 12 AR (bear) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice wearing?.  
 
Item, 13 Control (hose pipe) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice reading?. 
 
Item 14 Joke (coffee) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What had Alice made for Max?.  
 
Item 15 Forget (present) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next? 
Where had Alice just come from? 
 
Item 16 Irony (late) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
15
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If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Where was Alice standing?.  
 
Item 17 ME (Job) 
 
Why did Max say everything that he said in the clip?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
 What was Max talking about on the phone? 
 
  
Item 18 Control (climbing harness) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Max have in his plastic bag? 
 
Item 19 Joke (politics) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max reading? 
 
Item 20 Misunderstanding (fruit) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in the lady in the shop’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Max want to buy? 
.  
Item 21 Control (pills) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What pills did Max recommend? 
 
Item 22 White Lie (song) 
15
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Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
 ‘What instrument was Alice playing? 
 
Item 23 Control (train) 
 
Why did Max say that? 
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 




Item 24 Idiom (early riser) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice eating?. 
 
Item 25 Lie (phone call) 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max doing before the phone rang?’] 
 
Item 26 ME (urn)  
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice looking at when she was sitting on the bench? 
 
Item 27 Irony (shopping) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max carrying? 
15
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Iie, 28 Forget (house) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Mark’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Who did Max phone?’ 
 
Item 29 Pretend (playground) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Where was Max sitting at the end? 
 
 
Item 30 Persuasion (cold) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Where did Alice ask for a lift to? 
 
Item 31 Control (cows) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
 ‘What did Max say was affected by the drought?’ 
 
Item 32 White Lie (roses) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Where did Max get the flowers? 
 
Item 33 Persuasion (smoking) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
15
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If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Alice say Max was going to be? 
 
Item 34 AR (superman) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max holding? 
 
Item 35 White Lie (dinner) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
How much of her food had Alice eaten?  
 
 
Item 36 Control (cactus) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
How long was Max going away for? 
 
 
Item 37 Idiom (bike) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max fixing? 
 
Item 38 Control (gas bill) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
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Item 39 Lie (late) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
 
Where was Max at the beginning of the clip?  
 
Item 40 Idiom (tango) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Max say John should do? 
 
Item 41 AR (dress) 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
 What was Alice about to put on Max?’ 
 
Item 42 Mixed Emotions (job)  
 
Why did Alice say everything that she said in the clip? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Alice and Max do with their glasses? 
 
Item 43 Persuasion (mum) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
She wants her to come and see his mum. 
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Who does Alice find really difficult?’ 
 
Item 44 DB (sweet) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
16
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What did Alice have in her LEFT hand? 
 
Item 45 Control (plant) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Where did Alice say the plant could go?  
 
Item 46 Pretend (rowing) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice sitting on? 
 
Item 47 DB (dating website) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max looking at on the computer at the start? 
 
Item 48 Joke (news) 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max watching on TV? 
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6.7 Scene Selection 
Theme Content Definitely remove Max 1st alice 1st LR kitchen out/off Max 2nd alice 2nd LR kitchen out/off
Forget House number 1 1
present aware she has forgotten
Potatoes 1 1
Pretend Rowing 1 1




cross dressing 1 1
WL Roses Not a WL
Burnt food 1 1
Song 1 1
DB Sweet 1 1
Dating website 1 1
Sleep 5 exact





no job 1 1
biking accident 1 1
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Theme Content Definitely remove Max 1st alice 1st LR kitchen out/off Max 2nd alice 2nd LR kitchen Out/Off
Persuasion Cold 1 1
interview 2 exact
smoking 1 1
mum 3 exact 
Lie Phone 4 exact
pub 1 1
Late 1 1
Mis Fruit new character
Birthday cake 1 1
burglar 1 1






Social totals 1 4 0 3 2 4 1 2 1 2
Control line rental 1 1
gas bill 4 exact
soup 1 1
hose pipe 1 1
climboing harness 3 exact 
pills 1 1




Control totals 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 3 0
Social totals 1 4 0 3 2 4 1 2 1 2
Overall totals 2 6 1 5 2 6 2 2 4 2
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6.8 SSFT Scoring 
Scoring System  
 
In all cases participants are awarded points for their best answer when multiple 
answers are given. 
 
Mental State Scoring 
 
0 points -  no mental state words.   
 
1point – simple mental state words regarding one character or another character’s 
actions e.g. she was anxious, she wanted him to stop smoking OR words that imply 
psychological states in social context– defending, bullying, compromise, acknowledging, 
concerned etc. 
 
2 points – meta-cognitive statements e.g. beliefs about beliefs OR intentions to affect 
another person’s mental state e.g. she wanted him to feel guilty OR complex collection of 













2 points –reference to Alice thinking that Max is also to blame for what has happened 
between them,; Any reference that doesn’t imply that only John is at fault 
 
Key words : blame, equal responsibility, guilty as well, fault 
 
 
1 point – Simple description of events (things are complicated, it’s a figure of speech); 
response that describes Alice’s position but doesn’t suggest shared responsibility (she is 
taking/defending John’s side,  she disagrees with Max,  she thinks he should make more 
effort); mention of shared responsibility but responsibility is placed on Alice rather than 
Max. 
 
0 points – irrelevant or incorrect information. 
 
Mental state 2 points: 
 
She wants max to know that she is also responsible for what has Happened  
 
Max obviously feels as if he is in the wrong and alice is implying max is also in the 






2 point – A response that acknowledges implication of blame and attempts to clarify, 
reconcile or defend self in situation 
 
1 point - Poorly elaborated description (e.g. id get defensive), or direct speech (e.g. I 
disagree it’s just John’s fault or I agree it does take two to tango).  
16
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0 points – don’t know, response that shows incomplete understanding e.g. what do 
you mean?; socially inappropriate e.g. nothing, or irrelevant response e.g. ‘its their 




1 point - mention of Max needing to own up, confess or admit to what he had done.  
 








Control – Soup  
 
Why? 
2 points – reference to soup being solution to dilemma of feeling full but not wanting 
to waste food; he can use the leftovers to make soup. 
 
1 point – reference to facts (there is food left); states (he and Alice are full; not 
needing to eat anymore). Traits (being practical, kind or nice) or feelings (guilty).  
 
0 – reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (he had to do something, not cause an 
argument, soup is lighter). 
 
Mental state 2 point: 
 
He was suggesting a way of overcoming their dilemma of not wanting to eat and not 





2 point –response that shows acknowledgement of solution even if person doesn’t 
agree or provides alternative solution. 
 
1 point – no acknowledgment of solution e.g. go ahead, stating preference without 
acknowledgement e.g. I don’t like soup. 
 
0 points – don’t know, socially inappropriate in the context of the clip e.g. ‘let’s just 
finish it’, irrelevant or incorrect response e.g. don’t throw it away. 
Memory  
 
1 point – Soup 












2 points – reference to curiosity getting the better of her or overriding/co-occurring 
with her squeamishness or reservation.  
 
1points - mention of just curiosity or squeamishness; mentions both curiosity and 
squeamishness, but where squeamishness or curiosity is thought to be feigned; facts e.g. 
its  a gruesome picture.  
 
0 points – irrelevant/incorrect factors or facts  
 
Mental state 2 point: 
 
Presumably she was inquisitive about the injury but also had a sense of reluctance and 





2 point – acknowledgement of reluctance or mixed feelings. Response that highlights 
that her curiosity got the better of her squeamishness.  
 
1 point – no acknowledgment of emotions but just showing her the picture, 
commenting on the picture or saying ‘have a look’.  Statement that suggests 
squeamishness was feigned. 
 
0 points – don’t know, socially inappropriate e.g. we can’t watch it until you beg, 
irrelevant response or response that doesn’t comprehend holding both emotions ‘why 
would you look if you are squeamish?’ 
 
Memory  
1 point- mentions or describes accident or injury. 
0 points – don’t know or can’t remember or incorrect recall. 
17
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2 points – reference to Alice mistaking or thinking  Max was a burglar or that she 
thought she was being burgled. 
 
1 points - reference to facts (someone was going in the window), state (she was 
surprised) or descriptions (it looked like someone was breaking into the house) or 
statement of alice not knowing it was Max without articulating her misunderstanding. 
 
0 points – factually incorrect or irrelevant answers; mentions thinking that someone 
was going to burgle her house.  
 
Mental state 2 point: 
 
She felt a sense of fear/anxiety about what she thought was someone breaking into her 




2 point – statement or action that resolves misunderstanding by revealing identity or 
explaining situation e.g. don’t worry it’s only me’ or ‘I forgot my keys’ or ‘It’s me’ 
 
1 point –minimal statement that is partially correct e.g. I live here  
 
0 points – don’t know, inappropriate to the social context e.g. nothing, or showing 





1 point – any response iterating he was trying to enter the house e.g. climbing through 
a window or trying to get into the house. NB if participant believes character was a burglar 
breaking into the house then is awarded memory point for articulating this. 
 
0 points – don’t know, can’t remember or incorrect recall.  
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2 points - reference to her lying  or that  she doesn’t want him to know she is in the 
pub.  
 
1 point –partially correct e.g. cover up she is in the pub, reference to feelings without 
elaboration e.g. she feels guilty; facts (she is in a pub, she was supposed to be home for 
dinner); giving him information (she is going to be home soon), but which doesn’t imply 
wanting to alter his belief. 
 
0 points – incorrect intentions are assumed (e.g. having an affair, hide drinking habit), 
without mention of a lie or statement taken literally or irrelevant facts/factors. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 






2 point – statement that accepts information and articulates opinion regarding 
situation or requests more information e.g. ‘Oh okay, do you know what time you’re 
coming back?’ or response that questions Alice’s lie in a socially appropriate manner or 
makes a joke out of situation e.g. ‘I can hear the fruit machines’. 
 
1 point –minimal response that is still socially appropriate e.g. okay. dinners on the 
Table. 
 
0 points – don; know, inappropriate to the social context e.g. accepts lie but is still 
annoyed or states utterance is a lie, or irrelevant response. 
 
Memory 
1 point – in a bar or a pub. 
0 points – don’t know, can’t remember or incorrect recall.  
17
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2 points – any response that references forgetting, misheard or not paying attention. 
 
1 point – partial description that misses central point of forgetting e.g. she was 
justifying her purchase; state (she is surprised, he was annoyed), he looked at her 
questioningly; facts (e.g. she bought a cake). 
 
0 points – incorrect factors (e.g.  she didn’t want to buy potatoes or was only thinking 
of herself) , or facts (e.g. ‘she couldn’t find anything else for pudding’).   
 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 




2 point – statement that acknowledges Alice forgetting and/or clarifies original 
request/Max’s previous statement appropriately or an appropriate joke that references 
forgetting e.g. of course you remembered the cake. 
 
1 point –simple reassurance e.g. don’t worry, just leave it, or positive regard for 
decision without clarification that something was forgotten e.g. great.  
 
0 points – don;t know, inappropriate e.g. implying that forgetting was intentional, or 





1 point - cake or pudding 
 












2 points – reference to him making a joke about the fact he is dressed as a women or 
they have switched roles and are pretending to be in character.  
 
1 pont – desire (he needs the toilet, he doesn’t want to put the lipstick on), physical 
state ( he is wearing women’s clothing), trait ( he is a comedian). 
 
0 points – irrelevant or incorrect answers. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 




2 point – statement that acknowledges or carries on the joke of being dressed in 
women’s clothing/’being a women’ and that he needs the toilet e.g. ‘will you do it sitting 
down now then?’ 
 
1 point – minimal response of what would do/say but still recognizes joke e.g. laugh, 
state its funny.  
 
0 points – don’t know, inappropriate (e.g. simple acceptance of request) or takes 




1 point – lipstick 
 









2 points – any mention of him being sarcastic; he is saying the opposite to what he 
feels /expressing the contrary.  
 
1 point – reference to being unwell (diabetes), a physical act (he just injected himself) 
or statements that highlight his thoughts or intentions behind making his comment 
without mention of irony or sarcasm (he doesn’t really like doing it, it’s a chore/drag, 
sharing his thoughts, make light of the situation) 
 
0 points – incorrect factors e.g. he enjoys it, or facts e.g. he is taking drugs, or 
irrelevant answers. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 
He was being sarcastic because he doesn’t really like it and wants his girlfriend to 




2 point – statement that expresses sympathy or understanding at how hard it is or 
trying to make him feel better while reminding him of the importance of doing it.  
 
1 point –simple reminder of importance of using the injection e.g. ‘it’s for your own 
health’ or that situation could be worse ‘it’s keeping you alive’. Minimal statement of 
sympathy that shows comprehension of sarcasm (e.g. sorry).  
 
0 points – don’t know, inappropriate e.g. nothing or patronizing or jovial remark or 




1 point - injecting himself, using insulin, taking medication or related to diabetes ( a 
sugar boost). NB If they believed he was taking drugs then taking drugs is awarded point. 
 
0 points – don’t know, can’t remember or incorrect recall.  
17
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2 points –statements that mention it is cheaper, they save £30 or it’s a better deal. 
 
1 point – expressing her opinion, reference to having the money now and/or it being 
more convenient/sensible /making financial sense or not wanting to worry about the 
money without mention of it being cheaper.  
 
0 points – incorrect or inappropriate response. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 





2 point – statement that acknowledges idea, shows agreement with option chosen 
and/or with proviso e.g. checking finances.  
 
1 point minimal description of what would say or do. 
 
0 points – don’t know, socially inappropriate e.g. disagreeing without an explanation 





1 point - mention of any communication provider e.g. BT, broadband, or line rental 
company.  
 









2 points -  reference to her desires, beliefs or intention to affect his actions or feelings 
e.g. she wants him to stop smoking, she wants him to not smoke around her, she is trying 
to make him feel guilty. 
 
1 point –facts (he is smoking,  she is pregnant, he is going to be a dad, to stop), 
outcomes (to stop him smoking), statements about him being a father and smoking (its 
irresponsible, he needs to grow up, its not a good influence on the child, its bad for his 
health), but do not reference her intentions.  
 
0 points -  incorrect or irrelevant facts or factors. 
 
2 point mental state answer : 
 





2 point – statement that responds to Alice’s wanting him to give up or showing a 
desire or commitment to quit even if smoking now.  
 
1 point –response that shows will change behavior e.g. smoking outside, without 
acknowledgement of Alice wanting to stop. Minimal responses that are still socially 
appropriate e.g. you’re right. Asking for Alice to sympathise/minimizing e.g. its only one, 
without acknowledgement of wanting to quit.  
 
0 points –don’t know, socially inappropriate e.g. its my decision or my choice, or 
irrelevant comments that don’t respond to Alice’s previous statement e.g. Ill try. 
 
Memory 
1 point – a father, dad. 











2 points – he is joking or an explanation of the joke e.g. he thinks the politicians are 
full of rubbish or are rubbish.  
 
1 point – fats (he is commenting on politics or situation), feelings (he is annoyed), 
traits (he is being  cynical), Max’s intentions/opinion of politicians that miss desire to be 
humorous (politicians lie, he doesn’t like politicians, he thinks the politicians should 
change, politicians don’t tell the truth, discredit the party). 
 
2 point mental state answer: 





2 point –  statement that acknowledges joke and either agrees, asks for clarification, 
more information or challenges his opinion stated in the joke; responds to his joke with a 
second appropriate joke e.g. ‘I hate talking politics with you’. 
 
1 point – simple description of what would say or do e.g. laugh, sigh, I agree with you; 
statement that makes no explicit reference to the presence of a joke.  
 
0 points –don’t know, response that shows no understanding of the joke e.g. what 
does that mean? or directly challenges him missing the point of the joke e.g. ‘that’s not the 




1 point – newspaper, paper or reading. 
 









2 point – mention of double bluff or reference to Max saying the truth in such a way 
(e.g. sarcasm) that Alice will think he is joking/not telling the truth or an expression that 
conveys this e.g. hiding in plain sight.   
 
1 point  -reference to him joking/trying to be funny without reference to Alice not 
believing him, facts (he was looking at a dating website, it’s what he was doing), feelings 
(guilty), or trying to mislead her e.g. pretend doing nothing or play an emotional game. 
 
0 points – incorrect e.g. to try and break up with Alice, he is overly honest or is 
shocking her. Irrelevant answers. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 
Max wanted Alice to think he was joking so she wouldn’t believe that he would be 




2 point – statement that assumes he is joking  and/or makes a second joke in response 
e.g. ‘I have been looking for another boyfriend’. 
 
1 point – simple description of what would say or do e.g. laugh. Socially appropriate 
response that doesn’t acknowledge joke e.g. how was your day?’.Response that asks for 
clarification whether he was joking. 
 
0 points –don’t know, response that assumes statement is sincere, socially 




1 point – dating website or name of website or response that implies other women. 
 
0 points – don’t know, can’t remember or incorrect recall.
17
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2 points -reference to Alice pretending they were rowing a boat; they are playing 
make believe/imaginary game; role play. 
 
1 point  - facts (they bumped into each other), simple intention (she is joking, 
flirtatious, affectionate, being surreal), states (she is being silly, playful, amused), actions 
(messing around, playing a game) or just stating they are rowing without mental state 
words e.g. pretence.  
 
0 points – incorrect or irrelevant response. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 




2 point – statement that continues the make believe scenario or makes a joke out of 
the scenario or appropriate pretence through action e.g. pretending to splash with an 
imaginary oar. 
 
1 point – simple description of what would say or do that makes no acknowledgement 
of joke e.g. I really enjoyed that   
 
0 points –Don’t know, response that understands comment as the truth e.g. apologizes 




1 point – mention of a chair. 
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White Lie  -  
 
2 points - reference to white lie or making her feel good or not wanting to hurt Alice’s 
feelings  
 
1 point -  response that states simple traits (he is nice, being supportive, polite) or is 
simply relational (he likes her). Incomplete response(offering fake praise) or solely 
motivational (so she won’t be annoyed, avoid an argument, reassure her).   
 
0 points – incorrect e.g. ‘he thought it was good’ or only ‘he didn’t like it’, or irrelevant 
responses.   
 
2 point mental state answer: 




2 points – statement that acknowledges that Max’s comment might not have been 
completely honest and either asks for additional clarification or additional feedback in 
socially appropriate manner ‘do you really mean that?’; sarcastic agreement with his 
opinion that implies it could be improved.  
 
1 point –Incomplete response e.g. thank you, that doesn’t appreciate white lie. 
 
0 points –don’t know, socially inappropriate e.g. response that sees comment as 




1 point – mentions guitar. 
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Control Plant  
 
2 points –response that states the tropical plant requires sunlight, warmth and 
humidity (2 needed) and that in the bathroom the plant will get these due to it being south 
facing.  
 
1 point - reference to only warmth, sunlight or humidity due to either it being south 
facing or the bathroom.  Reference to facts (it’s a tropical plant, she’s giving advice, it’ll 
look nice); simple intentions (she is being helpful, letting him know she agrees, supportive, 
she thinks it’s the best place) incomplete answers that do not mention important factors 
(it will grow there). 
 




2 points – statement that shows agreement with option chosen or provides 
alternative that has a rational e.g. kitchen windows. 
 
1 point –Simple alternative without explanation. 
 
0 points – don’t know, socially inappropriate e.g. disagreeing without an explanation, 
or irrelevant response. 
 
2 point mental state answer: 
 
She thinks the upstairs bathroom will be the best environment for the plant to survive 
in and for Max to know she is being helpful.  
 
Memory –  
 
1point - mentions the bathroom. 
 
0 points – don’t know, can’t remember or incorrect recall 
18
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Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
De Crespigny Park 
London, SE5 8AF 
 
INFORMATION SHEET – ASD GROUP 
 
Strange Situations: A Video-Based Test of Social Understanding. 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study looking at the ability to 
understand other people’s thoughts and feelings. Before you decide whether to take part 
in this study, please take time to read the following information carefully.  Please ask if 
there is anything that is not clear to you or if you would like more information.   
 
Why is the study being done? 
 
The study is a student research project, being carried out as part of a Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry.   
 
People with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) often say that they find social 
situations more confusing than their friends and family who don’t have an ASD. This 
research is looking into why this might be. We have created a series of short films that 
show situations that people are faced with everyday and might be confusing or strange. By 
telling us what you think of the films we will better understand how people with an ASD 
view the social world when compared to people of a similar age who do not have an ASD.  
 
This study is important because at the moment there are not many tools that are 
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help us to understand more about how adults with ASD perceive the social world, which 
could in turn helps us to improve assessments and interventions for adults with an ASD in 
the future. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you have a diagnosis of an 
ASD (e.g. autism, Asperger syndrome). 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to you whether you take part in the study or not. If you decide to 
take part, you can change your mind at any time and leave the study without giving a 
reason and only the data collected up until that point will be used.  Refusal to take part in 
this study will not in any way affect you or affect the standard of any care you receive.  If 
you have any questions about this project, please ask the researcher before you decide 
whether to take part.   
  
What do I have to do if I agree to take part? 
If you decide to take part, we will ask you to complete some questionnaires before 
attending and sign a consent form when you arrive. Signing the consent form shows that 
you understand the study and are willing to take part. You will then be asked to view some 
short videos and answer questions about them.. You will also be asked to complete some 
tasks that look at how you understand social situations and other people’s emotions. Some 
of the tasks will be completed on computer and others will involve using pencil and paper. 
The questionnaires and tasks are not a test; there are no right or wrong answers. The 
appointment will take about 90 minutes in total to complete. If you attend this 
appointment you will receive £10 for taking part and will be reimbursed your exact travel 
costs (however this will be negotiated should your travel costs dramatically exceed £5). 
 
 
What are the possible benefits from the research?  
There is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study.  However, we hope the 
information gathered from the study will help us understand more about ASD in 
adulthood. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
18
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Any information you provide will be kept private and will not be shown to anybody 
apart from the researchers. Your data will be stored without your name on it, on a secure 
computer or in a locked cabinet at the Institute of Psychiatry.  Regulatory bodies may wish 
to view this anonymised information for audit purposes only.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be written up in a thesis as part of a Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. The results will also be submitted for publication in academic psychology 
journals.  No personal information will be identified in any publication of the results.  The 
final results of the study will be available to you on request. If the results are published the 




Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the [insert info] 
 
Contact for further information? 
If you have any further questions please feel free to call or email me at any time.   
 
Contact information: 
Mr Kim Murray 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Tel: 0207 848 0223 
Email: kim.k.murray@kcl.ac.uk 
Address: Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Addiction Sciences 
Building 










Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
De Crespigny Park 
London, SE5 8AF 
 
INFORMATION SHEET – Healthy Control Group 
Strange Situations: A Video-Based Test of Social Understanding. 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study looking at the ability to 
understand other people’s thoughts and feelings. Before you decide whether to take part 
in this study, please take time to read the following information carefully.  Please ask if 
there is anything that is not clear to you or if you would like more information.   
 
Why is the study being done? 
 
The study is a student research project, being carried out as part of a Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry.   
 
People with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) often say that they can find social 
situations more confusing than their friends and family who don’t have an ASD. This 
research is looking into why this might be. We have created a series of short films that 
show situations that people are faced with everyday and might be confusing or strange. By 
telling us what you think of the films we will better understand how people with an ASD 
view the social world when compared to people of a similar age who do not have an ASD.  
 
This study is important because at the moment there are not many tools that are 
specifically designed to look at social understanding in adulthood. By taking part, you will 
help us to understand more about how adults with ASD perceive the social world, which 
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Why have I been chosen? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are an adult who does 
not have a diagnosis of an ASD. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to you whether you take part in the study or not. If you decide to 
take part, you can change your mind at any time and leave the study without giving a 
reason and only the data collected up until that point will be used.  Refusal to take part in 
this study will not in any way affect you or affect the standard of any care you receive.  If 
you have any questions about this project, please ask the researcher before you decide 
whether to take part.   
  
What do I have to do if I agree to take part? 
 
If you decide to take part, we will ask you to complete a questionnaire. You may be 
asked to come for another appointment at the Institute of Psychiatry or this may be all we 
require from you. If you come for an appointment you will have to complete some further 
questionnaires before attending and sign a consent form when you arrive. Signing the 
consent form shows that you understand the study and are willing to take part. You will 
then be asked to view some short videos and answer questions about them. You will also 
be asked to complete some tasks that look at how you understand social situations and 
other people’s emotions. Some of the tasks will be completed on computer and others will 
involve using pencil and paper. The questionnaires and tasks are not a test; there are no 
right or wrong answers. The appointment will take about 90 minutes in total to complete.  
If you attend this appointment you will receive £10 for taking part and will be reimbursed 
your exact travel costs (however this will be negotiated should your travel costs 
dramatically exceed £5) 
 
What are the possible benefits from the research?  
There is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study.  However, we hope the 
information gathered from the study will help us understand more about ASD in 
adulthood. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
18
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Any information you provide will be kept private and will not be shown to anybody 
apart from the researchers. Your data will be stored without your name on it, on a secure 
computer or in a locked cabinet at the Institute of Psychiatry.  Regulatory bodies may wish 
to view this anonymised information for audit purposes only.  
 
What will Happén to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be written up in a thesis as part of a Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. The results will also be submitted for publication in academic psychology 
journals.  No personal information will be identified in any publication of the results.  The 
final results of the study will be available to you on request.  If the results are published 




Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the National Research Ethics 
Service Committee London – Westminster (13/LO/0092) and the Institute of 
Psychiatry’s/South London and Maudsley’s Research and Development Office 
(R&D2013/016). 
 
Contact for further information? 
If you have any further questions please feel free to call or email me at any time.   
 
Contact information: 
Mr Kim Murray 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Tel: 07999 929 241 
Email: kim.k.murray@kcl.ac.uk 
Address: Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Addiction Sciences 
Building 









Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
De Crespigny Park 
London, SE5 8AF 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANT 
 
Strange Situations: A Video-Based Test of Social Understanding. 
 
If you wish to take part in the above study, please read and complete the section 
below.   
 
This is to confirm that I freely agree to take part in the above research.  The researcher 
has explained to me why the study is taking place, what I will be asked to do and how long 
this will take. I have read the information section and understand the nature of the study.  
I understand that the study is purely a research project, and I do not expect to gain any 
personal benefit from taking part.      
 
I am aware that the study involves completing some questionnaires, as well as taking 
part in pencil and paper tasks and watching short clips on the computer and then telling 
the researcher about what I understood about the short clips.  
 
I understand that I am free to leave the research study at any time without giving a 
reason.  I also understand that if I refuse to take part in the above study, this will not in 
any way affect any care I receive. I understand that the information I give is strictly 
confidential and will not be made publicly available. All information is for research 
















Please initial boxes 
 
1.   I confirm that I have read and understand this information and consent 
form and have had the opportunity to ask questions.   
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights 
being affected. 
 
I agree to be contacted for both future research related to this  
study and other pieces of research. 
 
I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
5.  I agree to be audio recorded.  
 
 
_____________________  _____________  _________________ 
Name of Participant        Date    Signature 
 
 I confirm that the project has been explained to the participant: 
 
 
______________________ _____________  _________________ 
Name of Researcher        Date    Signature 
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6.11 The IRI 
 
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations.  For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
letter on the scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you have decided on your 
answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  READ EACH ITEM 




 A               B               C               D               E 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                                 VERY 
 WELL                                                             WELL 
 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might Happén to 
me.  
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.  
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.  
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.  
 
I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
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8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.  
 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
them.  
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.  
 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their 
      perspective.  
 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.  
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.  
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
 
If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's 
      arguments.  
 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.  
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.  
 
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them.  
       
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.  
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see Happén.  
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
19
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23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
       character.  
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies.  
 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
 
When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were Happéning to me.  
 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.  
 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place.  
 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
  PD = personal distress scale 
 
  A = 0 
  B = 1 
  C = 2 
  D = 3 
  E = 4 
 
Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored: 
 
  A = 4 
  B = 3 
  C = 2 
  D = 1 
  E = 0 
19
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6.12 Strange Stories and Scoring 
 
Strange Stories (Happé 1994) 
 
 
Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home. She doesn’t like walking home alone 
in the dark 
because she is always afraid that someone will attack her and rob her. She really is a very 
nervous 
person! Suddenly, out of the shadows comes a man. He wants to ask Mrs. Peabody 
what time it is, so he 
walks toward her. When Mrs. Peabody sees the man coming toward her, she starts to 
tremble and says, 
‘‘Take my purse, just don’t hurt me please!’’ 
 
Q: Why did she say that? 
 
 
Simon is a big liar. Simon’s brother Jim knows this, he knows that Simon never tells the 
truth! 
Now yesterday Simon stole Jim’s ping-pong paddle,and Jim knows Simon has hidden it 
somewhere, 
though he can’t find it. He’s very cross. So he finds Simon and he says, ‘‘Where is my 
pingpong 
paddle? You must have hidden it either in the cupboard or under your bed, because 
I’ve 
looked everywhere else. Where is it, in the cupboard or under your bed’’? Simon tells 
him the 
paddle is under his bed. 
Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the 
paddle? 
 
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is hisfavourite meal—sausages and beans. 
He is a very 
19
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greedy boy, and he would like to have more sausages than anybody else, even though 
his mother 
will have made him a lovely meal when he gets home! But everyone is allowed two 
sausages and 
no more. When it is Brian’s turn to be served, he says, ‘‘Oh, please can I have four 
sausages, because 
I won’t be having any dinner when I get home!’’ 
 




One day Aunt Jane came to visit Peter. Now Peter loves his aunt very much, but today 
she is 
wearing a new hat; a new hat which Peter thinks is very ugly indeed. Peter thinks his 
aunt looks silly 
in it, and much nicer in her old hat. But when Aunt Jane asks Peter, ‘‘How do you like 
my new hat?,’’ 
Peter says, ‘‘Oh, its very nice.’’ 
 




During the war, the Red army captures a member of the Blue army. They want him to 
tell them where his army’s tanks are; they know they are either by the sea or in the 
mountains. They know that the 
prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to save his army, and so he will 
certainly lie to them. 
The prisoner is very brave and very clever, he will not let them find his tanks. The 
tanks are really in 
the mountains. Now when the other side asks him where his tanks are, he says, ‘‘They 









Q: Why did the prisoner say that? 
 
 
Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she could ask her 
parents for a 
rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world. At last Christmas Day 
arrived, and 
Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her. She felt sure it would 
contain a little rabbit 
in a cage. But when she opened it, with all the family standing round, she found her 
present was 
just a boring old set of encyclopedias, which Helen did not want at all! Still, when 
Helen’s parents 
asked her how she liked her Christmas present, she said, ‘‘It’s lovely, thank you. It’s 
just what I 
wanted.’’ 
 
Q: Why did she say this? 
 
 
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots of kittens she 
didn’t want. 
Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn’t do anything to harm them, though 
she couldn’t keep them all herself. When Jill visited she wasn’t sure she wanted one of 
Mrs. Smith’s 
kittens, since they were all males and she had wanted a female. But Mrs. Smith said, ‘‘If 
no one 
buys the kittens I’ll just have to drown them!’’ 
 
Q: Why did Mrs. Smith say that? 
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on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn’t know the man is a burglar, he just 
wants to tell him 
he dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar, ‘‘Hey, you! 
Stop!,’’ the 
burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up 
and admits that 
he did the break-in at the local shop. 
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2 points—reference to her belief that he was going to mug her or her ignorance of his 
real intention 
1 point—reference to her trait (she’s nervous) or state (she’s scared) or intention (so 
he wouldn’t hurt her) without suggestion that fear was unnecessary 
0 points—factually incorrect⁄irrelevant answers; reference to the man actually 
intending to attack her 
 
Double Bluff (Ping pong paddle) 
 
2 points—reference to Jim knowing Simon lies 
1 point—reference to facts (that’s where it really is, Simon’s a big liar) or Simon hiding 
it without reference to implications of lying 




2 points—reference to fact that he’s trying to elicit sympathy, being deceptive 
1 point—reference to his state (greedy), outcome (to get more sausages) or factual 
0 points—reference to a motivation that misses the point of sympathy elicitation ⁄ 
deception, or fac- tually incorrect 
White Lie (Hat) 
 
2 points—reference to white lie or wanting to spare her feelings; some implication 
that this is for aunt’s benefit rather than just for his, desire to avoid rudeness or insult 
1 point—reference to trait (he’s a nice boy) or relationship (he likes his aunt); purely 
motivational (so she won’t shout at him) with no reference to aunt’s thoughts or feelings; 
incomplete explanation (he’s lying, he’s pretending). 
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect facts⁄feelings (he likes the hat, he wants 
to trick her) 
 
Doubel Bluff (army) 
20
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2 points—reference to 1 that other army will not believe and hence look in other place, 
reference to prisoner’s realization that that’s what they’ll do, or reference to double bluff 
1 point—reference to outcome (to save his army’s tanks) or to mislead them 
0 points—reference to motivation that misses the point of double bluff (he was 
scared) 
 
White Lie (RABBITT) 
2 points—reference to white lie or wanting to spare their feelings; some implication 
that this is for parent’s benefit rather than just for her, desire to avoid rudeness or insult 
1 point—reference to trait (she’s a nice girl) or relationship (she likes her parents); 
purely motiva- tional (so they won’t shout at her) with no reference to parent’s thoughts 
or feelings; incomplete expla- nation (she’s lying, she’s pretending) 
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect facts⁄feelings (she likes the present, she 




2 points—reference to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce guilt ⁄ pity 
1 point—reference to outcome (to sell them or get rid of them in a way which implies 
not drowning) or simple motivation (to make Jill sad) 
0 points—reference to general knowledge or dilemma without realization that the 
statement was not true (she’s a horrible woman) 
 
Misunderstanding (Burglar) 
2 points—reference to belief that policeman knew that he’d burgled the shop 
1 point—reference to something factually correct in story 
0 points—factually incorrect ⁄ irrelevant answers 
20
3 
Strange Stories Film Task Main Project 
 
 203 
6.13  SSFt instructions, Scoring Sheet and Order A (Order B is reversed) 
 
You are about to watch a series of short video clips.  In each clip there will usually be 
the same two characters; a man called Max and a women called Alice. Max and Alice are 
boyfriend and girlfriend, and live and work together. Each  video clip is self-contained, and 
what happens in one clip doesn’t relate to what happens in other clips; there isn’t a story 
running from one clip to another. 
 
I will show you each clip only once and after each clip has finished I will ask you three 
questions about what you have just seen.  I will write down your answers and also audio 
record them in case I miss anything.  Some of the questions do not have right or wrong 
answers  – I’m interested in what you think is going on in the clips, so please just answer 
the questions as best you can.. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
[If participant asks questions regarding the content of the material e.g. “How long have 
they been in a relationship? “Respond with  
 
Please give your answers based just on what you see and the information I gave you at 
the beginning. Would you like me to re-read the instructions?  
 
 
OK. The first three clips you are going to watch are just a practice so that you can see 
what is involved. We will watch the first clip twice. Please place the headphones in your 
ears and tell me if you need the volume adjusting [play practice control clip and adjust 
volume accordingly]. Ok, now I will ask you three questions. afterwards. (Play practice 
control clip again) 
 
 
NB : No prompting to be provided throughout unless participant’s response is 
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Practice 1 Forget (present) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next? 
Where had Alice just come from? 
 
 
Ok great, and here is the second practice clip – this time you’ll see it only once, just like 
in the real thing [show practice experimental clip] 
 
Practice 2 Control (cactus) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
How long was Max going away for? 
 
Ok great, and here is the second practice clip – this time you’ll see it only once, just like 




Practice 3 Persuasion (mum) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Who does Alice find really difficult?’ 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Now you are going to watch a series of clips similar to the ones you have just seen and 
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Play all clips and following each pause the task and ask 
 
Item 1 Idiom (tango) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Max say John should do? 
 
 
Item 2 Control (Soup) 
 
Why did Max say that? 
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max going to cook the next day? 
 
 
Item 3 Mixed Emotions (biking accident)  
 
Why did Alice say everything she said in the clip?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was the disgusting picture of?’ 
 
Item 4 Misunderstanding (burglar) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max doing when Alice called out?’  
 
 
Item 5 Lie (Pub) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
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Item 6 Forget (potatoes)  
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 





Item 7 AR (dress) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice about to put on Max?’ 
 
Item 8 Irony (injection) 
 
Why did Max say that?]  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max doing to his tummy?. 
 
 
Item 9  Control (Line Rental) 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
Who was Max talking to on the phone? 
 
Item 10 Persuasion (smoking) 
 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What did Alice say Max was going to be? 
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Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max reading? 
 
Item 12 DB (dating website) 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Max looking at on the computer at the start? 
 
Item 13 Pretend (rowing) 
 
Why did Alice say that?  
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
What was Alice sitting on? 
 
Item 14 White Lie (song) 
 
Why did Max say that?  
If you were in Alice’s situation, what would you say next?? 
 ‘What instrument was Alice playing? 
 
 
Item 15 Control (plant) 
Why did Alice say that? 
If you were in Max’s situation, what would you say next?? 
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6.14 Associations Between Traditional ToM Measures  
 
Associations of both groups’ performance on the traditional social cognition measures: 
Spearman’s partial coefficients and (r2 values). 
 
 SS PST F-HT Ac F-HT PST Eyes TASIT 
      
ASD [N = 20]      
      
SS Ac .51* (.26) .08 .21 .16 .36 
SS PST   .15 .17 .15 .06 
F-HT Ac    .78**a (.61) -.40  .02 
F-HT PST     -.24 -.08 
Eyes      .44  
      
      
Controls [N = 20]      
      
SS Ac  .87** (.76) 3.2 .14 .27 .08 
SS PST   .38 .30 .30 .22 
F-HT Ac    .74**a (.55) .34 .24 
F-HT PST     .26 .12 
Eyes      .37  
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6.15 Traditional ToM Measures and IRI, TAS-20,ADI-R and AQ Associations. 
Association of performance across social cognition measures with alexithymia and 














. Pearson’s r 
 
Traditional Social Cognition Measures TAS-20  IRI   
 Total PT F EC PD 
      
ASD [N = 19]      
      
SS Accuracy -.20 .18 -.49* -.02 .16 
F-HT Accuracya .08 -.15 -.18 -.30 -.04 
Eyes .02 -.18 .04 .01 -.05 
TASIT -.32 -.18 -.17 -.09 -.05 
      
Controls [N = 20]      
 
Traditional Social Cognition Measures 
     
      
SS Accuracy -.03 -.07 .09 .21 .11 
F-HT Accuracya -.15 .14 -.01 -.23 .03 
Eyes -.34 .21 .25 -.05 -.16 
TASIT -.14 .22 .13 .07 -.34 
      
21
0 




Association of performance between social cognition measures and ASD symptoms: 












aPearson’s r.  
 
 ASD Trait Measures   






ASD [N = 20]    
    
SS Accuracy .02 -.29 -.16 
F-HT Accuracy .12a .05 -.27 
Eyes -.05 .04 .43 
TASIT .06 .20 .41 
    
Controls [N = 20]    
    
SS Accuracy -.41 -  
F-HT Accuracy -.07 a -  
Eyes -.24   
TASIT -.43   
    
21
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6.16  SSFt Order Effects 
 
Within group difference s on the interaction question yielded non-significant 
differences that were supported by an independent bootstrap analysis for the ASD group 
(t(15) = -1.57, p = .138, CI = -1.33 – 1.6) and the control group (t(10) = -1.89, p = .08, CI = -
1.22 – -.04). 
 
Differences in order A’s increased 0 point responses across different clips was evenly 
spread: Clip 2 (+2) Clip 9 (+1) and Clip 15 (+1). This suggests that it was not a particular 
clips order that affected performance per se but individuals within group A as they were 
not randomized.  
 






t df p-value d 95% 
CI 
        
Experimental Clips         
        
Intention (max=24) 17.40 (3.64) 17.00 (3.26) 0.37 38 .72 0.12 -1.81 – 2.61 
Psychological State talk 
(max=24) 
12.10 (2.77)  13.20 (2.46) -1.33 38 .192 0.41 -2.68 - 0.46 a 
Interaction (max=24) 13.00 (5.19) 14.85 (4.63) -1.19 38 .241 0.37 3.92 – 8.78 
Memory (max=12) 11.55 (0.69) 11.85 (0.37) -1.73 29 .095 0.55 -0.66 – 0.26a 
        
Control Clips [max = 24]        
        
Intention (max=6) 4.25 (1.41) 4.25 (1.01) 0.00 38 1.00 0.00 -0.44 - 0.75a 
Psychological State talk 
(max=6) 
1.10 (1.17) 1.10 (0.91) 0.00 38 1.00 0.00 -0.65 -0 .66a 
Interaction (max=6) 5.25 (0.97) 5.85 (0.49) -2.48 28 .02 0.78 -1.08 – -0.14 
Memory (max = 3)  3.00 (0.00) 2.95 (0.22) 1.00 19 .32 0.32 0.04 - 0.18a 
21
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Background: Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are a continuum of 
neurodevelopmental disorders and the prevalence of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD) is high within this population compared to typically developing young people.  
 
Method: Retrospective referrals to a specialist pediatric OCD service at the Maudsley 
Hospital were examined.  Prevalence rates of referrals of young people with OCD plus ASD 
over a four year time period were anlaysed. Referrals of young people with OCD plus ASD 
(ASD+OCD) were compared to those without ASD (NoASD+OCD) at assessment on a range 
of clinical measures and demographic variables.  Finally, clinical outcomes of young people 
with ASD+OCD  following a course of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) were compared to 
an NoASD+OCD group matched on age, gender and pre-treatment OCD symptom severity.  
 
Results: The results suggest that referral rates have remained relatively stable. Young 
people with ASD tended to have more severe OCD symptoms as rated by clinicians and 
parent informants relative to those without ASD.  Moreover, the ASD+OCD group 
responded less well to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy delivered within the clinic’s 
protocol as compared to the matched NoASD+OCD group.  
 
Conclusions: Overall, the findings support the importance of multiple informants at 
assessment and that CBT is beneficial for this client group but modified protocols are 
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1 Introduction [Brief Literature Review] 
1.1 Definition and Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are a continuum of neurodevelopmental disorders 
categorized by difficulties in reciprocal social interaction, communication, imagination and 
having restrictive/stereotyped repetitive interests (World Health Organization [WHO] 
International Classification of Deseases-10 [ICD-10]; 2008). Childhood Autism, Asperger’s 
syndrome and  Pervasive Developmental Disorders- Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) 
all fall under  the umbrella term of ASDs and are differentiated by differences in 
symptomatology severity within the aforementioned triad, language delay and IQ (WHO, 
2008).  Traditionally, ASDs were believed to account for 0.05% of the population, 
however, more recent prevalence studies have suggested ASDs to be within 0.3-0.9% 
(Baird et al., 2006; Yeargin-Allsopp et al., 2003). Within the South Thames, London region, 
Baird, et al., (2006) identified prevalence rates of ASDs in 9-10 year olds to account for 
approximately 1% of the population, suggesting that ASDs are much more common than 
once thought. The same study found similar ratios of sex differences to US data (Yeargin-
Allsopp, et al., 2003) with a male to female ratio of 3.3-1.  
Whether these increased rates reflect the broadening of diagnostic categories or 
improved prevalence research, for mental health clinicians the issue of paramount 
importance is how to best assess and treat mental health referrals in the context of an ASD 
(White, Oswald, Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009). This is particularly true for clinicians working 
in the NHS, where policies such as clinical governance and an increasing drive towards 
‘Payment by Results’ (Department of Health Payment by Results Team, 2012) mean that 
an increasing importance is being place on clinical outcomes and ongoing improvement in 
service delivery. It is therefore imperative that services and clinicians working within 
them understand the clinical needs of young people with ASD and how best to treat 
distressing mental health problems associated with the condition.  
1.2 Anxiety Disorders in ASDs 
 
The most common forms of co-morbid Axis I disorders present in young people and 
adolescents with an ASD are the cluster of Anxiety Disorders (Ghaziuddin, 2002). Anxiety 
Disorders all share anxiety as their primary feature, but specific anxiety disorders 
manifest in distinct cognitive-behavioural reactions to feared stimuli e.g. avoidance of 
21
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potential contaminates in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD; Albano, Chorpita, & 
Barlow, 2003). Prevalence rates of anxiety disorders in typically developing children are 
estimated to range in community samples between 12-20% (Albano, et al., 2003). While 
research on a population level has not been conducted in youth with an ASD and co-
morbid anxiety disorders, White, et al.,’s (2009) review suggests that 11-84% of young 
people are affected by anxiety that causes significant impairment. Simonoff et al., (2008) 
revealed that in a community sample cohort study of 112 10-14 year olds with ASD 41.9% 
of the sample met diagnosable criteria for at least one anxiety disorder with social anxiety 
being the most common (29.2%) and OCD occurring in 8.2% of cases. Similarly, de Bruin, 
Ferdinand, Meester, de Nijs & Verheij (2007) showed that in a clinic sample of 94, 6-12 
year olds diagnosed with PDD-NOS, the single most common disorder diagnosed was 
simple phobia, with 6.2% of the sample meeting criteria for OCD.  
1.3 OCD in ASD 
 
OCD is an anxiety disorder characterized by intrusive, spontaneous and  unwanted 
thoughts , images or urges (obsessions) that cause significant distress, which in turn lead  
to purposeful rituals; mental and/or behavioural (compulsions), that serve to reduce the 
distress experienced, but can in themselves become a significant contributor to the 
individual’s distress (Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & Fineberg, 2006).  Symptoms have to cause 
the individual functional impairment and/or distress to warrant a diagnosis (WHO, 2008).  
Epidemiological studies, suggest rates of OCD in typically developing children to be 
between 1% of the population (Heyman, Mataix-Cols, & Fineberg, 2006). Thus, the 
prevalence rates of OCD of 6.2-8.2% found in ASD samples suggest that  the disorder is 
overrepresented in ASD populations (de Bruin, et al., 2007; Simonoff, et al., 2008; White, et 
al., 2009).  
 
OCD symptoms start most commonly at two distinct time points late childhood and 
early adulthood (Geller et al., 1998). Onset of co-morbid OCD in young people with an ASD 
has not been systematically evaluated to the author’s knowledge, but the 
phenomenological overlap of the two conditions, namely insistence on sameness and 
repetitive interests found in both ASD and OCD diagnoses, make differential diagnosis an 
important, but challenging consideration in the assessment of co-morbid OCD in young 
people with an ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1989).  The presence of egodystonic self reports 
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regarding symptoms and the presence of obsessions if potential compulsive symptoms are 
present are therefore particularly important to consider (Wood & Gadow, 2010). 
Insight into the excessive nature of compulsions and their egodystonic quality are 
hallmarks of adult OCD. While awareness criterion are more lenient when considering 
OCD in a typically developing paediatric population (Heyman, et al., 2006) when assessing 
OCD in paediatric ASD populations this calls in to question a number of factors. Firstly, 
alexythimic symptoms are more likely to be present in ASD populations (Tani et al., 2004) 
and rates of intellectual disability also, both of which can impact an individual’s ability to 
describe internal experiences required for accurately assessing anxiety.  
 
There has been controversy in the literature as to whether young people with ASD can 
therefore self report on anxiety symptoms reliably (Wood & Gadow, 2010). Mack et al., 
(2010) showed that when groups were matched on OCD severity, self and parent reports 
of OCD symptoms as measured by the Child Obsessive Compulsive Checklist (ChOCI; Uher, 
Heyman, Turner, & Shafran, 2008) were equivocal. However, the small N (12) in each 
group calls some of these findings into question as the authors note. In other studies, 
youth with ASD have shown to reliably self report, but also significantly underreport when 
compared to informant’s (Shipman, Sheldrick, & Perrin, 2011).  Furthermore, Gadow, 
Devincent, Sheldrick, & Perrin (2005), revealed that teachers can rate anxiety symptoms 
in their ASD pupils higher than parent-informants. Overall, the findings are mixed in this 
area. 
 
Clinician reported data, as measured by the Child’s Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive 
Scale (CY-BOCS; Scahill, Riddle, McSwiggin-Hardin, & Ort, 1997) have shown that 
symptom profiles in youth with ASD and OCD compared with those with just an OCD 
diagnosis are broadly similar, but that there are some idiosyncrasies within each group 
(Lewin, Wood, Gunderson, Murphy, & Storch, 2011; Mack, et al., 2010). The data is 
inconsistent between studies however. For example reduced checking, repeating and 
washing compulsions within the ASD and OCD group were observed in one study (Lewin, 
et al., 2011) and not in another (Mack, et al., 2010). Of note, a trend towards reduced 
sexual obsessions in the ASD and OCD group was observed in both studies. In all, this 
evidence highlights both an interesting question as posed by Wood & Gadow (2010), ‘Can 
self-report anxiety measures be deemed valid in paediatric ASD populations?’, and 
secondly, the importance of multiple informants when assessing co-morbid anxiety and in 
21
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1.4 Considerations When Delivering CBT for Young People with an ASD 
 
Treating paediatric OCD has accumulated a significant evidence base in recent decades 
and the National Institute for Health and Carel Excellence (NICE; 2005) recommend 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) that includes Exposure with Response Prevention 
(E/RP) as a first line treatment for young people with the condition.  However, the 
presence of an ASD is typically an exclusion criterion in randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs) and the existing evidence and guidance relate to typically developing young 
people. There has been little research into the treatment of paediatric OCD in the context 
of ASD and there are no guidelines on what forms of therapy are best suited to this 
population. 
 
Despite the limited research, there are a number of theoretical reasons to believe that 
young people with ASD may have difficulties engaging in standard, protocol-driven CBT 
interventions, which may require modification in order to optimize outcomes in this 
population. For example, difficulties in identifying thoughts, feelings and behaviours are a 
key component in CBT and ASD is associated with higher instances of alexithymia (Tani, et 
al., 2004)making this process potentially more challenging. The Theory of Mind hypothesis 
purports that young people with an ASD struggle to understand the thoughts, intentions 
and or beliefs of others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), which may affect the young 
person’s ability to engage with discourse associated with CBT, e.g. ‘what would your 
friend’s make of that thought?’ that require adopting another’s perspective. Finally, 
executive functioning impairments associated with the condition (Hill, 2004) may impair 
session planning, implementation of homework and generating new and novel means to 
challenge fears, furthermore the literal and concrete linguistic style associated with the 
condition (Lord et al., 2000) may make the use of metaphors and hypothetical thought 
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1.5 Treating Anxiety Disorders in ASD 
 
Over the last decade, there is a growing evidence base for the treatment efficacy of 
modified CBT in paediatric populations with both an ASD and an anxiety disorder in both 
group and individual formats (Lang, Regester, Lauderdale, Ashbaugh, & Haring, 2010; 
White, et al., 2009).   
 
In Lang et al.,’s (2010) systematic review assessing treatment of anxiety disorders in 
youth with an ASD they only identified one RCT (Wood et al., 2009), which could be 
considered ‘conclusive’ in its findings as the other three trials showed methodological 
flaws such as non-random assignment (Reaven et al., 2009) or the use of un-
blinded/therapists as raters (Chalfant, Rapee, & Carroll, 2007; Sofronoff, Attwood, & 
Hinton, 2005).  All the other studies mentioned in the review did not include an 
experimental design (for review see Lang, et al., 2010). Since then, a number of trials have 
addressed these concerns (Reaven, Blakeley-Smith, Culhane-Shelburne, & Hepburn, 2012; 
Storch et al., 2013).  In the well controlled trials, response rates to CBT were between 50-
76% and remission rates ranged from 38-52.9% (Reaven, et al., 2012; Storch, et al., 2013; 
Wood, et al., 2009). While the approach taken was transdiagnostic, including treating 
separation-, social-, generalized- anxiety disorder, specific phobias and OCD there was no 
effect of initial diagnosis on treatment outcome and the above remission rates are similar 
to those found in CBT for paediatric OCD in neurotypical samples (Pediatric OCD 
Treatment Study [POTS] Team., 2004). However, the rates of OCD referrals were either 
low (Storch, et al., 2013) or not included (Reaven, et al., 2012) in the above trials.  
 
Across all the trials CBT was the only therapeutic framework adopted, but protocols 
were modified to meet the needs of an ASD population, for example, the use of increased 
visual aids in treatment, greater parental involvement, using restricted interests to engage 
participants in treatment (Lang, et al., 2010) and in some cases addressing core autism 
symptomatology as part of the treatment package (Sze & Wood, 2008; Wood, et al., 2009). 
Parental involvement as a co-therapist or coach was a particularly important modification 
aimed at improving problems with generalizing skills learned inside the therapy room to 
the young person’s wider social environment, which was tested explicitly in one trial and 
shown to improve outcome over follow-up in group CBT (Reaven, et al., 2012).  Parents 
were more heavily involved at all stages of trials investigating individual (family-based) 
CBT treatment also, for example during ERP, psychoeducation, social skills, encouraging 
22
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independence, implementing rewards and advocating within schools (Storch, et al., 2013; 
Wood, et al., 2009). Despite the clear theoretical rationale for involving parents, additional 
clinical improvements did not appear at three-month follow-up in a recent well controlled 
study of family-based CBT compared to treatment as usual (TAU) (Storch, et al., 2013).   
 
The overall heterogeneity of clinical presentations, severity, treatment format and 
number of sessions makes comparative conclusions difficult.  These points to a growing 
need for equivalence trials as so far the majority of trials include only a TAU control arm 
rather than an active treatment group. For example, at present it is unclear whether group 
or individual treatments are more effective or whether this population requires additional 
sessions compared to typically developing populations. To date, only one equivalence RCT 
looking at CBT specifically for OCD in adults and adolescents with an ASD has been 
conducted with the authors finding both CBT and anxiety management equivocal 
treatment packages (Russell et al., 2013).  
1.6 Treating OCD in ASDs 
 
The evidence for treating OCD specifically in an ASD paediatric population is lacking 
and is limited to just two case studies (Lehmkuhl, Storch, Bodfish, & Geffken, 2008; Reaven 
& Hepburn, 2003) and some participants included in the aforementioned RCT (Russell, et 
al., 2013).  In Reaven & Hepburn’s (2003) case, the young person’s OCD severity reduced 
over 14 sessions from the moderate range to the normal range. The intervention was 
based on March and Mulle’s (1998) evidenced based protocol, but the authors discuss 
numerous modifications necessary for working therapeutically with a young person with 
an ASD. Parents were more actively involved throughout the psychoeducation phase and 
abstract concepts were made more concrete, such as creating a cardboard cut-out model 
of a CBT tool box with cardboard tools within it. During hierarchy formation and 
subsequent ERP the young person’s language was adopted and the use of token rewards 
was implemented to tackle reduced intrinsic social motivators for overcoming OCD 
symptoms.  
 
Lehmkuhl et al., (2008) document similar modifications and focused on a behavioural 
mechanism of change i.e. ERP, rather than cognitive techniques. They also adapted 
abstract concepts to tailor to the individual’s developmental stage.  After ten sessions of 
CBT, based on March and Mulle’s (1998) protocol also, the young person similarly 
22
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achieved remission status. The only RCT to date focusing on treating specifically OCD in 
ASD recruited a wide ranging age of participants, aged 14-65 years (Russell, et al., 2013). 
The findings suggest that both anxiety management and CBT show statistically equivalent 
and meaningful response rates (20% vs. 45%, respectively) and mean reductions in Yale-
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989)  scores at the end of 
treatment, although the effect size for CBT was larger than for AM (1.15 vs. .6, 
respectively). Similarly, remission rates were statistically equivalent between CBT and AM 
(20% vs. 15%). The treatment gains during the acute phase of CBT were maintained over 
twelve months in the CBT condition. This provides very promising evidence for the use of 
CBT and potentially other treatment modalities in treating OCD in adolescents and adults 
with an ASD.  
The limitation of generalizability is clear in the case studies and to a paediatric 
population in the predominantly adult RCT, but it is also worth noting that while both case 
studies fully remitted by the end of treatment, their initial OCD severity scores as 
measured by the CY-BOCS were only within the mild (Lehmkuhl, et al., 2008) and 
moderate ranges (Reaven & Hepburn, 2003).  Similarly, in Russell et al.,’s (2013) trial the 
mean initial CY-BOCS for both treatment groups was in the moderate range. It is well 
attested that severity of OCD symptomatology affects treatment outcome (Ginsburg, 
Kingery, Drake, & Grados, 2008), which questions how effective CBT treatments are for 
individuals who have a co-morbid ASD and OCD presentation, where their OCD is more 
severe?  
 
1.7 Service Evaluation Aims and Hypotheses 
 
OCD is relatively common in young people with ASD and while evidence is 
accumulating for CBT’s effectiveness using modified protocols for other anxiety disorders, 
the evidence for specifically treating OCD in young people with an ASD with CBT is very 
limited. In light of the above, the service evaluation had three main aims: 
 
Aim 1) To identify the rates of young people being referred with a dual diagnosis of 
ASD and OCD (ASD+OCD) to the National Specialist OCD service, within which this study 
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Aim 2) To assess the initial demographic and clinical characteristics of this cohort 
when compared to referrals who received an OCD diagnosis, but who did not have an ASD 
(NoASD+OCD).  
 
Aim 3) To assess how this cohort responded to a standard protocol of CBT for OCD 
when compared to individually matched and typically developing NoASD+OCD controls.  
 
Three hypotheses were generated: 
Hypothesis 1) Rates of referrals of the ASD+OCD subgroup have increased over the last 
five years,  
 
Hypothesis 2) The ASD+OCD subgroup’s initial OCD symptomology would be more 
severe as compared to the NoASD+OCD group.   
 
Hypothesis 3) The ASD+OCD subgroup would have responded less well to a course of 
CBT for OCD compared to an age, gender and OCD severity matched NoASD+OCD group. 
 
1.8 Service Context 
1.8.1 The National Specialist OCD and Related Disorders Service 
 
The National Specialist OCD and Related Disorders service at the Maudsley Hospital is 
a Tier 4 outpatient service that receives referrals nationwide, but which mainly receives 
referrals from local Tier 3 Children and Adolescent Mental Health Teams (CAMHS). While 
the majority of referrals are for young people affected by OCD, disorders that are related 
or likely to be co-morbid e.g. Body Dysmorphic Disorder, Tourette’s Syndrome and 
Trichotillomania, are also seen within the service. The team is formed of experienced 
Psychologists and Psychiatrists and offers both pharmacological and psychological 
treatments. Psychological treatments are delivered either on a weekly basis face to face/ 
over the phone or over the course of a 5 day intensive program where therapists work all 
day with families either at the clinic or at the patient’s family home.  
 
Assessment and treatment funding is usually commissioned through local 
commissioning groups although a number of referrals are funded via the National 
22
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Specialist Commissioning Team (NSCT). For patients to meet NSCT status their OCD must 
be within the severe range as measured by well validated structured assessments. 
Secondly, the individual must have had an ineffectual trial of a serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor (SSRI) at a recommended dose for at least three months and finally, the patient 
must have had a course of CBT that includes ERP that has also been ineffectual in reducing 
OCD symptomatology.  
 
1.8.2 Assessment Process 
 
All patients who are seen in the service undergo a thorough multidisciplinary 
assessment process that is overseen by a consultant Psychiatrist or Psychologist. The 
whole process lasts approximately three hours and during which, both parent interviews, 
focusing on a developmental history of the young person and important clinical 
information to inform ICD-10 diagnosis are conducted alongside a child interview focusing 
on the young person’s OCD symtomatology and severity. Diagnoses were assigned or 
confirmed at the point of assessment in the OCD Clinic by the multi-disciplinary team. 
With respect to ASD diagnoses, the majority of cases were referred with the diagnosis 
made in Tier 3 CAMHS. The remainders were referred without a diagnosis, but it was 
assigned by the OCD clinical team following a structured diagnostic assessment such as 
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 1989) 
1.8.3 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy Protocol 
 
The CBT protocol follows three distinct stages. In the first stage, sessions are focused 
on psychoeducation about OCD and anxiety, goal setting and hierarchies of the young 
person’s OCD symptoms are developed. In the second stage, which forms the majority of 
treatment, sessions are focused on ERP and collaboratively working up the young person’s 
‘fighting back’ hierarchy. The final stage is orientated towards relapse prevention. Parents 
are involved where possible and where clinically appropriate e.g. if family members are 
accommodating OCD rituals, but as a minimum, parents and family members are involved 










Consecutive referrals (N=387) to the OCD clinic that were assessed between January 
2007 and December 2011 were reviewed. For the purpose of examining referral rates, the 
dataset was categorized into 4 sub-groups: 1) Individuals who met diagnostic criteria for 
both OCD and an ASD at assessment (ASD+OCD); 2) Individuals who met diagnostic 
criteria for OCD, but did not meet criteria for an ASD at assessment (NoASD+OCD); 3) 
Individuals who met diagnostic criteria for an ASD, but did not meet diagnostic criteria for 
OCD at assessment (ASD+NoOCD); and 4) Individuals who did not meet diagnostic criteria 
for either an ASD or OCD (NoASD+NoOCD).  
 
A sub-group of the ASD+OCD group received CBT in the OCD clinic and had outcome 
measures available (n=22). These were compared against a group of young people within 
the OCD group (n=22) 
 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 The Children’s Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compuslive Scale (CY-BOCS)  
 
The CY-BOCS (Scahill, et al., 1997) is the gold standard measure for assessing OCD 
symptom severity in children and is based on the adult Y-BOCS (Goodman, et al., 1989).  
For this reason it was considered the primary outcome of interest. The CY-BOCS is an 
interviewer rated, semi-structured clinical interview. It comprises of 5 items (time spent, 
interference, distress, resistance and control) for both obsessions and compulsions, from 
which a total OCD severity score ranging from 0-40 can be calculated. The CY-BOCS shows 
good inter-rater reliability, construct validity and has been validated within a paediatric 
ASD population (Wu et al., 2013) 
 
2.2.2 The Child Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (ChOCI-R)  
 
The ChOCI-R (Shafran et al., 2003) is an OCD symptom severity questionnaire that 
follows the same format as the CY-BOCS and adult version of the Obsessive Compulsive 
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Inventory (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998). There are both a young person 
and a reliable informant version, typically a parent, and the measure shows good internal 
consistency and convergent validity (Uher, et al., 2008) 
 
2.2.3 The Children’s’ Global Assessment Scale (CGAS)  
 
The CGAS (Shaffer et al., 1983) was used to measure overall clinical severity and is a 
well validated measure (Shaffer, et al., 1983). Scores range from 0 to 100 with scores 
above 70 representing normal functioning. The CGAS shows good inter-rater reliability 
and shows good concurrent and discriminant validity (Shaffer, et al., 1983) 
 
2.3 Information Obtained 
 
Demographic information that was systematically extracted from case notes included:  
 Age in years, gender, age of OCD onset and NSCT status. 
The following clinical Information was obtained for individuals within the treatment 
outcome analysis:  




Data were extracted from an existing electronic database. In cases where key variables 
of interest were missing, attempts were made to retrieve data by examining paper and 
electronic files. This data was then examined and entered onto the clinic’s routine 
assessment and outcome SPSS database.   
 
In order to examine treatment outcomes of young people with ASD+OCD, a matched 
subgroup from the NoASD +OCD group were identified. CY-BOCS score at assessment was 
used as the primary matching variable as baseline OCD severity has been shown to affect 
CBT treatment outcomes (Ginsburg, et al., 2008). In addition, the groups were matched for 
age and gender. Approval to conduct the audit was granted by the South London and 
Maudsley Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service Audit Committee.  
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3.1 Referral rates 
 
 




Figure 2: Relative percentage of each group when compared to the overall number of 




Frequencies of referral rates of each sub-group across the five year period are 
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referrals for that year.  The ASD+OCD group’s referral rates increased across the five year 
time period from 5 to 13 although as a percentage of the clinic’s referrals the referral rate 
was stable from 2007-2010 accounting for 10% of referrals, with a slight increase in 2011 
to 15% of referrals. Rates of referral for the NoASD +OCD group increased steadily from 
31 in 2007 to 92 in 2010, but then declined to 63 in 2011. Similarly, as a proportion of the 
overall clinic’s referrals the referral rates for the NoASD +OCD group increased from 67-
81% between 2007 and 2010 and then dropped to 72% in 2011. As expected given the 
service context, the number of ASD+NoOCD referrals was consistently low across the time 
period being studied, with the number of referrals decreasing from 3 (7%) in 2007 to 
either 0 or 1 between 2008 and 2011.  Finally, rates of referral for the NoASD+NoOCD 
group remained consistent throughout the time period, with referrals ranging from 7-10 
per year (9-15%), across the five years.  
 
3.2 Demographics and Clinical Characteristics at Assessment 
 
The ASD+OCD and the NoASD +OCD group were compared on key demographic and 
clinical variables. Only individuals who had completed a CY-BOCS interview were included 
in this section of the analysis (ASD+OCD group: N= 37;  NoASD+OCD group: N= 283). 
Parametric properties were assessed for all variables and in cases where parametric 
assumptions were violated (e.g. data’s variance was not homogenous) non-parametric t-
test equivalents were used. In all figures therefore, means are depicted with error bars in 
cases where assumptions were met, and in all other cases medians are presented. 
Comparisons were made between CY-BOCS scores for each of the other routine measures 
between individuals who had completed the measure and those who had not, which 








Figure 3: Age of both groups and age of OCD onset in years 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of each group meeting NSCT funding criteria and the percentage of 
males in each group. 
 
 
There was no difference between the ASD+OCD and NoASD+OCD groups with respect 
to age at assessment, U = 5260, z = -1.41, p = .16, or age at onset of OCD, t(306) = -1.10, p = 
.27. The ASD+OCD group had slightly more males and individuals referred under NSCT 
status than the NoASD+OCD this did not reach statistical significance, X2 (1, 326) = 1.34, p 

































Figure 5: Total CY-BOCS, Child and Parent ChOCI-R, and CGAS scores at assessment. 
 
 p < .05. 
 
Analysis between groups yielded a significant difference between CY-BOCS scores, 
t(318) = 2.50, p = .013 with the ASD+OCD initial score  (M = 28.6, SD = 5.3) being larger 
than the NoASD+OCD group (M = 26.1, SD = 5.7). Scores on the Parent ChOCI were also 
significantly larger, U = 2432, z = -2.78, p = .005, within the ASD+OCD group (Mdn = 37, IQR 
= 12) compared to the OCD group (Mdn = 31, IQR = 15). However, there was no significant 
group difference with respect to scores on the Child ChOCI  t(253) = 1.117, p = .27. Finally, 
CGAS scores were significantly lower, U = 1665, z = -4.40, p = .001, in the ASD+OCD group 
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3.3 Treatment  
 
All individuals within the ASD+OCD group  that had also completed a course of CBT 
within the service were identified (N=22). The ASD diagnoses of these individuals were as 
follows: Asperger’s Syndrome (N=15), High Functioning Autism (N=2) and PDD-
NOS(N=5). 68% of the group had a supporting ADI-R or ADOS. All of the individuals in this 
group had an IQ in the normal range. 
 
Patients in the ASD+OCD group were then individually matched to individuals from 
the NoASD+OCD group using CY-BOCS score at baseline as the primary matching variable, 
followed by age and gender (see table 2).  A repeated measures mixed ANOVA was run 
with a within subjects factor of treatment (Beginning vs. End) and a between subjects 
factor of group (ASD+OCD vs. NoASD+OCD). In addition, CBT treatment response rates 
(CY-BOCS score reduction of at least 25%) and symptom remission rates (end of 
treatment CY-BOCS score of 14 or less) were calculated using empirically derived cut-offs 
(Storch, Lewin, De Nadai, & Murphy, 2010) as a measure of treatment efficacy. Rates of 
stable prescribed selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRI’s) were calculated 
between the groups alongside whether individuals in the group had been started on an 
SSRI alongside CBT treatment. Finally, the number of CBT sessions was analyzed between 
the groups. 
 




N 22 22 
CY-BOCS Score M (SD) 29.36 (4.98) 29.36 (5.01) 
Age Mdn (IQR) 15 (3.25) 15(4.25) 
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Figure 6: Mean total CY-BOCS score at the Beginning and End of treatment. 
 
   p < .05. 
 
Analysis revealed that there was a significant main effect of treatment for both groups 
F(1,42) = 177.699, p = .001 and a significant interaction between group and treatment F(1, 
42) = 5.69, p = .022. The ASD group’s CY-BOCS mean difference (M = -9.59, SD = 4.91, D= -
1.95) was significantly lower when compared to the OCD group’s mean difference (M = -
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Figure7 : Percentage of treatment responders (Responders) and remission rates as 




Analysis revealed no significant effect of group when comparing the number of 
treatment responders (X2 (1, 44) = 2.10, p =.15). However, a statistical effect was revealed 
between remission rates as measured by a CY-BOCS of 14 or less at the end of treatment , 
X2 (1, 44) = 4.7, p =.03, where the ASD group showed lower rates of remission (23%) 
compared to the OCD group (55%).   
 
Furthermore, analysis showed that the likelihood of a participant being on a stable 
dose of an SSRI did not difer significantly between the two groups although there was a 
trend towards the ASD group being more likely to be on an SSRI (X2 (1, 44) = 3.30, p =.07). 
Analysis revealed that group membership did not affect the likelihood of starting 
pharmacotherapy and CBT concurrently (X2 (1, 44) = .61, p =.43). While session numbers 
were satistically equivalnt between the two groups there was a trend toward the 
























4.1 Referral Rates 
 
The first aim of this audit was to examine referral rates of young people with a dual 
diagnosis of an ASD and OCD, which have increased from 2007-2009 although this 
increase is only minimal. However, when compared to a previous paper examining rates of 
referrals within the same clinic (Mack, et al., 2010) the referrals have increased 
substantially from 3.8% of referrals between 1996-2006 to currently the subgroup 
representing 15% of referrals in 2011. This increase in referral rate may reflect a number 
of factors, including the increasing profile of the service, and the introduction of the NSCT 
funded branch of the service, for severe, treatment-resistant OCD. Importantly, the rates of 
ASD referrals without OCD being referred was nearly zero throughout the time period 
suggesting that referrers are able to distinguish when OCD is not present. Importantly this 
does not equate to accurately discriminating OCD from ASD symptomatology when OCD is 
present.  
 
Overall, this points to an ever increasing need for accurate assessment within the clinic 
as this subgroup now represents a substantial proportion of referrals. Screening of ASD 
symptomatology where appropriate could aid this process. The Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ) is a well validated screening tool of ASD symptomatology in young 
people that is not affected by parental IQ or education (Chandler et al., 2007). Using such 
screening tools would provide additional information to clinicians working with this 
group without the burden of more intensive diagnostic tools such as the ADOS (Lord, et al., 
2000), which could be used for more select cases.  
 
Identifying and subsequent differentiation of symptoms early has benefits in 
treatment outcome as although a review of predictors of treatment response to both 
psychological and pharmacological treatments of paediatric OCD (Ginsburg, et al., 2008), 
showed that duration of illness did not affect response rates, long-term follow-up data 
suggests that duration of illness at assessment is a predictor of having a diagnosis of OCD 5 
years after treatment (Micali et al., 2010). While this data set did not include those with an 
ASD it is possible that such individuals could be similarly more likely to relapse if they 
have had OCD symptoms for a longer period prior to assessment and subsequent 
treatment.   
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4.2 Demographics and Initial Presentation 
The second aim was further understand the demographic and clinical variables of 
young people with a dual ASD and OCD diagnosis. The demographic findings suggest that 
the age at onset of OCD is similar among those with and without ASD, they are referred to 
the clinic at a similar age, and are no more likely to be referred as part of the National 
Specialist Commissioning Team. However, the ASD+OCD group had significantly more 
severe OCD symptoms as rated by clinicians and parents, but not by the young people 
being referred. Additionally their overall functioning was rated as being lower as rated by 
clinicians.  
 
One interpretation of these findings would suggest that the construct validity of self 
report measures assessing OCD in young people with an ASD is undermined, which adds 
evidence to one side of Wood and Gadow’s (2010) discussion on this area. This poses the 
additional question of whether self-report questionnaires should be used at all in young 
people with ASD. While the question is rhetorical, the utility of self-report and its function 
in the clinical assessment of OCD in ASDs is an important issue to clarify. Additional 
clinical information can clearly be obtained from self report measures, such as the content 
of obsessions, which could possibly be less available to informants (Uher, et al., 2008) or 
understanding which part of the young person’s OCD they articulate as most distressing. 
The latter is particularly helpful in engaging young people in the therapeutic process and 
setting personally meaningful goals.  
 
The discrepancy between self and clinician/parent report could also be used to help 
guide the focus of psychoeducation, such as exploring symptoms the young person may be 
less aware of using developmentally appropriate language and concrete visual aids 
(Reaven & Hepburn, 2003). Self-report instruments might be more adept at aiding the 
aforementioned clinical decisions therefore rather than guiding decisions regarding 
overall OCD severity in this population. The study is clearly limited with regard to 
understanding the potential confounding variables that may be affecting the observed 
discrepancy such as intra group differences in alexithymia symptoms (Tani, et al., 2004) or 
IQ. This is an area that warrants further research. Conversely, the 2 point difference 
observed between the groups means could be argued as representing a statistical, but not 
clinically meaningful finding. The weight of clinical experience within the National 
23
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Specialist OCD clinic when assessing and treating co-morbid OCD within an ASD 
population (Russell, et al., 2013) and the construct validity and treatment sensitivity of the 
CY-BOCS in this population (Wu, et al., 2013) should support the notion that these findings 
are not related to OCD symptoms being missed or misattributed to being part of the ASD 
phenotype. In all, further research is needed to inform what patient, informant and 
clinician variables are moderating this process. Clinically, this finding necessitates the 
additional input of multiple informants when conducting psychiatric assessments with 
youth with an ASD and OCD. It is only with such corroborative evidence that a meaningful 
clinical description of the young person’s OCD be reached. 
 
4.3 Treatment Outcomes  
 
The third and final aim of this audit was to evaluate treatment outcomes for young 
people with a dual diagnosis of ASD and OCD compared to a case matched controlled 
sample. Following a course of evidence-based treatment by a team of experienced 
therapists who work with both severe OCD in youth and OCD in the context of an ASD 
(Russell, et al., 2013) the ASD+OCD group’s mean difference was significantly lower than 
the matched OCD group at the end of treatment. The ASD+OCD group fell within the 
‘Moderate’ range of severity and the OCD group fell within the ‘Mild’ range of severity 
(Scahill, et al., 1997). The effect size of the interaction was medium (d=.72) and the effect 
of treatment for both the ASD+OCD and OCD group was large (d=-1.95 and d=-2.09, 
respectively). Importantly, the differences in CBT response found between the two groups 
cannot be explained in terms of group difference in medication or number of CBT sessions. 
 
The pattern of response rates supports this picture further. No differences were 
revealed between response rates, which supports the growing body of literature that CBT 
is effective at treating anxiety disorders (Lang, et al., 2010; Reaven, et al., 2012; Storch, et 
al., 2013) and OCD specifically (Lehmkuhl, et al., 2008; Reaven & Hepburn, 2003; Russell, 
et al., 2013) in youth with an ASD. It is worth noting that the response rates observed are 
similar to some previous RCTs (Lang, et al., 2010; Storch, et al., 2013), but higher than 
others (Russell, et al., 2013). The former trials, with comparable response rates, were 
solely working with young people there may be an effect of age occurring in that overall 
young people with ASD respond better to treatment than their adult counterparts. It is 
possible that the greater levels of involvement from family members and the young 
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7 
OCD in Young People with and Without an ASD Service Evaluation  
 
 237 
person’s wider system may be contributing to this effect (Reaven, et al., 2012) and that for 
adults with ASD they may also benefit from such input if it is available, to help with 
difficulties characteristic of having an ASD e.g. generalizing gains made during therapeutic 
time. 
Remission rates were significantly lower for the ASD+OCD group compared to the OCD 
group (23% vs. 55% respectively). The remission rates are similar to previous findings 
(Russell, et al., 2013) but lower than other RCTs which included young people with ASD 
and anxiety disorders (Storch, et al., 2013). It is worth noting that the use of differing 
definitions of remission, outcome measures and varying levels of baseline severity 
between studies will contribute to these inconsistencies especially as response is a 
relative definition whereas remission is an absolute term. Furthermore, previous studies 
would have employed an  adapted CBT protocol tailored specifically to the needs of young 
people with ASD, whereas in the current study a standard CBT protocol was adopted.  
 
 The pattern of results suggests that there are two key points. Firstly, that baseline 
OCD severity is highly influential in how well the individual will respond to CBT treatment 
akin to youth without an ASD (Ginsburg, et al., 2008) and this is naturally going to affect 
clinical remission status. The second is that when these two presentations occur in unison, 
severe OCD and ASD, the individual’s OCD is particularly difficult to ameliorate altogether. 
The overall severity of the group was therefore an obstacle in itself to treatment, but not 
contraindicative that psychological therapy could be beneficial for this population.  
 
What can be taken from this evidence and the research precluding it, is that 
individuals with an ASD and co-morbid OCD benefit from CBT, which puts to rest the 
notion that this population does not have the prerequisite skills necessary to engage with 
this form of therapy (for further discussion on this topic see Lickel, MacLean, Blakeley-
Smith, & Hepburn, 2012), but improving remission rates is a challenge for the research 
and clinical communities. This is an important consideration as improved remission rates 
not only benefit young people in the short term with regard to relief from the distress 
associated with the condition, but also previous trials have showed that young people who 
reach such status maintain their gains at follow-up (Russell, et al., 2013; Storch, et al., 
2013). It is clear that a standard CBT protocol is not sufficient for this population and that 
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4.4 Treament Modifications 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this service evaluation to discuss all the treatment 
modifications that would be helpful in this client group and further literature is available 
on this area a number of themes that are present in the literature are evident. Firstly, this 
client group requires a greater number of sessions to benefit from CBT (Russell, et al., 
2013). The family and broader system may need to be involved more heavily and not just 
within the psychoeducation and relapse prevention phases (Reaven, et al., 2012) to help 
with clinical features of ASD e.g. generation difficulties and to help parents delineate ASD 
symptomatology from OCD symptoms. Clinicians may have to alter their interactional 
style to account for interpersonal, imagination difficulties and executive function 
difficulties such as planning associated with the diagnosis. Therapists may want to spend 
more time and focus on psychoeducation especially with regard to delineating thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours and how they influence on another and exploring/ identifying 
emotions as alexithymia has been shown to be elevated in this population (Tani, et al., 
2004). 
 
When completing treatment a number of adaptations surrounding making E/RP 
‘autism friendly’ is helpful e.g. using an individual’s special interest to complete an anxiety 
scale and using more tangible signs of anxiety e.g. physical symptoms, as a gage on how 
anxious the young person is feeling rather than relying on a scale of one to ten where the 
question used is “How worried do you feel right now?”. Similarly, Reaven & Hepburn 
(2003) highlight the importance of adapting the language used with this client group. This 
could include avoiding complex metaphors that involve multiple perspectives, and using 
concrete visual aids during E/RP to promote the young person’s abilities to utilize their 
own resources when facing anxiety provoking situations. The focus of the treatment may 
therefore need to be more behavioural in nature (Lehmkuhl, et al., 2008). Recent research 
has shown that treating anxiety can have an positive effect on the young person’s ASD 
symptomatology as well as their anxiety symptoms (Wood, et al., 2009) suggesting that it 
may be beneficial to broaden the focus of treatment and include outcome measures that 










The current study has a number of limitations. First of all, therapists would have acted 
as raters for treatment outcome potentially biasing the main treatment effect sizes. 
However, while this may have altered the neutrality of the findings this effect is stable 
across both groups so does not undermine the interaction. Secondly, the discrepancy in 
session numbers (although not significant) means that gains made after 14 sessions within 
17 weeks as per the clinic protocol cannot be assessed. Thus, the high response rate in the 
ASD group could be due to increased therapeutic contact. While this is a limitation in the 
findings, it provides further evidence that youth with ASD and OCD require a greater 
length of therapeutic involvement from clinicians to benefit from CBT delivered by experts 
in the field. Previous research protocols have involved CBT interventions between 16 and 
20 sessions in length (Russell, et al., 2013; Storch, et al., 2013) as opposed to 14 seen in 
RCTs for typically developing youth (POTS, 2004) as is the norm for the clinic. It is 
important in the absence of clinical guidelines for commissioners that funding bodies are 
aware of this when negotiating treatment lengths that are going to be effective for this 
client group. 
 
 Additional co-morbid diagnoses were not systematically screened for. In future 
studies it would be important to consider this closer, as depression, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)  and opposition defiant disorder (ODD) all impact on 
response and/or remission rates. Similarly, having at least one or more co-morbid 
psychiatric condition also impacted on end of treatment outcome (Storch et al., 2008). 
Thus, systematic screening of these diagnoses would be particularly helpful in improving 
outcomes and further research is needed to assess whether this is true in the case of 
young people with an ASD as well. 
 
Both groups were statistically equivocal in terms of whether individuals were taking 
an SSRI or not and whether individuals started both pharmacological and CBT treatments 
concurrently. However, as some individuals were not on stable medications during the 
treatment phase, teasing apart the relative contributions of CBT and the SSRI on treatment 
outcome is difficult.  
 
Finally in the absence of follow up data it is unclear whether the gains made during the 
acute phase of treatment would be maintained over a follow-up period. The adult data 
suggests that this population is able to maintain gains it’s gains, but that OCD symptoms 
24
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plateau over a follow-up period (Russell, et al., 2013) and participants do not continue to 
improve and reach remission status. The short term data in youth similarly show no 
additional gains over a short term follow up period of three months (Storch, et al., 2013). 
Further research is needed to clarify a) whether there is a differential in terms of follow-
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5 Service Recommendations 
 
In this section a number of service recommendations will be suggested that may help 
the service manage their ASD+OCD referrals on the basis of the study’s findings: 
 Systematically implementing a well validated screening tool e.g. SCQ 
(Chandler, et al., 2007) for referrals who are likely to have an ASD, prior to 
assessment and at the end of treatment. 
 
 Ensure information from multiple informants’ e.g. teachers, parents and 
clinicians when it is available and spending additional time to obtain 
evidence from such sources if the information is not readily available.   
 
 Prioritize clinician rated measures e.g. the CY-BOCS, which have been 
validated in an ASD population to inform OCD severity in the assessment 
process.  
 
 Use the assessment process as part of the intervention to disentangle ASD 
from OCD symptoms e.g. assessing the presence of obsessions and identifying 
egodystonic beliefs regarding said symptoms. 
 
  Systematically assess for the presence of co-morbid psychiatric disorders 
especially ADHD, ODD and depression, which can impact on treatment 
outcome. 
 
 Discuss with funders about negotiating additional treatment time of up to 20 
sessions for the treatment phase. 
 
 Draw upon treatment manuals in the ASD+OCD literature to develop a 
paediatric ASD+OCD specific intervention so that the team feels confident in 
treating such cases and a consistent protocol driven approach is adopted 
akin to typically developing referrals. Peer supervision and/or training 
within the team may be helpful. 
 
 Once a modified CBT protocol for ASD+OCD has been developed, this should 
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6 Dissemination of Results 
 
The results of this service evaluation were presented to the OCD team on their 
research ‘away day.’ In addition, as part of a symposium chaired by Dr Georgina Krebs, on 
‘obstacles in treating paediatric OCD’, this study was presented at the BABCP conference in 
London, 2013. The findings been submitted to the European Journal of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry and is currently under peer review. The findings were used to 
support the application of a grant for a randomized control trial investigating the 









This service evaluation has provided a space for learning about the intimate 
connection between academic understanding and the development of service provision 
within SLaM. From preparing for ethical approval, collating and analyzing the data and 
finally disseminating the findings to the team and the wider academic community I have 
learned that to contribute to the development of a service provision it is crucial to look at 
the individuals who the current forms of treatment are less efficacious and from there one 
can better a service and the treatments it provides.  
 
This work has given me insights into obtaining routine outcome measures and how 
valuable the data is for bettering services more generally. Without the diligence of the 
team to manage their clinical data efficiently, research like this would not be possible and 
it is only with such data that the evidence-base can be evaluated in clinical settings outside 
the academic arena. When considering the political and economic climate of the last five 
years maintaining and evidencing a services work through robust and well validated 
outcome measures is all the more important. 
 
 Furthermore, this work has highlighted the need for further research in this area as 
the number of well designed studies evaluating treatment efficacy in young people with 
ASD an anxiety disorders is sparse and it is gratifying to think that this piece of work may 
contribute to the clinical and academic communities understanding of working with young 
people with these conditions.  
 
Presenting the work was a challenge and as it was the first time I have presented at a 
major conference so it was naturally anxiety provoking. However, the simultaneous 
satisfaction of sharing a piece of work with an interested and professional audience was 
extremely rewarding. Their questions, comments and reflections on the work guided my 
thinking about not only this work, but the importance of academic and clinical practice 
evolving simultaneously. 
 
With hindsight it would have been helpful to know more about own the young people’s 
ASD symptoms interacted with treatment outcome. Furthermore, analyzing the effects of 
treatment on the young people’s obsessions and compulsions separately would have been 
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interesting to have understood. However, this work has taught me that research is slow 
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